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ABSTRACT  
Post-Apartheid South Africa has been plagued by recurrent and protracted provincial 
boundary disputes since the demarcation of new provinces in 1993. These conflicts have mainly 
opposed the Government and affected communities with high security, economic, social and 
political cost. In many respects, these disputes have threatened the very legitimacy of Local 
Government. However, existing literature exclusively focused on the early Bushbuckridge case. 
Besides, analysis of this first instance of post-apartheid provincial boundary, though very 
enlightening, overemphasized socio-economic factors to account for the border dispute, paying 
little attention to ideological and strategic underpinnings of the clashes. These deficiencies 
particularly came to light when there emerged in 2005 other provincial boundary disputes in 
Khutsong, Matatiele, and Moutse. In the face of such countrywide political phenomena, it became 
clear that early studies of the Bushbuckridge border dispute needed to be complemented in order to 
enrich our understanding of social, economic and political drivers of these territorial conflicts. 
This PhD research distinctively uses a multiple case study approach in order to explain 
post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes. Drawing on interviews, observations and secondary 
materials on the three chosen case studies namely the Bushbuckridge, Khutsong, and Matatiele 
cases, this PhD thesis argues that post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes are complex socio-
political phenomena which can best be accounted for by taking into account various socio-
economic and political factors including the interplay between historically constituted material 
conditions of affected communities and their local notions of democracy and development, 
conflicting regional planning models, Government‟s democratic deficit, strategic political struggles 
and limits of judicial arbitration. Interpreting these cases with the proposed explanatory framework 
clearly demonstrates that under the veneer of provincial boundary disputes, disputants have actually 
been engaging in battles for socio-economic emancipation, in ideological contestations and 
strategic political struggles. Physical provincial frontiers are fought over not because of any 
inherent importance, but mainly because they are represented as proxies for socio-economic 
prosperity and political power. At a time when the current government is still grappling with at least 
two provincial boundary disputes and is contemplating reducing the number of provinces, this 
thesis highlights lessons which should inform future provincial demarcation decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCHING POST-APARTHEID 
PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY DISPUTES 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
This thesis uses a multiple case study approach in explaining provincial boundary 
disputes in post-apartheid South Africa. The latter are recurrent and protracted clashes 
between local communities and post-apartheid Governments over the provincial location of 
affected municipalities. Three case studies are here considered namely the Bushbuckridge, 
Khutsong and Matatiele cases (See map 1.). The thesis outlines a more sophisticated 
interpretation of post-apartheid boundary disputes which highlights the importance of a 
complex combination of material conditions, local notions of democracy and development, 
conflicting regional planning models, Government‟s democratic deficit, strategic political 
struggles, and limits of judicial arbitration in accounting for these political phenomena. 
This explanatory framework clearly shows post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes as 
battles over what disputants perceive as frontiers of socio-economic prosperity and political 
power. This chapter first presents the political challenges raised by post-apartheid 
provincial boundary disputes. It then shows how existing literature has debated these issues 
before elaborating on this thesis‟s original approach, its advantages and the resulting 
argument.  
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Map 1. The three case studies considered in this thesis: Bushbbuckridge, 
Khutsong(Merafong) and Matatiele 
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1.2. Post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes as political 
problems  
 
From the 1993 re-demarcation of new provinces at CODESA, there have been repeated 
clashes between affected local communities and Government. The post-apartheid re-
demarcation of provinces resulted in at least fourteen disputed areas considered in the 
Interim Constitution of 1993 as “affected areas”1. Insurmountable disagreement persisted 
over these areas either among political parties or between the political elite and local 
communities. In leaving these boundaries undecided, the 1993 Interim Constitution 
provided that they could be resolved before the finalisation of the Constitution in 1996. 
Organisation of local referenda was even envisaged as a mechanism of boundary dispute 
resolution (South Africa Interim Constitution, 1993, Article 124). Yet, no such referendum 
had been called for or organised by the 1996 finalisation of the Constitution as the ANC -
led Government preferred party driven political settlements (Griggs, 1998).  
                                               
1 The Interim Constitution of Post-apartheid South Africa left undecided the following boundaries: whether 
Bosbokrand (the area consisting of the Mala district of Gazankulu and the Mapumaleng, district of Lebowa) 
should stay in the provincial territory of Limpopo or should be included in the provincial territory of 
Mpumalanga; the continued inclusion of the District of Namaqualand in the provincial territory of the 
Northern Cape, or its inclusion in the provincial territory of the Western Cape; the continued inclusion of 
District Groblersdal in the provincial territory of Mpumalanga or its inclusion in the provincial territory of 
Limpopo; whether Northern Transkei/Pondoland should stay in the provincial territory of Eastern Cape or be 
included in the provincial territory of KwaZulu-Natal; the continued inclusion of Umzimkulu of Transkei in 
the provincial territory of Eastern Cape or its inclusion in the provincial territory of KwaZulu-Natal ; whether 
Pretoria should stay in the provincial territory of Gauteng or should be included in Mpumalanga; the 
continued existence of Eastern Cape as one province or its division into two separate provinces; the continued 
existence of Northern Cape as a separate province or its discontinuance as a separate province; whether the 
area for which the “KwaNdebele legislative authority has been instituted” should stay in the provincial 
territory of Mpumalanga or should be included in Gauteng; the continued inclusion of the district of 
Sasolburg in the provincial territory of Orange Free State or its inclusion in the provincial territory of 
Gauteng; the continued inclusion of the area consisting of the districts of Clanwilliam, Vredendal and Van 
Rhynsdorp in the provincial territory of the Western Cape or its inclusion in the provincial territory of 
Northern Cape; whether Gauteng should exclude Odi and Moretele portions of Bophuthatswana; whether 
KwaZulu-Natal should include Mount Currie; and finally whether Northern Cape should include Kuruman, 
Postmasburg and Hartswater (Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, Article 124). See 
map 2 for a visualisation of the geographical location of these disputes.  
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The prevalence of party political negotiations as a mechanism of boundary disputes 
resolution proved to be a source of even more complications as factions within the ruling 
ANC or the tripartite alliance supported conflicting boundary arrangements. The protracted 
border dispute in Bushbuckridge was such a case of prolonged conflict as a result of “party 
political boundary demarcation” (Griggs, 1998). The conflict has been described as “the 
first revolt of a black community against a post-apartheid Government” (Niehaus, 2006). 
The community conflicted with the ANC-led Government on whether the locality should 
be demarcated in Limpopo or in Mpumalanga. It was clear that the overwhelming majority 
of residents preferred Mpumalanga as it was perceived to be geographically closer to the 
people. From 1996 to 1998, Bushbuckridge was involved in protest, negotiations and a 
Court challenge against the South African Government while it endured detrimental service 
delivery backlogs as a result of its undetermined provincial identity. By 1998, the 
Bushbuckridge dispute had run for four years, had left the community under-serviced and 
destructive protest had caused at least R40 million worth of damage (Griggs, 1998; Narsiah 
and Maharaj, 1999). Four deaths were directly caused by public violence that characterised 
the border conflict (Niehaus, 2005, p. 103). When the ANC party political settlement of the 
crisis framed the solution as residing in the provincial exchange between Bushbuckridge 
(Limpopo) and Groblersdal (Mpumalanga), the NP aligned white community of 
Groblersdal vehemently opposed such horse-trading that would have seen their locality 
transferred to Limpopo. In a last resort move to have the Government adhere to its 
promises, the Bushbuckridge Border Crisis Committee (BBCC) unsuccessfully took the 
State to the High Court of Pretoria in 1998.  
 15 
The Matatiele provincial boundary dispute erupted as the town was moved from 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) to Eastern Cape (EC) in late 2005. An overwhelming majority of 
residents had unsuccessfully tried to oppose the change through representations and protest. 
However, the community was intensely polarised as a minority group driven by ANC 
councillors and traditional chiefs supported inclusion of the area into the EC. These 
divisions have sometimes escalated into violent confrontations. They have also 
compromised service delivery.  The conflict has run over more than four years (late 2005 – 
2010) during which dissenting residents have brought three Constitutional Court challenges 
against Government with little success. Following a 2006 Court ruling, Government was 
forced to rerun a very laborious legislative process to correct defects with the initial 
Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005 and the related cross boundary repeal act, but 
in October 2007, it confirmed the contested boundary decision, thus prolonging the conflict 
with dissenting residents and internal community antagonism. In one instance of 
community unrest, a fight broke out on 16 October 2008 between supporters of KZN and 
proponents of EC who were holding a march allegedly with the municipality logistical 
support in celebration of the first anniversary of the inclusion of the town of Matatiele in 
EC. Subsequent to the violent confrontation, shops were burned or looted. A few people 
were injured and the police made arrests in a bid to reassert law and order.  
The Khutsong provincial boundary dispute is remembered as the most violent. 
Following the move of the Merafong municipality from Gauteng to North West in late 
2005, it quickly assumed national and international notoriety for the high level of 
disruption and public violence which residents of the township unleashed against 
Government officials, public infrastructure and any third party suspected of supporting the 
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contested policy.  The stand-off lasted for three years (late 2005- 2009) with huge security, 
economic and socio-political calamities: more than one hundred and fifty arrests, destroyed 
public infrastructure, vandalised private properties including houses of councillors who 
were forced to flee outside the township, and disrupted schooling. Residents‟ recourse to 
the Constitutional Court did not help to chart a favourable outcome. In 2009, however, due 
to the emergence of a new ANC leadership and electoral opportunism, the policy was 
reversed. Another laborious and fast tracked legislative process was put in motion to effect 
the change. 
Moutse residents have also been contesting the transfer of their area from Mpumalanga 
to Limpopo as a result of the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005 and the Cross-
Boundary laws Repeal Act of 2005. During the 1970s and 1980s, the area had been 
transferred from South Africa to Lebowa, from Lebowa to KwaNdebele, and back to South 
Africa as a result of apartheid regional policies
2
. These transfers happened against the 
wishes of the affected residents and were accompanied by civil unrest. In 1993, Moutse 
was listed as an affected area which could call for a referendum to decide whether it wanted 
to be incorporated in Mpumalanga or in Gauteng. At that time, Moutse residents wanted to 
be incorporated in Gauteng
3
. Following the negotiations with the ANC-led Government, 
Moutse residents did not make use of the referendum provision and accepted to be serviced 
by Mpumalanga. In 1998, Moutse became part of a cross boundary district municipality 
called Sekhukhune. It constituted the section of the municipality that was serviced by 
Mpumalanga whereas the remainder of the municipality was administered by Limpopo. 
                                               
2 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Moutse Demarcation Forum and Others v President of theRepublic of 
South Africa and Others, 2008, CCT40/2008, Applicants’ written argument.  
3 Ibidem  
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When cross boundary municipalities were discontinued in 2005, Government decided to 
incorporate Moutse in Limpopo against the wishes of the inhabitants of the area.     
In 2008, the Moutse Demarcaton Forum followed the footsteps of the people of 
Merafong and Matatiele in launching an attack on the constitutionality of the Constitution 
Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005 and the Cross Boundary Repeal Act of 2005. The Forum 
argues that the Mpumalanga provincial legislature failed to facilitate public involvement of 
the residents of Moutse in the legislative process. They also allege that the decision to 
incorporate Moutse in Limpopo is irrational. Applicants‟ argument cites extensively 
previous similar Court cases such as the Doctors For Life International, the Matatiele and 
Merafong cases. The uniqueness of this case lies in the fact that the Court case has been 
running concurrently with efforts of a newly appointed Minister of Provincial and Local 
Government to “resolve the matter extra-curially”4 by organizing fresh consultation with 
residents of Moutse. The Court has yet to make a ruling on the quality of public 
participation that had taken place prior to the adoption of the challenged Acts and on 
whether Government‟s decision to exclude Moutse from Mpumalanga is rational.  
Balfour, a town situated in Dipaleseng local municipality in the Mpumalanga province 
has been pushing for its incorporation in Gauteng. The area has been the site of recurrent 
violent protests driven by a multiplicity of grievances including poor service delivery, the 
mining industry‟s insufficient local labour force, local governance issues, and incorporation 
into Gauteng. Senior politicians including President Zuma visited the town in 2009 and 
2010 in order either to quell civil unrest or to secure votes in 2009 general elections and 
2011 local elections. They promised to attend to residents‟ concerns and transform Balfour 
                                               
4 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Moutse Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others, 2008, CCT40/2008, Submission on behalf of the second respondent, 6 May 2009  
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into “a model municipality”5. At a media briefing on 24 March 2011, Gauteng Local 
Government MEC Humphrey Mmemezi solemnly declared: "We intend taking Balfour to 
Gauteng. The people of Balfour have long wanted to come to Gauteng. They believe we are 
delivering services to the people."
6
 Whether and when such intention will materialise is 
difficult to predict. There isn‟t at this stage any legislative step taken towards transferring 
Balfour from Mpumalanga to Gauteng.  
Finally, Ga-Ba-Mothibi community has been contesting its incorporation in the North 
West province and wants to be transferred to the Northern Cape Province. As in the cases 
of Matatiele and Moutse, a polling process took place in the area to determine the views of 
the residents with regards to the provincial demarcation. On 4 March 2010, the residents of 
Ga-Ba-Mothibi joined the inhabitants of Moutse and Matatiele in a protest action aimed at 
ensuring that the ANC made public the outcome of polls on residents‟ provincial 
preferences and fast-tracked the necessary legislative measures to move affected 
communities in their preferred provinces. As for Matatiele, Moutse, Balfour, the Ga-Ba-
Mothibi community continues to wait to be included in the Northern Cape province. 
In some other areas, dissatisfaction about provincial boundaries has not yet found 
political expression. It is thus possible that certain currently silent communities will come 
to vocally contest their provincial location. Besides, the ANC plan to reduce the number of 
provinces
7
, if implemented, may spark a new cycle of provincial boundary disputes across 
the country.  
                                               
5 Nhlabathi, H. Balfour residents lose hope, Mail & Guardian Online 27 March 2011, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-03-27-balfour-residents-lose-hope, accessed on 17 August 2011. 
6 SAPA, Balfour to be incorporated into Gauteng, 24 March 2011, 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Balfour-to-be-incorporated-into-Gauteng-20110324, accessed on 
17 August 2011. 
7 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/ANC-parks-discussion-on-provinces-20100923 ,accessed on 
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Map 2.  Disputed boundaries left undecided in the 1993 Interim Constitution 
 
                                                                                                                                               
01 February 2011; http://www.timeslive.co.za/Politics/article674048.ece/ANC-to-decide-on-provinces 
within-three-months , accessed on 01 February 2011. 
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Many post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes have erupted as a result of the 
disestablishment of cross boundary municipalities in late 2005. It is thus important to 
outline the context in which this municipal category was established and later withdrawn.  
The status of cross boundary municipality attributed to sixteen municipalities 
including Merafong, Bushbuckridge, and Moutse was “an unintended consequence of the 
extended municipal demarcation of 2000, which reduced South Africa‟s municipalities 
from 843 to 284” (Moodley and Mckenzie, 2005, p. 36). It was also a way to allay 
community dissent on the 1993 demarcation of provinces. A cross boundary municipality 
was envisaged as an area where communities existing in adjoined provinces were “so 
closely linked and socially and economically interdependent that the establishment of a 
single functional municipality will require the determination of  a municipal boundary 
across the provincial boundary in question” (The Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Second Amendment Act, 1998). However, it soon became clear that cross boundary 
municipalities posed intractable administrative and service delivery complications that 
contributed a great deal to their poor performance. As a result, major services such as 
health services, provincial housing, public works, regional planning and development, road 
traffic regulations, vehicle licences and welfare services were discharged in an 
uncoordinated manner.  
In 2005, the then Minister of provincial and Local Government, Sydney Mufamadi, 
explained the complexity posed by cross boundary municipalities in these terms:  
Many provinces have different legislation for similar functions and if the laws of 
more than one province need to be administered in a cross-boundary municipality, it 
is confusing, duplicative and costly. For instance, a cross-boundary municipality 
needs to have its Integrated Development Plan (IDP) approved by both affected 
provinces, and integrating programmes and budgets for different provinces into a 
single IDP can prove impossible. This is an administrative nightmare and it leads to 
 21 
service delivery being compromised, with cross-boundary municipalities featuring 
prominently among those municipalities discharging less than 30% of their assigned 
powers and functions (Moodley and Mckenzie, 2005, p. 36).  
 
To ease service delivery in the affected municipalities, the Department of Provincial 
and Local Government undertook, in line with a 2002 presidential coordinating council 
decision, to re-demarcate cross boundary municipalities in such a way that they would fall 
entirely in one province. The decision had to affect sixteen cross boundary municipalities 
and six provinces namely Gauteng, North West, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal. This also required an amendment to the Constitution as well as an act 
repealing the cross boundary municipalities‟ laws. The process would implicate the 
Municipal Demarcation Board which is the independent board constitutionally empowered 
with the task of demarcating municipalities and delimiting wards.  Getting rid of cross 
boundary municipalities thus put in motion two different and overlapping processes, 
namely the municipal demarcation procedure of demarcating municipalities and the 
national legislative process of re-determining provincial boundaries. In line with Articles 
74 and 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, affected provinces were 
required to approve the Bills and the public was to be involved in the legislative process. 
How, though, has existing literature explained post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes? 
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1.3. Existing literature on post-apartheid provincial boundary 
disputes 
 
Only early episodes of the Bushbuckridge provincial boundary dispute have attracted 
sustained scholarly attention
8
. To explain the Bushbuckridge “border dissent”, scholars have 
stressed economic and developmental factors. Sagie Narsiah and Brij Maharaj have 
contended that “the struggle of the people of BBR is rooted in the material conditions of their 
existence. (…) The struggle of the people of BBR is to re-define provincial borders so that 
their material conditions could be addressed” (Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999, p. 51). In the same 
vein, Ramutsindela and Simon have argued that “the dispute is not only about the boundary 
in question but also about opportunities and constraints offered by the process of 
transformation” (Ramutsindela and Simon, 1999, p. 479). Development prospects are 
perceived to be brighter in Mpumalanga that BBR demands to be dissociated from its 
linguistic group in Limpopo. Towns that are economically prospering under the post-
apartheid dispensation such as Hoedspruit have not contested their demarcation into 
Limpopo. For this particular reason, Narsiah and Maharaj insist that the key to explaining 
dissent of local communities “is not what they are, but how they are” (Narsiah and Maharaj, 
1999, p. 43). Poor service delivery in Limpopo and anticipated improvement of the situation 
in the preferred Mpumalanga relates to the same concern for improved material conditions 
                                               
8 Three published studies have been devoted to analysing the Bushbuckridge boundary conflict from its 
eruption to the court action in 1998. These are: Ramutsindela and Simon, 1999; Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999; 
and Niehaus, 2005. 
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(Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999, p. 43) This materialistic explanation, as this thesis will later 
argue, overshadows other equally powerful determinants of this conflict.  
Scholars of BBR “border dissent” also mention, though in a peripheral manner, 
residents‟ reliance on the promises of nascent democracy. BBR residents held to their right to 
democratically participate in the definition of their geographical identity. Claims to 
democratically decide their province were often formulated as a call for direct democracy, for 
regional self determination or even for the establishment of an independent “People‟s 
Republic of Bushbuckridge” especially after the Court failure in October 1998 (Narsiah and 
Maharaj, 1999, pp. 45-47). 
This drive for a more democratic regional planning paradigm was resisted by the post-
apartheid Government which insisted on the unitary and centralised nature of the South 
African State. The ANC Government opposed resolving boundary disputes through referenda 
as the latter could cause instability or costly financial and logistical strains. For scholars of 
the Bushbuckridge provincial boundary dispute, the fundamental reason may be the 
uncontrollable devolution of power to local communities and its consequences. It is clear 
that:  
Reference by the ANC to the internal borders as unnecessary in a “unitary” state is a 
reminder that the ANC-led Government is still concerned about the nature of the state. 
Any „behaviour‟ such as the claims of residents of Bushbuckridge, which appear to be 
undermining „unitarist notions‟, is dismissed as politically irrelevant (Ramutsindela 
and Simon, 1999, p. 498).  
 
For Griggs, the root cause of protracted and costly post-apartheid boundary disputes is 
actually the abandonment of local referenda and the prevalence of what he calls “party 
political boundary demarcation” as a mechanism of boundary definition. In his disapproval 
of the ruling party ANC-led negotiations over contested boundaries, Griggs argues that 
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“support of referenda to resolve boundary disputes suggests an interest in moving the entire 
South African polity toward a system of more direct democracy and community 
empowerment” (Griggs, 1998). 
In their account of the Bushbuckridge saga, Ramutsindela and Simon also mention the 
important role played by personal interests of politicians at provincial and national level and 
how this compounded the conflict. The possible transfer of Bushbuckridge into Mpumalanga 
evoked crucial political consequences such as the deduction of at least two seats in the 
Limpopo provincial legislature, the increase of NP representation in the National Council of 
Provinces, erosion of a political base for Bushbuckridge based national MPs and 
representation of traditional chiefs in the House of Traditional Leaders in Limpopo 
(Ramutsindela and Simon, 1999, pp. 493-494). They suggest that politicians‟ careers were at 
stake as the Premier Ramatlhodi honestly put it: “So if we do not manage the process of 
implementation [transfer of areas] in a way that would protect us for a period and protect all 
the sitting MPs for a period then there would be a problem because some people among us 
here or in Cape Town would have to vacate their seats” (Hansard, 1994, col. 45). This factor 
goes a long way to explaining the horse-trading that conditioned the transfer of 
Bushbuckridge on the incorporation of Groblersdal into Limpopo, which residents of 
Groblersdal vehemently resisted. It also helps to understand why the Bill for the transfer of 
Bushbuckridge was never debated in 1996 parliamentary session as the Constitution was 
being finalised (Ramutsindela and Simon, 1999, p. 494).  
Even restructuring of metropolitan Local Government during the transition period was 
fraught with intense disputes often among competing political parties. These conflicts over 
metropolitan boundaries have been studied by Cameron, Mabin and Pillay (Cameron, 1999). 
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Cameron has contended that “boundary demarcation was arguably the most heated and 
controversial part of the entire Local Government democratisation process” (Cameron, 1999, 
p. 1). However, as will transpire in the course of this thesis, provincial boundary disputes 
have, in many respects displayed different socio-political dynamics from those observed in 
the process of demarcation of metropolitan boundaries. What are the limitations of the 
existing literature on post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes? How does this thesis 
intend to enrich the scholarship on regional planning and provincial boundary disputes in 
post-apartheid South Africa? 
 
1.4. Unique contribution of this thesis 
 
 While existing literature on post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes has been 
single case oriented
9
, this thesis adopts a multiple case study approach to explaining post-
apartheid boundary disputes. Given the recurrence and the cost of provincial border conflicts 
in the post-apartheid era, a single case research design is less conducive to the emergence of 
a holistic understanding of the relevant social, economic and political dynamics at work in 
these disputes. Besides, the two high profile cases of Khutsong and Matatiele have not 
constituted the subject of a sustained social scientific investigation. A critical analysis of the 
three case studies which this thesis undertakes embodies the added value of tracking common 
threads, identifying systemic and structural problems, and discussing the uniqueness or the 
replication of some of the dynamics found in a particular case of provincial boundary 
                                               
9 Until 1999, scholars‟ interest has uniquely focused on the Bushbuckridge case: Ramutsindela and Simon, 
1999; Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999; and Niehaus, 2005.  
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contestation. Lessons emerging from such multiple case study research design are more 
solidly grounded than if they only transpired from the single Bushbuckridge case study.  
Based on such methodological difference, this thesis contends that post-apartheid 
provincial boundary disputes have proven to be complex political phenomena whose 
intelligibility passes through taking into account the interplay between material conditions of 
affected communities and their conceptions of democratic governance and local 
development, the conflict between Government‟s functional regional planning model and 
people‟s territorial regional planning demands, Government‟s democratic deficit, strategic 
political struggles at various levels of governance, and limits of judicial arbitration. Analysed 
within this proposed framework, post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes appear as 
battles not over physical provincial lines, but over frontiers of socio-economic prosperity and 
political power. Let us elaborate on key elements of this argument.   
First, this thesis emphasises the interplay between material conditions and local 
notions of democracy and development as determinants of boundary disputes where previous 
research has stressed materialistic explanation of this phenomenon. “It has been the 
contention of this paper that the struggle of the people of BBR (Bushbuckridge) is rooted in 
the material conditions of their existence”, state Narsiah and Maharaj (1999, p. 51). They 
further elaborate: “the dispute in Bushbuckridge concerns the struggle of a community to 
access resources, to have their basic needs satisfied…” (Ibid., p. 40). The class dimension is 
coupled with a racial dimension as expressed by the contrasting of Bushbuckridge and a 
neighbouring town Hoedspruit:  
While the people of BBR languish in a spiral of underdevelopment, the white 
component of the area, Hoedspruit, continues to reap the fruits of a democratic 
dispensation in the form of increased tourism and development… Significantly, 
 27 
Hoedspruit is not lobbying to be included in Mpumalanga and is content to be part 
of the Northern Province (Ibid., p. 43).  
 
For these scholars, to understand local communities‟ reaction to unpopular demarcation 
decisions, the analyst should look at how they are rather than what they are.  
This emphasis on the material conditions of local communities as the key 
determinant of their dissent overshadows the ideological setting that has characterised these 
disputes. The Khutsong and Matatiele cases further highlight the importance of both material 
conditions and ideological discourses of popular democracy and local development in 
resisting Government imposed provincial arrangement. This thesis does not find it relevant to 
decide which determinant has priority between material conditions and ideology. Whereas 
Marxists would favour a materialistic explanation of the type developed in the above 
mentioned statements and idealists would profess the priority of residents‟ notions of 
democracy and local development, this thesis rather puts emphasis on the interplay between 
residents‟ material conditions and their conceptions of democracy, social justice and 
development. How people interpret their economic prospects and their social and political 
rights in the new South Africa is important in shaping their regional preferences and their 
actions or reactions with regard to provincial demarcation decisions.  
Second, this thesis argues that the conflict between Government‟s predominantly 
functional regional planning approach and communities‟ territorial regional planning model 
constitutes one of the main determinants of the clashes. Narsiah and Maharaj allude to this 
conflict of regional planning paradigms as “competing meanings of territoriality” (1999). The 
functional regional planning paradigm conceives regions as nodes in a larger network of units 
whose interactions are driven and designed from a few centres of power. Functional 
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explanations of regional planning often claim universal validity and are presented as neutral 
and scientific. However, the territorial regional planning model emphasizes the involvement 
of the people of a region in the planning process and the construction of planning measures in 
a way to meet local needs and to promote equity and a general improvement in the quality of 
life for all the people in the area. This model approaches the geographical area as a territory 
and recommends that planning be undertaken in a manner that gives priority to “territorial 
interests”. The literature on regional planning widely discusses the merits and demerits of 
functional and territorial regional planning models (Gore, 1984). While some scholars 
consider these two approaches to be fundamentally antithetic, other scholars think that they 
are not mutually exclusive. Yet, there is little demonstration of ways in which these two 
planning paradigms can be reconciled or combined in developing and implementing regional 
policies. Scholars of South African regional planning agree that functional planning has 
predominantly shaped regional policies both during and after apartheid (Ramutsindela and 
Simon, 1998; Narsiah .and Maharaj, 1999).  
However, a closer examination of the South African legislation pertaining to 
regional demarcation reveals that a form of territorial planning is enshrined in the 
Constitution and other related statutes. The Constitution guarantees provincial territorial 
integrity to provinces in such a way that a province has the power to veto any national 
legislation that envisages altering its powers, functions or boundaries (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, Article 74). Besides, provinces are constitutionally bound to 
consult with the people prior to any approval or disapproval of a national regional policy 
affecting them (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Article 118). Dissenting 
residents in border disputes areas have advocated a form of territorial regional planning 
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approach to provincial boundary demarcation. This in-depth study of three case studies of 
provincial boundary disputes will enrich this debate by outlining ways in which post-
apartheid South African State has been grappling with these two apparently conflicting 
approaches to regional planning. This thesis will show the tensions that arise from the clash 
of these two models and how these inherent difficulties are being handled in the post-
apartheid South African context.  
Third, while existing scholarship on the Bushbuckridge saga has referred to 
democratic deficit as one of the drivers of residents‟ resistance to State regional policy, this 
thesis deepens the investigation by pointing to conflicting conceptions of sovereignty as a 
key cause of recurrent provincial border clashes. Accounting for the “border dissent” in 
Bushbuckridge, Narsiah and Maharaj identified grassroots call for democracy as a key 
determinant of residents‟ resistance: “South Africa is a new democratic dispensation and it is 
important to the laity that decisions which are perceived to impact directly on their lives be 
infused with democratic content”. (Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999, p. 40). Hence, residents‟ 
negotiations with the ANC-led Government were marked by “eloquent enunciations of the 
right of the people to determine their own destiny” (Ibid., p. 45). They regarded their demand 
for inclusion in Mpumalanga as a basic right in a democratic society: “Why not let us go to 
Mpumalanga? This is a new South Africa where people should exercise their rights. In the 
past we were forced to be part of Gazankulu” (Ramutsindela and Simon, 1999, p. 487). 
Griggs‟ general discussion of “the security costs of party political demarcations” in South 
Africa laments over the prevalence of party political demarcation and considers it as the main 
reason behind costly and national security threatening boundary disputes. He sees in the use 
of referenda a better mechanism for boundary demarcation or boundary dispute resolution as 
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can be read in this statement: “support of referenda to resolve boundary disputes suggests an 
interest in moving the entire South African polity towards a system of more direct democracy 
and community empowerment” (Griggs, 1998). In deepening our understanding of the nature 
of the democratic deficit reflected in post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes, this thesis 
identifies two conflicting conceptions of sovereignty held by affected residents and the ruling 
elite. As this thesis will later show, the ruling elite sticks to a representative conception of 
democracy whereas residents push for direct democracy in line with the Freedom Charter 
clause “people shall govern”. This conceptual tension is more evident in how each camp 
interprets the nature and scope of public participation in legislative processes. This thesis 
argues that this profound conflict between popular sovereignty and state sovereignty greatly 
accounts for the recurrence and protracted character of provincial boundary disputes in the 
post-apartheid era.  
Fourth, this research also argues that post-apartheid boundary disputes reflect 
strategic political struggles at local, provincial and national levels which partly account for 
the protracted and confrontational character of these conflicts. These battles are now 
predominantly internal to the ruling ANC in contrast to the 1993 process of delimitation of 
provinces and the demarcation of metropolitan Local Government when contestations of 
boundaries rather involved all major political parties. In his seminal work on regional 
planning theories, Charles Gore concludes by affirming the political contingency of regional 
policies. He further argues that “the adoption of regional policies and their specific nature can 
only be understood by analyzing how the conflicting interests of various social groups within 
a country are mediated through the institutional apparatus of state” (Gore, 1984, p. 259). He 
then calls for social scientists to contribute to the development of such knowledge. This 
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thesis as a whole can be seen as a response to fill this gap as far as post-apartheid 
demarcation policies are concerned. In critically discussing the three cases of provincial 
boundary disputes, this thesis will in a way “theorize the space-time constitution of sectional 
interests, power relations, and political struggles … which influence policy” (Gore, 1984, p. 
260) and counter-policy. As it will later transpire, the Bushbuckridge, Khutsong and 
Matatiele demarcation decisions and their Amendments have been the sites of intense 
political contestations among various interest groups, including ANC councillors, traditional 
authorities, local business associations and ruling elites at local, provincial and national 
levels. And the balance of power among competing interest groups has significantly 
determined which policy decision prevails. 
Contrary to existing literature on the Bushbuckridge case, this thesis approaches 
regional planning as a strategic and contested terrain. For that reason, this thesis shows how 
strategic political struggles have always interfered with provincial demarcation policies and 
have contributed a great deal in sparking and intensifying conflicts. The term “strategic” 
refers, in line with the German philosopher Habermas communication theory, to conscious 
manipulation of information or procedures in a bid to promote hidden partisan or egoistic 
interests. This contrasts clearly with sincere and open social interactions aimed at reaching 
the best possible outcome for the stakeholders or for the society at large (Habermas, 1987).  
 Existing literature on border disputes (Ramutsindela and Simon, 1999; Narsiah and 
Maharaj, 1998; Griggs, 1998) does not generally construct such conflicts as fundamentally 
strategic struggles. Even in unveiling the logic of deceit, broken promises and voluntary 
delay in the management of border dissent, these accounts do not include and investigate the 
crucial hypothesis that some State institutions or public officials may, from the very start of 
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the demarcation process or the boundary dispute resolution process, be driven by partisan 
interests and hidden agendas to be secured through specific strategies. Whether such pre-
existing interests have predetermined the State‟s position throughout the dispute has not been 
investigated. Besides, demarcation and dispute resolution have been widely presented as a 
primary task of the Government rather than a joint endeavour between the State and the 
public. Moreover, eruption of conflicts in the process of demarcation has been considered as 
abnormal or pathological. Many accounts have imagined smoother processes of demarcation 
by improving the involvement of citizens or letting local residents directly decide through 
such mechanisms as local referenda. Griggs for example has attributed boundary disputes “to 
the dominance of spatial decision-making by political party negotiations” and has contended 
that “the use of referenda from 1994 could have by passed all the major problems that 
characterised both the creation of the provinces and the attempts to resolve ongoing disputes. 
Referenda, however, are not neutral objects in the construction of bounded spaces. They 
break the coalition of politicians against public access to the decision-making process and 
hence could play a role in building a culture of grassroots democracy in South Africa” 
(Griggs, 1998).  These views in the literature have raised expectations that demarcation can 
be a “straightforward” (Narsiah and Maharaj, 1998, p. 48) or linear process. Besides, as the 
demarcation and dispute resolution process is dominantly constructed as State monopoly, 
local communities have been depicted as reactionary to State decisions and as largely at the 
mercy of politicians. Bushbuckridge residents have been, for instance, presented as victims 
of false promises by politicians. It is as if they were doomed to lose the battle as suggested in 
the following lines: “where there has been conflict between community desires and national 
goals, community participation has tended to be overridden. In this context, the wishes of the 
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people of Bushbuckridge to be re-incorporated into Mpumalanga were not met, mainly 
because they were seen to be contrary to decisions that have been taken at provincial and 
national levels, including those taken at the highest level of the ANC” (Ramutsindela and 
Simon, 1999, p. 498). Such emphasis on the power of the State has failed to establish the 
local community concerned as a real actor, a serious challenger whose deeds and attitudes 
have a bearing in the final outcome of the process. This thesis moves away from the 
abovementioned limitations. Territorial demarcation and disputes are constructed from the 
outset as strategic struggles that can only be satisfactorily accounted for in unveiling partisan 
interests, hidden agendas and covert strategies aimed at securing a specific outcome.  
The multiple case study approach and the resultant argument have emerged from a 
fundamental research question which can be formulated as follows: How does one explain 
recurrent and protracted conflicts between the post-apartheid Government and local 
communities over provincial boundaries? In order to operationalise the research question, the 
research narrows its focus on what disputants see at stake in the conflict and what strategies 
they develop to advance their respective cause. On one hand, the research question asks: 
what is at stake in a specific boundary dispute? Is it about ethnicity? Is it about the very 
nature of the State (unitary or federal)? Is it a reflection of the structural conflict between the 
representative and the participatory aspect of the South African democratic system? Is it 
about grassroots calls for direct democracy? Is it mainly about economic concerns or about 
“emotional attachments” to a province? On the other hand, the research investigates 
disputants‟ strategies. In this regard, this research asks: what has each disputant done to 
secure a particular outcome? How is the Constitution being used in both sides of the 
spectrum either in order to claim a constitutional right to a provincial location or in order to 
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resist local communities‟ preferences? To what extent is the clash fuelled or shaped by 
internecine party or alliance divisions? Has the conflict been exacerbated by “political 
manoeuvring” or “politicking” led by personal or group interests? 
In exploring these questions, this research project aims at developing a socio-
political explanation of post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes, at critically discussing 
key factors that drive the resistance of local communities to the State, at critically accounting 
for various strategies mobilized by disputants in order to advance their cause, and at 
identifying broad socio-political issues raised by post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes.  
In this way, this study‟s investigation responds to Gore‟s recommendation that any 
interpretation of regional planning strategies and practices must “analyze the different 
sectional interests in society, the ways in which these interests are mobilized into political 
organizations and represented within the institutions of the state, and the ways in which 
resistance to particular policies is organized, and repressed” (Gore, 1984, p. 248). 
 
1.5. Methodology 
 
A study of provincial boundary disputes can be approached from various theoretical 
perspectives. It may be studied from a regional planning perspective, from a regional 
economics standpoint or from a development planning theoretical approach. This research 
takes a classic political science approach into this question. It addresses the problem of 
provincial boundary disputes from political science theories of social conflict and power 
contestation. Unlike previous scholarly studies on existing literature on the Bushbuckridge 
provincial boundary dispute, this thesis approaches territorial demarcation and provincial 
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boundary disputes from the theoretical assumptions that they are contentious matters, conflict 
ridden practices and thus strategic terrains.  
While previous research on this problem has been single case orientated, this thesis 
adopts a multiple case study research design for advantages that are outlined below. As one 
would tell from the type of research questions, this study is of qualitative orientation. It is 
designed around three case studies of post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes. These are 
the Bushbuckridge, Khutsong and Matatiele cases. A multiple case study approach is better 
suited to deepen our understanding of socio-political dynamics at play in post-apartheid 
South Africa. It has among other merits the advantage of highlighting commonalities, 
particularities and structural issues. The choice of case studies is purposive. The chosen case 
studies have constituted the most prominent instances of provincial boundary disputes in 
recent times. Though there will be scope for comparison among case studies, the primary 
purpose of exploring multiple case studies is not to provide a basis for comparative 
discourse, but to use them as mirrors that reflect broad socio-political dynamics at play in 
South Africa‟s post-apartheid politics. This study approaches the three case studies as a 
platform that allows deeper debate on post-apartheid politics. 
It is acknowledged that the preferred multiple case study approach may limit the 
scope or depth of issues to be discussed in each specific instance of provincial boundary 
dispute, especially when the issue is not central to the objectives pursued in this study. A 
single case study approach would potentially have allowed more depth in accounting for a 
specific instance of provincial boundary dispute. However, it would have deprived us the 
opportunity to identify commonalities and specificities as well as the latitude to engage the 
broader national politics. Since this thesis is primarily interested in providing an explanatory 
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framework to the problem of provincial boundary disputes in identifying and analysing key 
drivers of these conflicts across the three case studies, certain peripheral issues such as the 
politics of patronage, local processes of mobilisation for protests, the specific interests of 
traditional authorities, references to cultures or history will be raised, but not necessarily 
pursued in an exhaustive manner. This limitation will make sure the thesis remains focused.      
It is important to note that border conflicts did not run simultaneously in the three 
chosen areas. By the time the dispute erupted in Khutsong and in Matatiele in late 2005, the 
Bushbuckridge conflict was over. In fact, the piece of legislation that ended the provincial 
boundary dispute in Bushbuckridge is the same that sparked contestations in Khutsong, in 
Matatiele, and in Moutse. By March 2009, the Khutsong provincial boundary dispute was 
resolved, but the Matatiele one was far from being addressed. Despite such temporal 
differences, these case studies can still be discussed together as instances of post-apartheid 
provincial boundary disputes and have the potential to unveil broader structural socio-
political problems. Besides, these three areas fell within six provinces namely Gauteng, 
North West, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. The decision to 
disestablish each of these areas as a cross boundary municipality had to obtain approval from 
the two provinces it straddled across. This meant that each of these six provinces was 
implicated in a provincial boundary dispute. So, a research design around three case studies 
implicating six provincial Governments and the national Government has the potential to cast 
a more solidly grounded image of the country‟s socio-political climate.  
Data have been obtained through semi-structured in-depth interviews, focus groups, 
observation and use of existing secondary materials. The author, with the help of research 
assistants, has conducted interviews and focus groups meetings in various cities and towns 
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where informants could be found
10
. The author also made use of direct observation in 
attending a public hearing session in Carletonville, an ANC election rally in Khutsong, and 
many sessions of the portfolio committee on provincial and cooperative governance in 
Gauteng. Visits to the three areas also provided first-hand information on the area, its 
inhabitants and the nature of the provincial boundary dispute. A great deal of insight has been 
garnered from Court materials, newspaper reports, written submissions to legislative bodies, 
and various memoranda and statements. 
Since this study‟s research design is purposefully not ethnographical, the thesis does 
not aim to capture the lived experiences of individual actors with regards to the boundary 
dispute nor does it primarily seek to account for the significance of provincial boundaries in 
the everyday life of specific individuals in the affected communities. These are interesting 
research questions that would be best investigated through ethnographic research design. 
However, these questions remain beyond the scope of the present research whose main 
methods of data collection have been interviews, focus group discussions and official 
documents.       
Informants have fallen within these categories: members of provincial legislatures, 
officials of the Department of Provincial and Co-operative Governance, traditional 
authorities in Matatiele and in Bushbuckridge, councillors, members of the tripartite alliance 
(ANC, COSATU and SACP), members of opposition political parties, members of the 
Municipal Demarcation Board, activists in anti-demarcation organizations, teachers, traders, 
and taxi associations. A full list of interviews conducted for the purpose of this research is 
provided in the appendix 1. Selection of interviewees was dictated by the need to get first 
                                               
10Towns and cities where interviews and focus groups meetings were conducted  include: Johannesburg 
(Gauteng), Mafikeng (North West), Carletonville (Merafong), Khutsong (Merafong), Newcastle(KZN), 
Matatiele, Maluti, Bushbuckridge, Hazyview. More details are provided in the Appendix 1.  
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hand information from actors directly or indirectly involved in provincial boundary disputes 
on both sides of the spectrum. Being qualitative in its design, this research did not aim at 
speaking to a representative sample of affected residents and officials. However, as much as 
the study has pursued in-depth understanding of issues, it has also striven to listen to as much 
diverse opinion as possible.  
Thematic content analysis is the main mode of data analysis employed in this 
research. Besides, the process of inductive reasoning has been used in order to develop the 
interpretative framework for understanding post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes.  
 This research project has faced a few challenges. The author is not fluent in African 
languages spoken in local communities. However, research assistants were able to 
compensate for this deficiency and most interviewees could express themselves in English. 
Researched communities such as Matatiele and Khutsong still experienced a great deal of 
distrust, tension and suspicion at the time of interviews. This allowed researchers to assess 
the gravity of the situation created by provincial boundary disputes. However, it also 
prevented open debate and relaxed focus group discussions. This explains why individual 
interviews by far outnumber focus group discussions. These two difficulties do not overly 
affect the value of this study‟s findings. A detailed account of the methodology is presented 
in the appendix 1.  
 
1.6. Outline of chapters  
 
This thesis is organised in six chapters including this introductory section. After the 
first chapter, the three case studies are presented. The order in which these case studies are 
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discussed is chronological. Chapter two covers the Bushbuckridge provincial boundary 
dispute. Chapter three proceeds with the Khutsong case and the Matatiele case is presented in 
chapter four. The fifth chapter critically analyses common patterns and broader structural 
socio-political issues raised by the three case studies, taken as instances of post-apartheid 
provincial boundary disputes. This chapter also discusses the implications of this thesis‟s 
findings for future policy making in this area. A concluding chapter sums up key findings.   
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CHAPTER 2: PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY DISPUTE IN 
BUSHBUCKRIDGE 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Revisiting the Bushbuckridge provincial boundary dispute, despite extensive and 
high quality scholarly literature on the case, rests on the usefulness of casting an 
interpretation of the conflict illuminated by the reading of two later similar instances of 
provincial boundary conflicts. Placed side by side with the Khutsong and Matatiele cases, 
the re-examination of the Bushbuckridge case delivers new insights and nuances. On the 
basis of our own field work in the area and extensively drawing from existing literature, 
this chapter frames the Bushbuckridge provincial boundary conflict between 1993 and 
2005 as a complex political phenomenon which can only be accounted for by highlighting 
the role played by underlying material conditions, local notions of democracy and 
development, conflicting regional planning paradigms, Government democratic deficit, 
strategic political struggles, and limits of judicial arbitration. Each of these factors is 
elucidated as the chapter strives to provide a socio-political explanation of the 
Bushbuckrigde provincial boundary dispute.  Let us begin by providing the geographical 
and historical context of the locality.   
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2.2. The geography and historical background of Bushbuckridge  
 
Bushbuckridge Local Municipality covers the area located in the south- eastern part 
of Limpopo Province and north-eastern part of Mpumalanga Province (See map 3.). It is 
bounded on east by Kruger National Park and the sensitive watershed and forests of the 
Drakensberg Mountains. To the north of the town runs the Olifants River that flows 
through a stunning gorge into the Kruger National Park. Bushbuckridge town from which 
the region is named constitutes a small trading and administrative centre approximately 
midway on a north-south line between Nelspruit, the capital of Mpumalanga and Tzaneen, 
a major centre of commerce and agriculture in the lowveld of Limpopo.   The Municipal 
area provides a link to Lydenburg and other centres in the lowveld, particularly Hoedspruit, 
Pilgrim‟s Rest and Graskop. Bushbuckridge is made up of the Mhala district of the former 
Gazankulu Bantustan and the Mapulaneng district of the former Lebowa Bantustan. Before 
the establishment of the two Bantustans, Bushbuckridge formed part of the Eastern 
Transvaal and was administered by the Graskop local authority.    
One of five local municipalities in Elhanzeni District municipality within the 
provincial territory of Mpumalanga, the municipality of Bushbuckridge has several small 
urban areas including Acornhoek, Thulamahashe, Bushbuckridge, Marite, Dwarsloop, and 
Mkhuhlu. However, rural areas make up the most part of the municipality. Small rural 
villages comprise 29% of the population while dense rural villages represent 61% and 
about 9% of the population lives in urban centres (The water dialogues South Africa, 
2008). The 2001 Census reported a population size of 497, 958 for the municipality. The 
real population size is certainly higher due to unregistered immigrants. The 2006/07 Water 
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Services Development Plan estimated that the municipality of Bushbuckridge had a 
population of around 720,000 (The water dialogues South Africa, 2008). The population of 
the municipality is significantly young as some 65% of the population is under the age of 
24 years (Census 2001).  
The region stretches on pieces of two old Apartheid Homelands, Gazankulu and 
Lebowa, as well as parts of the then “white South Africa” consisting of white-owned farms 
and state lands, including military reserves and a large airbase. The apartheid regime 
established Gazankulu as the ethnic home for the Tsonga and Shangaans who had migrated 
from Mozambique. Lebowa was constituted as the land for North Sotho and Pedi. 
KaNgwane was the “homeland” constituted for Swazi blacks. Ethnicity was largely 
entrenched by apartheid ethno-regional planning and related policies (Ritchken, 1994 ; 
Delius, 1996; Niehaus, 2006). Traditional leadership was by the same token manipulated 
and co-opted as an important element in the apartheid state‟s administration of homelands. 
This does not negate the diversity of nations that inhabited the region with long history of 
both ethnic hostilities and peaceful cohabitation (Ritchken, 1994; Delius, 1996; Niehaus, 
2006).  
Black communities in this region have painfully endured recurrent forced removals 
from their ancestral lands either as a result of overt racist political motives or 
environmental conservation policies. Through the 1913 Land Act, the area was scheduled 
as a “released area” and reserved for exclusive occupation of Africans. Since 1930, 
forestation of large tracts of land and mechanization of production processes on nearby 
white-owned farms displaced many households which moved into Bushbuckridge. These 
historical events transformed most black people into rent tenants, put enormous pressure on 
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rural resources, and decreased agricultural yields. With the advent of apartheid in 1948, 
large farm lands were purchased for the creation of homelands and nature conservation 
areas. Many black households were forcibly removed and resettled for the most part on the 
formerly white-owned Lowveld farms which became dense settlements. Towns and rural 
areas such as Dwarsloop, Cottondale, Greenvalley, Acornhoek, Buffelshoek, Rooiboklaagte 
were all formed in this manner (Thornton, 2003). 
In 1960, “a betterment plan” by the South African Native Trust further restrained 
black communities‟ access to residential and agricultural land. As a result, “labour 
migrancy to South Africa's industrial and mining centres now became an imperative for 
survival” (Niehaus, 2006). In this same year, the introduction of Bantu authorities saw the 
division of Bushbuckridge into two ethnic zones namely the Mapulaneng Regional 
Authority for Northern Sotho in the west and the Mhala Regional Authority for Shangaans 
in the east. In 1973 these structures were affiliated to the Lebowa and Gazankulu 
Bantustans, respectively. Today, Bushbuckridge still displays the character of a labour 
reservoir and a marginalised area in the midst of a region in which tourism, commercial 
farming and game reserves flourish.  
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Map 3. Geographical location of Bushbuckridge. 
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 The enactment of the Land Restitution Act in 1994 brought hope of restorative 
justice to individuals and communities dispossessed of their land through racist policies 
since 1948 and even before. As shown in the work of Thornton (Thornton, 2003), these 
promises have been marred with complexities which have made arbitration of land claims 
difficult. Poor or non-existent recording of land ownership organization, difficulties for 
individuals and communities to produce legally acceptable evidence of past ownership of 
the land, competing conservation needs for established nature reserves, and conflict over 
jurisdictional prerogatives between spheres of Government are just some of the factors that 
have slowed or deadlocked the process of post-apartheid land reform in the region of 
Bushbuckridge. The land question has generated conflicting claims and interests which the 
post-apartheid Government has had to confront while facing a revolt on the provincial 
demarcation of Bushbuckridge since the re-demarcation of regions in 1993.  
The area had a recent history of social unrest. Until the 1980s, the region of 
Bushbuckridge experienced little overt political resistance against apartheid. Movements 
such as the campaign of Sebatakgomo migrants' association against the imposition of Bantu 
authorities in Sekhukhuneland and the struggle against child labour led in 1950s by the 
brothers Matsikitsane and Segopela Mashile,  with ANC support, did not assume durable 
and wider political significance. “Black consciousness” propagated by few students fleeing 
from Soweto to Bushbuckridge in 1976 failed to make any local impact (Ritchken, 1994; 
Delius, 1996; Niehaus, 2006).  
However, the eighties saw the emergence of the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
affiliated structures in Lebowa and Bushbuckridge. Two such organisations namely 
Mapulaneng Crisis Committee and the Brooklyn Youth Organisation established at 
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Impalahoek in 1986, became the centre of political activism against apartheid. As adult 
members of the crisis committee were soon detained, young comrades drove the political 
resistance with new emphasis on freeing their society from evils including witchcraft. It is 
estimated that between April and May 1986, Comrades attacked more than 150 witches, 
killing at least thirty-six (Ibid.). The youth movement was to enter into cyclical violent 
confrontation with members of the Sofasonke ('We Die Together') Civic Union, a new 
group of adults who disapproved of the Comrades‟ actions. Mutual violent assaults were 
only stopped when the Lebowa police arrested several members of both groups. After the 
unbanning of the ANC, ANC branches mushroomed in Bushbuckridge under the control of 
teachers and businessmen who managed to win to the ANC camp former adversaries of the 
youth such as the chiefs (Ibid.). 
As new boundaries for provinces were being defined in 1993 at CODESA, the 
commission for the delimitation and demarcation of regions (CDDR) recommended the 
inclusion of Bushbuckridge in the Northern Province (Limpopo) against residents‟ 
preference for Mpumalanga. Given such resistance, the 1993 Interim Constitution 
considered Bushbuckridge as an “affected area” with the prerogative to petition for the 
organization of a local referendum to decide on its provincial location. However, ANC 
leaders discouraged the use of local referenda in affected areas promising residents that the 
ANC-dominated Government would effect their inclusion into their preferred Mpumalanga 
province. For a complex set of political reasons which will become clear in the course of 
the analysis, this promise did not materialize causing residents to embark on disruptive and 
violent protest culminating in a Court action in late 1997. Four deaths were directly linked 
to the Bushbuckridge border conflict (Niehaus, 2005). A number of strikes, school boycotts 
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and public demonstrations also disrupted the economic and social life in the area, causing 
destruction estimated at 40 million rands (Griggs, 1998; Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999). The 
military had to be deployed to protect tourists against possible assault by protesting 
residents. After the Court failure, the resistance campaign subsided partly because the ANC 
had instructed its members to pull out from the BBCC. From 1998 to 2005, Bushbuckridge 
was made the seventh region in Limpopo province, making it possible for all Government 
departments to have offices in the area. It also had to function as a cross boundary 
municipality which meant that Mpumalanga would also service the area on an agency 
basis. In December 2005 when cross boundary municipalities were disestablished across 
South Africa, Bushbuckridge was finally included in Mpumalanga as long wished by the 
majority of its residents. It took 11 years, a protracted and violent conflict and its associated 
consequences for the ANC-led Government to accede to the wishes of affected residents. 
To understand this saga, this thesis offers the interpretative framework evoked in the 
introduction. First of all, it is important to look at the role played by underlying material 
conditions in contributing to the conflict.  
 
2.3. Material conditions of the population of Bushbuckridge   
 
As a dumping area for forced removals in its neighbourhood and as a reserved area 
merely needed for its labour force, Bushbuckridge remained -until the dawn of democracy 
in 1993- in conditions of extreme poverty and underdevelopment. The area had poor road 
infrastructure. To date, many villages are not accessible by good roads and streets in 
townships and villages are impassable during the rainy season. The provision of water has 
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remained one of the biggest challenges in the area. In the 1980s, “there were no taps and 
people had to walk more than a kilometre to get water. Few people had latrines… cholera is 
endemic in the rainy season. Furthermore, boreholes are a common supply of water” 
(Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999: 41). Despite efforts by successive Governments to address the 
water crisis in Bushbuckridge, communities in the area still lack a reliable source of clean 
water. Households spend the best part of their time queuing or walking in search of water. 
The Inyanga dam project which was expected to deliver a long term solution to the water 
problem in the region has failed to meet its projected completion deadline and may still be 
delayed for at least two years. Before 1993, all rural areas around Bushbuckridge did not 
have electricity. Today, electricity is provided in most areas in the municipality of 
Bushbuckridge though rural villages spend long blackout periods due to electrical faults.  
In the early 1990s, Bushbuckridge was also poorly resourced in terms of health, 
education and policing infrastructure. According to Narsiah and Maharaj, there was no 
hospital in the area. The nearest hospital was 85 kms away. One could find only one clinic 
which was open from 8 am to 4 pm and two police stations which catered for a population 
of 1 million (Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999). In 1996, there were 335 schools catering for a 
student population of 196,727 with a pupil-classroom ratio of 54:1 in the Mhala district and 
58:1 in Mapulaneng (Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999).  
The socio-economic profile of the Bushbuckridge population also reflects 
precarious material conditions. Despite its location in a region where tourism has been 
flourishing, unemployment is very high. Narsiah and Maharaj reported that with a 
population of 1 million growing at a rate of 2.5 per cent annually and a high density, 
unemployment was estimated at 50 - 60% in early 1990s (Ibid.). Current estimates place 
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employment rate below 15% (http://www.bushbuckridge.gov.za/about.html). Most 
unemployed fall within the 25 - 34 age group. Such a high degree of youth unemployment 
greatly contributes to increasing levels of criminality in the area. The area has attracted 
little investment and job creation. “We only have few malls in three big townships which 
employ few people. The majority is unemployed or works outside Bushbuckridge”, 
lamented an informant. It is estimated that 70% of employed people work outside 
Bushbuckridge in Hazyview, Nelspruit, Hoedspruit, Graskop or other surrounding lodges. 
In the 1990s, average household income per month was R 630 way below the mean living 
level (MLL) of R 970 (Narsiah and Maharaj, 1999). Lack of investment partly explains 
unemployment: “Investors are not attracted here. There is nothing in Bushbuckridge except 
few shopping malls. Even tourists avoid passing through Bushbuckridge. They use other 
routes to the Kruger National Park. Nothing attracts them here. There is no hotel, no facility 
for them” stated Mr Reinas Khumalo, ANC councillor and chief whip in the Bushbuckridge 
municipal council. Due to this absence of any local economic base, the municipality of 
Bushbuckridge is totally dependent on grants from the national treasury. “We have no way 
to generate local revenue. Except shopping malls in three townships, there is nothing else 
that can generate income for the municipality. As a municipality, we are now working on an 
urban renewal project to address this problem”, explained Mr Reinas Khumalo. 
By any standard, material conditions are still bad for the majority of the population 
in Bushbuckridge, despite significant achievement in various development projects 
undertaken since 1993. These conditions were even worse during the transitional period 
and community frustrations even higher because of the oppressive apartheid system and a 
lack of Government structures that people could trust.  
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In this context, provincial boundaries became a crucial element in the struggle for 
the upliftment of the area. Boundaries had been used by the apartheid regime as markers 
separating havens of prosperity and areas of extreme poverty. For residents of 
Bushbuckridge, the fight against poverty would be tied with resistance against what they 
saw as an unfavourable provincial boundary arrangement.  
In the Bushbuckridge case, material conditions serve as an explanatory factor both 
at source and end of the dissent. Precarious living conditions made the area more 
susceptible to revolt against an unfavourable policy. It is in that sense that Narsiah and 
Maharaj argue that “the dispute derives from historically constituted material conditions of 
life in the area” (Narsiah and Maharaj, 1998, p. 38). Moreover, the community‟s 
intransigent involvement in a disruptive and protracted conflict against Government sought 
to secure brighter socio-economic prospects, to “access resources, to have their basic needs 
satisfied” (Ibid., 1998, p. 40). How inclusion in Mpumalanga could have improved socio-
economic opportunities as compared with continued location in Limpopo will be discussed 
in a later section. However, the dispute had not only a material basis, but also ideological 
underpinnings.  
 
2.4. Local notions of democracy and development  
 
Residents of Bushbuckridge opposed their demarcation in Limpopo because they 
strongly believed that they had the right to determine their provincial location and shape 
the future development of their area. Notions of “people‟s power” and popular sovereignty 
shaped various initiatives that residents embarked upon in an attempt to secure the transfer 
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of the area to Mpumalanga. This is particularly manifest in campaign actions and 
discourses. Responding to changing political circumstances, residents successively 
established the Referendum Facilitation Committee in 1994, the Bushbuckridge Border 
Committee (BBC) in 1996, and the Bushbuckridge Border Crisis Committee (BBCC) in 
April 1997 with broad representation from major sectors including churches, political 
parties, traditional authorities, and business associations. Such structured political 
organisation is evidence of high political consciousness and faith in the power of the people 
to determine their destiny. It was significant that the anti-demarcation movement drew 
support across ethnic lines in a region that had experienced “ethnic wars” in the past. “We 
were united in this struggle.  Unlike other areas such as Moutse where people could be 
divided, here we stood as one and that was our strength”, argued Themba Godi, the then 
secretary of BBCC and currently APC president and Member of Parliament. Further 
evidence of such common beliefs in popular sovereignty is recurrent enunciation of the 
right to self-determination in various meetings of members of the BBCC held with ANC or 
Government leaders. A meeting held in Mapulaneng Education College in September 1994 
where an agreement to transfer Bushbuckridge to Mpumalanga was reached between ANC 
leaders and BBCC was concluded with the statement: “the people have spoken”.  
Using notions of “people‟s power” as a basis to challenge an unfavourable policy 
had a historical dimension in the area. The past incorporation of the area in the homelands 
of Lebowa and Gazankulu was fiercely resisted, though never successfully challenged. The 
post-apartheid decision to include the area in Northern Province was mainly based on such 
past association with the two homelands that had joined with Venda to form Northern 
Province. However, for residents the post-apartheid decision was as undemocratic, as 
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irrational and as forceful as the apartheid one. Years of political activism in the 1980s under 
the influence of African nationalism, with active involvement of the youth, contributed a 
great deal in cementing ideas of effective political organisation and popular sovereignty.
11
 
The leadership of the BBCC was in great part formed of young people who had 
participated in or inherited the youth activism of the previous decade.  
Residents‟ conception of local development also formed part of the ideological 
underpinning of their resistance against demarcation in Limpopo. They saw local 
development as a function of one area‟s distance from centres of political decisions and of 
economic activities. Bushbuckridge is one hour away from Nelspruit and its inhabitants 
work and do business in Hazyview, Nelspruit, and Mpumalanga towns. On the other hand, 
Pietersburg, the headquarter of Limpopo, is three hours away. Work and business related 
traffic between Bushbuckridge and Limpopo towns are significantly lower. That explains 
why the functional argument was the most cited by residents to justify their dissent. 
Government officials tried to challenge this conception that ties local development with 
proximity to political and economic centres arguing that South Africa is a unitary state and 
that “nobody will be disadvantaged by being a citizen of the Northern Province” (Niekaus, 
2005, p. 105). However, this argument could hardly convince the people on the ground.  
Overemphasis in the existing literature on the historically constituted material 
conditions as key drivers of Bushbuckridge dissent overshadows an equally significant role 
played by grassroots notions of democracy and development. In and of themselves, 
material conditions hardly explain political resistance. One would have to account for why 
                                               
11 Extensive study of these dynamics is provided in Ritchken‟s thesis: E. Ritchken, 1998 Leadership and 
Conflict in Bushbuckridge: Struggles to Define Moral Economies within the Context of Rapidly Transforming 
Political Economies (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1994).  
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communities in similar material conditions may respond differently. To avoid an overly 
materialistic explanation of the border dissent, it is important to insist on the interplay 
between underlying conditions of material deprivation and specific shared representations 
of popular sovereignty and local development as a key driver of the protracted provincial 
boundary dispute in Bushbuckridge. Armed with historically constituted ideologies of 
“people‟s power”, residents of Bushbuckridge approached the process of provincial 
boundary demarcation with a territorial regional planning model, thus entering into conflict 
with the Government‟s predominantly functional regional planning approach.  
 
2.5. Conflicting regional planning paradigms 
 
The initial decision to demarcate Bushbuckridge in Limpopo was mainly based on 
ethnic or linguistic reasons
12
. Fox has argued that regional proposals pushed by various 
political parties during the CODESA negotiation “were very close to the language 
distributions” (Fox, 1995, p. 24). For negotiators at CODESA, it made sense for Nothern 
Sotho and Shangaans, who form the majority group in Bushbuckridge, to be associated 
with their ethnic counterparts in Limpopo. Such thinking did not take into account the fact 
that ethnicity had been artificially constructed and politically instrumentalised by the 
apartheid regime over several years (Ritchken, 1995; Delius, 1996; Mamdani, 1996). A 
non-ethnicised line of justification considered that Bushbuckridge had been administered 
from Giyani and Lebowakgomo during the homelands period and that it made sense for the 
area to continue being administered from Northern Province (Limpopo) which was formed 
                                               
12 Interview with Kgoshi Mokoena, at Mathibela Royal Palace,  21 August 2010; and Interview with 
   Themba Godi, Member of Parliament, APC President and former secretary of BBCC,  9 August 2010, 
   Telephone interview. 
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of three former homelands namely Venda, Lebowa and Gazankulu. Besides, the initial 
demarcation decision was based on apartheid era development regions, a model that greatly 
influenced the post apartheid regional arrangement (Lemon, 1995; Muthien and Khosa, 
1998). Bushbuckridge‟s inclusion into Northern Province (Limpopo) was in line with 
boundaries of development regions developed by the 1981 Good Hope regional strategy 
(Tomlinson and Addleson, 1987). Ethnicity and development regions based justifications of 
the demarcation of Bushbuckridge in Limpopo clearly fall under the functional regional 
planning paradigm. Under this model, sub-units of the national territory are organised or 
divided by a central State organ according to the optimal function they can play in attaining 
certain specific goals such as economic growth, social cohesion, and economic viability. 
The ANC Government‟s attitudes to the border dissent in Bushbuckridge from 1994 
to 1998 further confirmed the continuity of functional regional planning in the post-
apartheid period. Though it engaged with residents and showed willingness to accede to 
their regional preferences, the ANC rejected local referenda as a mechanism of boundary 
demarcation or boundary disputes resolution. Boundary change decisions were centralised 
at the party top leadership level. In addition, the ANC Government insisted on the unitary 
nature of the State, thus implying that provinces were irrelevant. In the course of the 
Bushbuckridge dispute, Government officials would call for the relativisation of internal 
boundaries:  “nobody will be disadvantaged by being a citizen of the Northern Province” 
(Niekaus, 2005, p. 105). On 19 May 1997, the ANC NEC decided that Bushbuckridge 
would remain in Northern Province (Limpopo) on the grounds that “the boundary disputes 
in BBR and Groblersdal had no bearing on the fundamental transformation of South Africa 
and the creation of a better life for all, and that the constitutional status quo of boundaries 
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should be respected” (Ramutsindela and Simon, 1999, p. 495). Convinced that provincial 
boundaries made a difference to their prospects for socio-economic prosperity and access to 
political power, residents of Bushbuckridge disagreed with this argument. However, 
Government imposed the contested regional arrangement for more than a decade. During 
this period, it failed to act on residents‟ regional preferences and opposed any settlement 
through a local referendum.  
On the other hand, in their contestations of their inclusion into Limpopo, residents 
clearly professed an adherence to a territorial regional planning paradigm. They insisted on 
their right to determine their provincial identity. They rejected the idea that provincial 
identity could be imposed on them as it had been the case during the apartheid period: “we 
naturally belong in Mpumalanga”, most informants often stated. In arguing in favour of 
inclusion in Mpumalanga, residents were less concerned about the broad national 
consequences of such policy. What mattered to them were primarily the positive benefits of 
sharing a common province with one‟s closest towns and of being closer to the provincial 
administration headquarters. Such emphasis in popular self-determination, local identity 
and equity are hallmarks of the territorial regional planning model. The protracted 
boundary dispute was ultimately rooted on this underlying conflict between the people‟s 
and Government‟s approach to territorial planning. The clash between these two 
approaches to territorial reform reflected two equally conflicting conceptions of democracy. 
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2.6. Government’s democratic deficit  
 
  Dissenting residents adhered to an understanding of democratic governance as 
popular sovereignty, whereas ANC and Government representatives, in reserving the right 
to make the final decision on the boundary arrangement, stressed the representative nature 
of the post-apartheid democratic dispensation. For local communities, the advent of 
democracy raised expectations of a new era of people-driven policies and economic 
development. The possibility contemplated in the Interim Constitution to resolve boundary 
disputes through local referenda was consistent with such a political atmosphere. However, 
soon after the election of the first post-apartheid Government, power to decide on the 
Bushbuckridge boundary dispute was gradually moved to top ANC national and provincial 
leadership. Shifting the power to pronounce on this issue from the people to its 
representatives, while the people still insisted on their preferences, inevitably led to the 
“first revolt by African people against South Africa's new government”(Niehaus, 2006). 
Representation need not conflict with popular sovereignty. However, the ANC Government 
clearly used the representative nature of the post-apartheid democratic system to rule out 
the implementation of local referenda, to delay and ultimately to oppose the move of 
Bushbuckridge from Limpopo to Mpumalanga. Such conduct was widely viewed as 
undemocratic.  
Besides, unresponsive representation was undemocratic when one looks at broken 
promises made by ANC officials. When Bushbuckridge residents contested the 
recommendation of the CDDR, they were requested by the ANC to calm down and vote for 
 57 
the ANC which after elections would make sure they were incorporated in Mpumalanga. 
After the elections, residents had to remind the ANC leadership of the promise. In August 
1994, Ngoako Ramathlodi, then premier of Northern Province denied knowledge about the 
border transfer at a meeting in Mkhulu. Militant comrades took Ramathlodi “hostage” until 
Mathews Phosa, then premier of Mpumalanga, arrived in a helicopter to rescue him 
(Niehaus, 2005, p. 101). In September 1994, an agreement to transfer the area to 
Mpumalanga was reached in a meeting at Mapulaneng Education College. The 
Mpumalanga provincial legislature subsequently passed a resolution to receive 
Bushbuckridge in May 1995. But the Northern Province‟s resolution to release the area was 
conditioned by the transfer of Globlersdal from Mpumalanga to Northern Province. This 
horse-trading provision was the main reason why legislation aimed at facilitating this 
arrangement failed to garner support in Parliament. The two-thirds majority needed to pass 
the Bill could not be mobilized as National Party (NP) members supported the white 
community of Globersdal in their refusal to be excised from Mpumalanga. In the end, the 
ANC was left with no option but to impose the status quo on the residents of 
Bushbuckridge. The ANC conference in 1997 then decided to shift Bushbuckridge ANC 
structures from Mpumalanga to Limpopo in order to align party structures with 
governmental administrative organization. The decision to move party structures to 
Limpopo took protest actions to its highest level with dire security and economic 
consequences. Resistance culminated on a Court action based in the main argument that 
ANC and Government failed to honour promises made to residents of Bushbuckridge. In 
Court papers, the BBCC also argued that the inclusion of Bushbuckridge in Mpumalanga 
was not supposed to be linked with the transfer of Globersdal to Limpopo. In response to 
 58 
the accusation, Government stated that promises made to the people of Bushbuckridge 
were of a political nature, thus not legally binding or enforceable. Whatever the 
complications that prevented the rapid realization of electoral promises, the post-apartheid 
Government‟s failure to effectively act on its pledge and rejection of legal responsibility on 
the ground that promises were of political nature constitute a democratic deficit. 
Perceptions of such deficiency on the part of the first post-apartheid Government 
undoubtedly contributed to a hardening of positions in the dispute. Various personal or 
group interests also shaped the dispute in such a manner that they compounded and delayed 
any swift solution to the crisis.  
 
2.7. Strategic political struggles 
 
Beneath the proximity and related economic development arguments in support of 
Bushbuckridge residents‟ preference for Mpumalanga lay strategic interests of the ANC 
political elite in the area. Bushbuckridge comprises a significant number of ANC branches 
which by the strength of their number and active participation “determine outcomes in 
provincial conferences of the ANC”.13  For the local ANC elite, such leverage could more 
effectively be politically capitalized upon in Mpumalanga rather than in Limpopo where 
there exist other more powerful ANC powerhouses including the Capricorn region. One 
informant stated that Capricorn region holds a hegemonic position in Limpopo party and 
Government provincial politics. In terms of ANC internal party politics, Bushbuckridge 
ANC leaders had a choice between a marginal role in ANC Limpopo and a central position 
in Mpumalanga. Historically, Bushbuckridge ANC branches had participated with 
                                               
13 Interview with Kgoshi Mokoena, in Mathibela Royal Palace, 21 August 2010; and Interview with Malatji.  
Matome, communication manager of the mayor of Bushbuckridge, in Bushbuckridge, 22 August 2010. 
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Mpumalanga structures where they had established strong networks. While rejection of 
Limpopo was for the majority of residents predicated on functional grounds, for local ANC 
elite who led the resistance, it was about securing their hegemonic position in Mpumalanga 
ANC politics and associated political dividends. These strategic interests hardly come to 
light in the existing literature as key drivers of the dispute. It is revealing that the dispute 
only assumed disruptive and violent forms as at mid-1997 when the ANC took the decision 
to shift Bushbuckridge ANC structures to Limpopo province to align party organization 
and Government administrative structures. The decisive role of the shifting of party 
structures to Limpopo in intensifying the dispute was described by Mr Khumalo Renias as 
follows:  
We were told as ANC structures that we will remain politically in Mpumalanga, but 
the area would be administrated by Limpopo while Government rounds up 
everything. But in 1997, there was a resolution that party structures and 
Government structures had to be aligned. So it was confirmed that ANC structures 
in Bushbuckridge will fall under Limpopo. As soon as that was implemented, there 
were protest actions in the region. The leadership both in the party and in 
Government was invited to Pretoria to deal with the matter. BBCC was formed as a 
pressure group to fight for the incorporation of Bushbuckridge in Mpumalanga. 
They went to Court. They did not succeed. They could not.
14
 
 
Precisely because of its significant weight on ANC provincial and national politics, 
the premiers of Mpumalanga and Limpopo as well as certain ANC NEC leaders had vested 
interests in Bushbuckridge final provincial location. Divisions within the ANC created 
paralysis as Kgoshi Mokoena explains: “The ANC itself was divided. There were those 
who were in favour of the area going to Mpumalanga, and those that were in favour of the 
area remaining in Northern Province. Not even here, at the national level. In the province 
of Mpumalanga, the leadership wanted the area to come to Mpumalanga. But some serving 
                                               
14 Interview with Mr Reinas Khumalo, ANC councillor and chief whip in the municipal council, in 
Bushbuckridge, 20 August 2010. 
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in the NEC of the ANC did not want the area to come to Mpumalanga. Hence the ANC was 
undecided. It said: let the situation as it is and we will review it later”.15 The then premier 
of Mpumalanga, Dr Mathews Phosa pushed for a speedy incorporation of the area in 
Mpumalanga, but the then premier of Limpopo, Mr Ngoako Ramathlodi and other NEC 
members such as Colette Shabane opposed the move. Members of the provincial 
legislatures of Mpumalanga and Limpopo that had Bushbuckridge as their power-base were 
naturally lobbying for a solution that would not sever them from their constituency. That 
explains the existence of a local minority group, mostly made of some former politicians in 
homelands, campaigning for the area to remain in Limpopo. However, as their case was 
mainly based on personal strategic interests, “they could hardly come to the open and 
engage on this issue”.16 
Informants have seen a link between ANC national leadership opposition to Dr 
Mathews Phosa‟s bid for deputy president of the party in 1997 and the party‟s refusal to 
carry out the promise of moving Bushbuckridge back into Mpumalanga. Dr Mathews 
Phosa, premier of Mpumalanga, unequivocally supported and fast tracked the inclusion of 
Bushbuckridge into Mpumalanga partly because it would constitute a potentially reliable 
power base for future provincial and national leadership contests. Kgoshi Mokoena, former 
leader of Lebowa homeland, former Member of Parliament and chief of the Mathibela 
traditional authority confirmed this interpretation: “Dr Mathews Phosa wanted this place to 
be under his province. This area has many ANC branches, at least thirty-four. Even when 
you go to conference, Bushbuckridge determines the conference in Mpumalanga. He 
                                               
15Interview with Kgoshi Mokoena (Mathibela traditional authority),in Mathibela Royal Palace, 21 August 
2010. 
16 Interview with Mr Reinas Khumalo, ANC councillor and chief whip in the municipal council, in 
Bushbuckridge, 20 August 2010. 
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wanted to have Bushbuckridge, because he would know that if I have it I am safe in terms 
of securing my premiership position”.17  
It was also believed that certain ANC leaders who did not welcome Dr Mathews 
Phosa‟s ambition for the position of ANC deputy president at December 1997 Mafikeng 
national conference did not want to push for rapid inclusion of Bushbuckridge into 
Mpumalanga as this would strength the latter‟s position. Dr Mathews Phosa had been 
nominated by ANCYL and ANC‟s Mpumalanga branches while the uncontested 
presidential candidate and deputy president of the country Thabo Mbeki and President 
Nelson Mandela backed Jacob Zuma instead. After unsuccessful pressures for Dr Mathews 
Phosa‟s nomination to be withdrawn, he was fraudulently taken out of the race as reported 
by Gumede:  “no one, thus, was more surprised than Phosa himself to learn while on a trip 
to France that he had withdrawn from the race. To his consternation, Mandela had made the 
announcement, but an even greater shock lay in store. Phosa arrived home to rumours that 
he had been a spy for the apartheid regime and was deeply involved in corruption in 
Mpumalanga. Yet another unwanted bid for the deputy presidency had been successfully 
thwarted…” (Gumede, 2005, p. 50). Themba Godi, former leader of the BBCC and 
currently APC Member of Parliament describes the strategic political struggle within the 
ANC and its impact on the border dispute in these terms: “There was a political chess 
game. There was an ANC conference in Mafikeng in December 1997. Some people within 
the ANC looked at Mathews Phosa as someone who was funding our campaign. And he 
was thought to be running for the position of deputy president. So there was a sense that if 
Bushbuckridge goes to Mpumalanga that will increase his power base to challenge for 
                                               
17Interview with Kgoshi Mokoena (Mathibela traditional authority), in the Mathibela Royal palace, 21 August 
2010. 
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positions in Mafikeng. There are people who were looking at it in that sense. So those 
things also came to play their role”.18 
Political parties also waged a struggle to capitalize on residents‟ discontent in order 
to raise their own profile. UDM leader, Bantu Holomisa pledged his support to the people 
of Bushbuckridge. His party currently holds one seat in the Bushbuckridge municipal 
council. Under the leadership of Patricia de Lille, the PAC got deeply involved. Patricia de 
Lille visited Bushbuckridge on 26 June 1997 and later unsuccessfully introduced into 
Parliament a Bill transferring Bushbuckridge to Mpumalanga. Participation of PAC 
members in the BBCC was active. PAC youth leader Themba Godi‟s rise to Parliament is 
partly a result of his past record as secretary of BBCC. The Democratic Party and National 
Party also called on Government to give “the people what they want” (Ramutsindela and 
Simon, 1999, p. 496). The ANC naturally disliked the BBCC transactions with opposition 
parties and instructed its members to quit the structure or face disciplinary actions. Local 
ANC members were told that they could not associate with people who criticize and insult 
their leaders in public. Despite ANC instructions, certain members remained active in the 
BBCC in a bid to ensure that a successful outcome of the campaign could still be claimed 
as an achievement of the ANC. The rivalry between political parties and the concern about 
which party gets the credit for “giving the people what they want” partly explains why the 
ANC did not have the two-thirds majority support needed to pass the Bill in Parliament 
despite the fact that almost all political parties supported the cause of the people of 
Bushbuckridge. The horse trading clause linking Bushbuckridge‟s exclusion from Limpopo 
to Globlersdal‟s move from Mpumalanga to Limpopo which could not satisfy the National 
                                               
18 Interview with Themba Godi, member of Parliament, APC President and former secretary of BBCC, 9 
August 2010, Telephone interview. 
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Party further eroded the chance of galvanizing the required support for the passing of the 
Bill. This inter-political party rivalry driven by strategic political interests added to ANC 
internal infighting to frustrate any prospect of moving Bushbuckridge to Mpumalanga. In 
2005, the final decision to demarcate the area into Mpumalanga was greatly facilitated by 
the absence of internal party battles on the issue and the ANC‟ consolidated power in 
Parliament.  
The status of Bushbuckridge as a cross boundary municipality came to an end in 
2005 as Government decided to disestablish all the 16 cross boundary municipalities. A 
2002 presidential coordinating council report had established that cross boundary 
municipalities were among the most underperforming municipalities partly as a result of 
administrative complications and legal complexities brought by the requirement of joint 
jurisdiction of two provinces (Moodley and Mckenzie, 2005). The report recommended 
that cross boundary municipalities be discontinued and legislative measures be taken for 
every municipality to fall exclusively within one province. As for the municipality of 
Bushbuckridge, it could be demarcated either in Mpumalanga or in Limpopo. From the 
start of the legislative process, the recommendation of the Minister of Local and Provincial 
Government was aligned with residents long held preferences for Mpumalanga. Themba 
Godi argued that Government had learned from its past mistakes and sought to avoid 
reopening old wounds by demarcating the community in its preferred province
19
.   
 
                                               
19 Interview with Themba Godi, member of Parliament, APC President and former secretary of BBCC, 9 
August 2010, Telephone interview. 
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2.8. Limits of judicial mechanisms in arbitrating the conflict 
 
That the dispute continued unresolved until late 2005 was partly due to the limits of 
judicial arbitration. In October 1997 when it became clear that Government would not 
transfer the area to Mpumalanga, the BBCC resolved to use the amount of money donated 
by residents to support the border campaign in a Court action against the Province of 
Limpopo, the Province of Mpumalanga, the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and the African National Congress.  
However, the BBCC had weak legal grounds on which to argue their case. In Court 
papers, it argued that politicians‟ promises to transfer Busbhuckridge to Mpumalanga raised 
legitimate expectations and requested the Court to declare the relevant promises legally 
enforceable. It further submitted that defendants‟ failure to transfer the area to Mpumalanga 
amounted to a violation of residents‟ right to administrative fairness both at common law 
and in terms of section 24 (b) of the Interim Constitution as well as Article 32 (read with 
item 23 (2) (b) of schedule 6) of the final Constitution, No 108 of 1996.  
Partly as a result of the absence of an enabling legal framework, BBCC made a 
series of unreasonable requests, namely that the Court order the national Government to 
table the relevant Bill in Parliament, that Mpumalanga and Limpopo be ordered to approve 
such a Bill in terms of Article 74 (8) of the final Constitution and finally that the ANC be 
ordered to instruct its members in provincial legislatures and Parliament to support the Bill. 
These demands were manifestly ill-conceived. Whether such poor articulation of residents‟ 
case had to do with the legal constraints of the time, the circumstances of the dispute or the 
weaknesses of the legal team, remains an open question.  
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The judgement, handed down on 26 October 1998, rejected with costs the 
application arguing that it lacked legal basis and that it requested orders that a Court cannot 
grant. To the violation of the right to administrative fairness argument, the Court responded 
that the decision to table or approve a Bill or a motion in Parliament or provincial 
legislature “are not administrative acts which give rise to a cause of action at common law, 
nor are they acts that give rise to a cause of action in terms of Article 24 of the Interim 
Constitution and Article 32 of the final Constitution. Accordingly the relief sought is 
incompetent at law”.20 Tackling the legitimate expectations principle, the Court ruled that 
“the promises and undertakings referred to in the summons do not and cannot be construed 
as anything more than political promises made by members of a political party as such or 
as members of the executive of the first, second and third defendants. This does not and 
cannot form the basis of a legitimate expectation under the common law or in terms of the 
provisions of the Interim and final Constitutions”21. Finally, the Court reasoned that 
acceding to BBCC‟s requested orders turns legislatures into rubber stamps and deprives 
them of their constitutional prerogative. As to the demand that ANC instructs its members 
to approve the relevant Bill, the Court argued that if granted, it will reduce those sitting in 
respective Parliaments to puppets. By virtue of the principle of separation of powers, the 
judiciary cannot dictate to the legislature what provincial boundary arrangement to adopt. It 
is limited. Aggrieved residents of Bushbuckridge were sent back to politicians who had 
failed to honour their earlier undertakings. This clearly suggested that the judiciary is not 
the right platform for communities seeking resolution of provincial boundary disputes.  
                                               
20 High Court of South Africa, Judgement in the High Court of South Africa, in the matter between 
Bushbuckridge border committee, Michael Mangisi Mnisi and the Government of Northern Province, the 
Government of Mpumalanga, theGovernment of the Republic of South Africa, the African National Congress, 
Case No 15607/97, paragraph 12.  
21 Ibid., para 18. 
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This Court failure dealt a serious blow to residents‟ struggle for provincial border 
change. Themba Godi describes the sentiments of the leadership of BBCC in these terms: 
“After going to Court and losing and after promises of establishing a joint administration 
between Limpopo and Mpumalanga, we dissolved the committee and said this is how far 
we could go. This is what we could achieve and this is where we are putting it to death”.22 
Establishment of Bushbuckridge as a cross boundary municipality and its transformation 
into the 7
th
 region in Limpopo also decreased local active opposition.  
When Government decided to disestablish all cross boundary municipalities in late 
2005, Bushbuckridge was totally transferred to Mpumalanga arguably as a result of lessons 
drawn from the past protracted dispute.  
  
2.9. Conclusion  
 
The Bushbuckridge boundary dispute was a significant political development in the 
post-apartheid era as it represented the first revolt of a black community against the ANC 
Government. The clash between the local community and the State ran over many years, 
from 1993 to 1998, in a manner that displayed community upheaval and public violence. It 
culminated in a Court action against the Provinces of Mpumalanga, Northern Province 
(Limpopo), the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the ANC. Though 
residents‟ preferences for Mpumalanga could not be legally enforced, the ANC 
Government partially addressed the concerns of the community by authorising joint 
administration of the area by Mpumalanga and Northern Province (Limpopo). The conflict 
                                               
22 Interview with Themba Godi, Member of Parliament, APC President and former secretary of BBCC, 9 
August 2010, Telephone interview. 
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was finally resolved in late 2005 when the discontinuation of cross boundary municipalities 
prompted Government to attach the area to Mpumalanga rather than Limpopo.  
Though this dispute has been extensively studied in existing literature, the 
originality of this thesis‟ approach is to revisit this instance of provincial disputes alongside 
others in an attempt to track common patterns. A later chapter discusses further cross 
cutting socio-political dynamics at work in post-apartheid boundary disputes. However, 
examining solely the Bushbuckridge case, it has clearly appeared that to satisfactorily 
account for the emergence and protracted nature of this conflict, a complex combination of 
factors should be taken into account: the interplay between historically constituted material 
conditions in the affected area and local notions of democracy and development, the 
conflicting regional planning paradigms espoused by communities and the State, 
Government‟s democratic deficit, strategic political struggles connected to the border 
decision, and the limits of judicial mechanisms to provide an adequate solution to the 
conflict.  
This explanatory framework emerges from careful consideration of the 
Bushbuckridge provincial boundary dispute. This clearly complements and reinterprets 
previous social scientific analyses of the case. Drawing on previous accounts and on my 
own field work, this thesis has particularly emphasised the interplay between material 
conditions and local ideologies of democracy and development as the core of the dispute. 
Disputing the exaggerated role attributed to economic performance and governmental 
efficiency in Mpumalanga as one of the main factors behind residents‟ preferences for 
Mpumalanga, this account of the Bushbuckridge saga has stressed residents‟ functional 
argument and claims that “even if Mpumalanga was under AWB, they would still want to 
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go there as that is where we belong”.23 Strategic political interests of the local ANC 
political elite as well as infighting over leadership positions at the 1997 Mafikeng 
conference did play a much more determinant role than has been recognised in the existing 
literature. Finally, the arbitration of the Supreme Court which returned the dispute to the 
already contested political arena should be regarded as an important explanatory factor for 
the duration of the conflict. In the final analysis, the Bushbuckridge provincial boundary 
dispute unfolded as a struggle for the community‟s socio-economic prosperity and a contest 
over political power at various scales. And it is these same socio-political dynamics that 
play themselves out in the Khutsong provincial boundary dispute.  
                                               
23 Ibid. 
 69 
CHAPTER 3: PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN 
KHUTSONG 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Faced with the 2006 local elections boycott by residents of the black township of 
Khutsong as a way to oppose the transfer of their municipality from the wealthy Gauteng to 
the mostly rural North West, President Thabo Mbeki downplayed the significance of the 
protest saying: “Khutsong is only a drop in the ocean”. In reaction to what they perceived 
as a derogatory statement, residents of Khutsong mounted over three years, from 2005 to 
2008, strong resistance to Government policy. The defiance campaign assumed national 
and international notoriety partly because of the high degree of violence and public 
disruptions it involved. At the height of the conflict, Khutsong became synonymous to 
“chaos”, “hell” as well as “resistance”. At issue was the provincial demarcation of the 
municipality of Merafong, in which Khutsong is situated, in either North West or Gauteng 
after the termination of the cross-boundary municipality arrangement. The people of 
Merafong and the Government found themselves at loggerheads with neither party showing 
readiness to compromise. Only a change in Government leadership in late 2008 altered the 
political opportunity structure making possible a denouement.  
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of the Khutsong provincial boundary 
dispute. In analyzing some of its most important episodes and providing an explanatory 
framework, two questions underpin the investigation: What are the key reasons polarizing 
the dispute? What are the strategies used by disputants to advance their respective cause? 
Against this backdrop, this chapter develops a socio-political account of the boundary 
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conflict in the Merafong municipality, with special focus on Khutsong as it was the driving 
force behind the resistance. The municipality would have easily moved to North West, had 
it not been for the intransigent dissent of Khutsong Township.  
The central argument of this chapter is that the Khutsong provincial boundary 
dispute can best be explained by looking at the interplay between historically constituted 
precarious material conditions and local conceptions of democratic governance and 
development, at conflicting regional planning paradigms espoused by the disputants, at 
Government‟s democratic deficit, at certain strategic political struggles around the 
boundary decision concerned, and finally at the limits of judicial arbitration of this type of 
conflicts. As in the previous chapter, what follows expands on each of these explanatory 
factors and ends with a conclusion which sums up major findings. To begin with, a 
geographical and historical profile of Merafong municipality and Khutsong Township is in 
order. 
 
3.2. The geography and historical context of the dispute  
 
Khutsong, a Tswana name meaning “place of peace”, forms part of Merafong City 
Municipality which straddled the south-west of Gauteng and the north-east of North West 
Province, 75 km from Johannesburg and 50 km from Potchefstroom (See map 4). 
Established in 1958, Khutsong owes its existence to its role as a township to Carletonville, 
one of the principal mining areas to the west of Johannesburg and the main centre of 
economic activity in Merafong City Municipality. Carletonville represents the biggest gold 
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mining complex in the world. This area was first developed with the discovery of gold in 
the early 1930s.  
The town of Fochville was established first, followed by Carletonville in 1948 and 
Wedela in 1978. Although these towns are considered separate entities, they were 
combined to form the Merafong City Municipality in 2004. Amalgamated areas included 
the then Carletonville Transitional Local Council as well as parts of Gatsrand rural council 
which were situated within the boundaries of Gauteng Province with the then Fochville 
Transitional Local Council, Wedela Transitional Local Council, as well as the surrounding 
farm portions which were situated within North-West Province. This explains why 
Merafong local municipality functioned as a cross boundary municipality until 2005. Under 
this dispensation, most of its inhabitants lived in Gauteng (71%) and the other part in North 
West (29%). The Municipality consists of the suburbs of Greater Carletonville, Fochville, 
Khutsong, Kokosi, Khutsong South, Wedela, Blybank, Welverdiend and the commercial 
farming areas surrounding these built-up areas.  
Merafong, a Sotho name for “place of gold”, located in the West Rand District 
Municipality, has the second largest population (215,865) in the District after Mogale City 
Local Municipality (SA Stats, 2007), and the largest average family size (5.2) (Merafong 
City Annual Report 07/08). Khutsong is by far the most populated town with 33.2% of the 
municipality population (Ricon [Pty] –Regional explorer data base, 2001; Merafong City 
Annual Report 07/08). The racial configuration of the municipal population is as follows: 
black African (83.5%), Coloured (0.8%), Indian or Asian (0.1%), white (15.6%). However, 
Khutsong is mainly a black African township (99.7%; Coloured (0.2%), Indian or Asian 
(0.0%) and white (0.1%)) (Ricon [Pty] –Regional explorer data base, 2001).  
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Map 4. Geographical location of Merafong and Khutsong  
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Before diving into the analytical framework that this thesis puts forward in 
explaining the Khutsong provincial boundary dispute, an overview of the escalation of the 
conflict is in order.  
From October 2005 to March 2009, the residents of Merafong under the leadership 
of the Merafong Demarcation Forum were involved in a fierce dispute to prevent the 
municipality of Merafong from being transferred from Gauteng to North West Province. 
Prior to 31 October 2005, opposition to Government proposed demarcation policy was 
generally peaceful and channelled through relevant institutions. On 24 and 25 September 
2005, peaceful rallies were held in Westonaria and in Merafong with the active support of 
the SACP and COSATU. In October 2005, residents submitted representations in response 
to the Municipal Demarcation Board‟s notice of their incorporation in North West. Noting 
the overwhelming resistance to the inclusion into North West, the Municipal Demarcation 
Board withdrew the proposed plan and confirmed that Merafong would remain in Gauteng. 
On 30 October 2005, residents of Khutsong held a celebration rally for what appeared to be 
the final victory on this issue. The triumph was short-lived as the Municipal Demarcation 
Board, on 31 October 2005, notified the municipality that Government‟s plan to 
incorporate Merafong into North West had been reintroduced.  
Hence, over the period from early November 2005 to 23 December 2005, residents 
intensified pressure including through violent means in a bid to prevent the enactment of 
the Government‟s plan. This was the period of the legislative process comprising the 
passing of the Bill in the National Assembly, its referral to the NCOP, the holding of public 
hearings in Provinces, the approval of the Bills in provincial legislatures, its approval by 
the NCOP, and finally its enactment by the President. An inconclusive meeting between 
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aggrieved residents of Khutsong and the Minister of provincial and Local Government, Mr 
Sydney Mufamadi, on the 5
th
 November 2005 contributed to entrenching perceptions that 
Government was determined to excise the municipality from Gauteng against the wishes of 
the majority in the area. The meeting was preceded by three days of intense community 
mobilisation, disruptive demonstrations and violence targeted at local public 
representatives. This initial violent campaign left a municipal building burned, councillors‟ 
houses petrol bombed, the mayor‟s house stoned, five councillors driven out of the 
township, telephone booths ripped out and thrown into the streets, many shops looted and 
82 people arrested.
24
 
A series of less disruptive public rallies and handing in of petitions followed 
including massive participation to the public hearing jointly organised by the Provinces of 
Gauteng and North West on 23 November 2004 where residents unequivocally voiced the 
majority preference to remain in Gauteng and legislators promised to support the majority 
view. For some technical reasons, the Gauteng legislature could not fulfil the promise at the 
time of voting in the NCOP. In a context where vetoing the Bill would have resulted in 
unpleasant consequences, on the legislature‟s analysis, it decided rather to approve 
                                               
24 On 2 November 2005, violent protest took place in Khutsong with these happenings: residents barricaded 
roads with burning tyres, car wrecks, large rocks and branches of trees; rocks were thrown at vehicles 
wanting to leave the suburb; some people wanting to go to work were intimidated, groceries bought in town 
were damaged; matric exams were stopped and learners were forced to leave school; twenty seven youth were 
arrested for looting shops. On 3 and 4 November 2005, well attended rallies took place in Khutsong stadium 
with respectively 3,000 and 6,000 attendees. On 5 November 2005, a march was organized and a delegation 
met with the Minister of provincial and Local Government, but no solution to residents‟ concerns was  
provided except a promise to forward residents‟ grievances to Parliament which was considering the 
legislation. These three days were marked by these disruptive events: angry residents set the municipal 
building on fire, looted shops, streets were barricaded with burning tyres, rocks, branches of trees and car 
wrecks, telephone booths were ripped out and thrown into the streets; on 4 November 2005, police 
reinforcements were called to assist when 6,000 residents, after a rally, started looting businesses; the homes 
of Mr Des Van Rooyen (Mayor) and other councillors‟ were bombarded with stones and a crowd petrol 
bombed councillors‟‟ houses causing five of them to flee; on 5 November 2005: marchers arrived at the 
extension four traffic lights and youth set rubber tyres alight; police used rubber bullets to disperse angry 
crowds; 43 people were arrested for looting (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2006). 
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Merafong‟s exclusion from Gauteng, thus reneging on its commitment without taking any 
step to inform affected citizens of new developments. The Constitutional Court was sharply 
divided on whether such conduct of the legislature amounted to a breach of a constitutional 
duty, as we shall discuss later. The 14
th
 December 2005, the day the Bill was approved by 
the NCOP, saw the culmination of community anger, with the destruction of valuable 
public and private properties, vandalisation of schools, burning of the mayor‟s house, 
physical attack on councillor Elias, with five policemen injured in a confrontation with 
stoning residents, and a high number of arrests (57).
25
 This also constituted the day of total 
breakdown in the relationship between the residents of Khutsong and the ANC as well as 
its president Thabo Mbeki. The political divorce was manifested through the public burning 
of Mbeki t-shirts and residents‟ ANC cards. An eleventh hour memorandum to President 
Thabo Mbeki, asking him not to sign the Bill into law could not prevent the acting 
president from sealing the fate of the people of Merafong by officially assenting to the Bill 
on 23 December 2005. The unrest in the township was far from over.  
Though the festivities of Christmas and New Year constituted a reprieve moment, 
the period running from 2 February 2006 to 2 March 2006 saw renewed waves of 
                                               
25 On 11 November 2005, a march was organized to submit a memorandum to the police station. On 23 
November 2005, residents attended the public hearing in Carlentonville which was jointly organized by the 
Gauteng and North West provincial legislatures. On 7 December 2005, disruptive protest took place in 
Khutsong and seven protestors were arrested by the police. On 12 December 2005, a march went to submit a 
memorandum to chief magistrate Howard Raath. The 14 December 2005 experienced the highest level of 
public violence and vandalism: Khutsong residents burnt t-shirts with President Mbeki printed on them; 
residents burnt ANC membership cards; a municipal truck was set alight; smoke from burning tyres engulfed 
the township and the streets were barricaded with boulders and old car wrecks; schools were vandalized; the 
library was destroyed and electronic equipment was stolen, those costs being estimated to be R8 million; a 
R350 000 council building used by the Southern African National Cancer Association was destroyed; 
Khutsong‟s stadium, swimming pool, roads and infrastructure were badly damaged; the police shot at 
protestors as their armoured vehicles came under fire from protestors throwing stones and bottles; residents 
used dustbin lids to shield themselves from rubber bullets, birdshop and stun grenades; the residents divided 
into smaller groups and destroyed 10 houses, and also torched Mayor Des Van Rooyen‟s house; Councillor 
Elias “Rachpark” Legoete‟s minibus, car and house were set on fire; he was injured in the attack and had to 
be hospitalized; five policemen were injured; fifty seven people were arrested; five houses were burnt down. 
(Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2006). 
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demonstrations and public violence that could be characterised as electoral violence. 
Whereas earlier acts of violence targeted officials of the State, this wave of attack was 
directed towards ANC leaders and ANC members who dissented from the community‟s 
election boycott campaign. In this crucial electioneering period, the Khutsong unrest 
became an ANC internal war with local SACP members distancing themselves from the 
ANC, and the ANC being divided in terms of pro- and anti-North West. The first march of 
the year was peacefully organised by the Young Communist League on 2 February 2006. 
Yet, on 12 February 2006, a group of some 150 SACP members threw stones at ANC 
members attending a campaign rally in Khutsong stadium. Temperature rose higher with 
the visit of the chairperson of the ANC, Terror Lekota, the premier of North West and 
Minister Brigitte Mabandla who was scheduled to address election rallies in Khutsong on 
18 and 19 February 2009. This was the first time that an ANC national leader had arrived in 
the township since its failed campaign to stay in Gauteng. Angry residents prevented 
people from attending the ANC rally and accused the ANC of dividing the community by 
bringing in residents from a nearby informal settlement to attend the rally. On 19 February 
2009, some 2,500 protesters created havoc outside Khutsong stadium where the rally was 
being held. Ministers Lekota and Justice Minister Brigitte Mabandla had to be whisked to 
safety by heavily armed police. Reports said that Lekota reacted strongly to the protesters, 
who chanted "voetsak (fuck off) out of Khutsong" and sang derogatory songs. Within these 
two troubled days, police arrested some 128 people charged with public violence. In the 
aftermath of Lekota‟s expulsion, the township remained in a state of volatility leading to 
the election boycott of 2 March 2006 after the Pretoria High Court had rejected -on 28 
February 2006- Khutsong‟s application for an election postponement. Less than 10% of 
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registered voters cast their vote in a climate of intimidation.
26
 Hours after elections, a house 
and a shack belonging to ANC members were set alight. The elected township leadership 
could only govern from “exile” as they had been violently chased from the township.  
Khutsong residents persevered over three years in their fierce opposition to 
inclusion in the North West, seizing every opportunity to protest and petition the 
Government while they also brought the matter to the Constitutional Court. On 21 April 
2006, a march jointly held with the residents of Moutse, also resisting inclusion in 
Limpopo, ended up with a fire being set alight on the lawns of the Union Building, 
Pretoria. The inauguration of the new council in Merafong on 3 May 2006 also sparked 
violent protest with two houses of councillors burned. However, it is the official integration 
of Merafong into the North West in March 2007 that saw renewed disruptions and violent 
attacks on councillors.
27
 The North West Premier Edna Molewa was sworn at by residents 
who told her to bring back Gauteng Premier Mbhazima Shilowa.  
From April 2007, schools in Khutsong became an important site for contestation of 
the demarcation decision. Key leaders of the Merafong Demarcation Forum were teachers 
in Khutsong schools which were among the first institutions of the public sector to interact 
with the new administration of North West Province. A series of school boycotts started on 
12 April 2007 that disrupted a great deal of teaching in Khutsong schools. Disruption of 
schooling in Khutsong lasted for three months with dire consequences on children‟s 
education, vandalised school infrastructure and breakdown of relationship in the school 
                                               
26 A mere 232 of 29,540 registered voters cast their ballots on polling day –and 12 of these were spoilt. This 
compares with 13,422 voters in the 2000 municipal elections, a turnout of 57,2 % (The Centre for 
Development and Enterprise, 2007, p. 31)  
27 On 26 February 2007, the premier of North West announced that Government was working on the final 
stages concerning the integration of Merafong into North West. On 1 March 2007, violent protest erupted in 
Khutsong. Six houses were petrol bombed. 12 people were arrested including an ANC councillor. Schools 
were disrupted (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2006). 
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community. At least three teachers were suspended in connection with their involvement 
with the demarcation forum. A recovery camp for Khutsong matric students in Taung was 
not only the source of more controversy, but marred with violent incidents opposing 
students to the host community. 
Khutsong remained ungovernable for three years even as its new provincial entity, 
North West made some attempts at asserting political authority. Any symbol of North West 
Province encountered strong rejection and North West officials had to be heavily protected 
by the police during visits in Khutsong. Residents specifically complained about the 
deterioration of health services. Distrust within the community was also at its highest level 
given divisions over the demarcation issue and the violent incidents. Delivered on 13 June 
2008, the judgment of the Constitutional Court, while dismissing the MDF application, 
reflected deep divisions among the judges.  
Taking seriously the Court‟s advice that the problem called for a political solution, 
aggrieved residents of Merafong redirected their advocacy actions towards politicians. 
However, three main factors played to their advantage. First, the new ANC leadership that 
had emerged from Polokwane in December 2007 with Jacob Zuma as the president sought 
to distance itself from contested policies of the Mbeki administration and to cast an image 
of a caring and people-driven Government. The re-alignment within the alliance opened 
channels of easier communication between the SACP and COSATU that unambiguously 
supported the cause of the residents and the new ANC leadership. In the aftermath of 
xenophobic violence in May 2008, the MDF organised a march to Luthuli house with great 
participation of African immigrants in an effort to broadcast a message of peaceful 
integration and submitted a memorandum that was well received by the new general 
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secretary, Gwede Mantashe. On 25 June 2008, just ten days after the Court judgement, a 
delegation of ANC leaders promised to return calm to Khutsong after meeting residents in 
the area. This was followed by a series of ANC meetings involving ANC North West, ANC 
Gauteng, and the Merafong community under the leadership of the ANC national office. By 
late 2008, these meetings had resolved the return of Merafong back to Gauteng.  
Second, the recall of President Thabo Mbeki followed by the resignation of his 
close allies in Government such as Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Sydney 
Mufamadi and GP premier Mbazima Shilowa gave impetus to the new ANC leadership 
intention to reverse the demarcation decision. From his first week in office, the new 
premier of GP, Paul Mashatile, reassured Khutsong residents that a legislative process was 
underway to get them back to Gauteng. The new Minister of provincial and Local 
Government, Sicelo Shiceka, also declared the determination of his cabinet to reverse the 
decision.  
Third, the prospect of an electoral boycott in Khutsong in April 2009 general 
elections prompted the ANC to ensure its return to Gauteng before voting. This was a 
strategic imperative in a context of decreasing ANC membership in Gauteng due to the 
competition of the ANC breakaway party, Congress of the People (COPE) and the 
controversy over the moral integrity of ANC presidential candidate, Jacob Zuma. Weeks 
before the finalisation of the decision by Parliament, Gauteng premier and ANC 
chairperson Paul Mashatile, in a rally held in Khustong, appealed to “residents of the 
Merafong Municipality to reward the ANC with their votes for bringing them back into 
Gauteng” (Du Plessis, 2009). No wonder then that opposition parties criticised the move as 
“political expediency” and “an opportunistic political move by the ruling ANC through 
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Government structures” (Bateman, 2008). Many members of Parliament expressed the 
view that the process was rushed through.
28
 The reincorporation of Khutsong to Gauteng 
came about as a result of another costly formalistic legislative process which caused 
dissatisfaction from minority groups. On approving the Bill that returned Merafong back to 
Gauteng, two Government Ministers formally apologised to residents for the “mistake” of 
placing them under North West jurisdiction:  
We are putting a final nail in the coffin that buries the unhappiness of the people of 
Merafong in general and in Khutsong in particular… These people were 
incorporated into the North West Province against their will… The Freedom Charter 
says no Government can claim legitimacy unless it is based on the will of the 
people… Today we are coming to reaffirm the principle that guided the ANC for the 
past 97 years… “Re entse phoso‟-Sesokho (we made a mistake)… „Lixhoshwa 
libhekile‟ -isiZulu (we are all fallible)” (Mkhwanazi, 2009).  
 
To explain this protracted and violent provincial boundary conflict, the following 
sections develop the interpretative framework which emphasizes the interplay between 
historically constituted material conditions and local notions of democracy and 
development, the conflict between disputants‟ regional planning paradigms, Government‟s 
democratic deficit, strategic political struggles, and limits of judiciary arbitration.  
 
3.3. Material conditions of the population of Khutsong  
 
Historically constituted precarious material conditions rendered the township 
susceptible to resistance and social unrest. These poor socio-economic conditions also 
                                               
28
 Statement by the NCOP delegate, Mr Madala Abram Mzizi on briefing the Gauteng legislature on the 
Constitution Sixteenth Amendment Bill, 20 February 2009. These exchanges were observed by the author 
who attended four meetings of the Gauteng provincial legislature‟s Local Government portfolio committee on 
20 February 2009, 27 February 2009, 3 March 2009, and 6 March 2009. More details on these meetings are 
provided in the appendix 1.  
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constitute a state of affairs which residents of Khutsong strove –through border dissent-, to 
emancipate themselves from. In this regard, the role of material conditions in explaining 
the dispute is to be understood in terms of both galvanizing factors and targeted goals. They 
are at the source of the discontent, but also the end to which the resistance is geared. How 
did material conditions contribute to and drive the provincial boundary dispute in 
Khutsong?  
The socio-economic profile of Khutsong‟s population as well as the physical 
characteristic of the settlement pointed to dire material conditions which constituted a 
source of resentment.  The municipality of Merafong counted 52% employed people, 
20.6% unemployed and 26.7% economically inactive (Merafong City Annual Report, 
2007/2008). Khutsong had one of the worst employment profiles in the municipality: 
26.4% employed, 35% unemployed and 39.6% economically inactive (Ricon [Pty] Ltd –
Regional explorer data base, 2001). Some 70.6% of Khutsong‟s inhabitants were classified 
as having no income while the percentage of this category in the whole municipality is 
43.9%. Top earners (in the range of R3,201 to R25,000) in the township constituted a mere 
1.8%. Khutsong‟s employment, education and income levels were substantially lower than 
those of the entire Merafong City Municipality.  
              In addition, the dolomitic nature of the land which renders 90% of land in 
Khutsong unfit for human habitation is one of the causes for Khutsong‟s under-
development. It has been a deterrent for investment in the area while other similar risk 
ridden areas have been handled positively. Mining resources from the area have not been 
utilised to uplift Khutsong and other similar townships in the region. The Local 
Government has embarked on a resettlement plan for Khutsong. However, the dolomite 
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crisis in Khutsong has been so poorly handled that it has engendered confusion and 
mistrust over the years. Whereas, starting in the 1960s, other dolomitic lands in 
Carletonville were brought under control via the establishment of the Far West Rand 
Dolomite Water Association with the assistance of the Council of Geoscience, Khutsong 
did not receive similar assistance. “Centurion and Carletonville are also dolomitic, but the 
pipes and infrastructure in these two places have been handled well”, said a municipal 
official (The Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2007, p. 37). Thus the township 
continued to grow despite the ever increasing instability of the dolomitic land resulting in 
structural damage to homes and depreciation of their value. The municipality and 
individual councillors also acted in a manner that left residents confused about the nature of 
the dolomitic threat. The municipality managed to have Khutsong declared a disaster area 
and to secure a resettlement plan for Khutsong, but this was not effectively communicated 
to residents. The municipality and councillors continued to develop in the area.  “Why are 
these infrastructural projects allowed to continue when our officials know that they 
ultimately want to resettle the community”, a protest leader reacted at news that a road 
construction project had been awarded (Ibid.). Lack of clarity on the issue led community 
members and leaders of the protest to look at the dolomitic issue as “simply a ploy used by 
the mining companies not to invest in Khutsong” and an excuse used by the Merafong City 
municipality for “its failure to develop the area” (Ibid.). 
             The Centre for Development and Enterprise report strongly highlights the 
importance of historically constituted material conditions in explaining Khutsong‟s border 
protest. Authors of the report argue that “poverty and unemployment and the perceived 
failure of the mines in the area to contribute to broader development were a fertile breeding 
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ground for protest” (Centre for Development and Enterprise, ibid., p. 43). This is conveyed 
by a youth leader in these terms: “When people are hungry, they are capable of doing 
anything. People are poor around here. We‟ve got a social democratic Government, but … 
democracy is killing us. People are given matchboxes to live in… In fact, the demarcation 
issue is but one of the factors that led to the protest” (Ibid.). Dissatisfaction with service 
delivery was also common in some areas of Khutsong as a community leader stated: “some 
areas in Khutsong are not provided with basic services such as running water, refuse 
removal and sanitation. Furthermore, where these services are provided, they are of such a 
low standard” (Ibid.). Khutsong‟s infrastructure is also worse compared to other 
neighbouring towns. Khutsong‟s poorer socio-economic standing in the municipality can be 
partly explained by the fact that other areas are closer to the mines, more important feeder 
areas for jobs in the mines and draw more benefit from this proximity. Yet, this creates 
resentment and feelings of exploitation as can be read in pronouncements from a 
councillor: “During my tenure I argued that mines should pay something to the Merafong 
Municipality. If you look at Khutsong, does it compare with other mining towns? Do you 
see any life here? No, our mines are useless. Our area is being destroyed daily by 
capitalists‟ mining companies, yet we receive nothing in return. Areas such as Krugersdorp, 
Randfontein and Kagiso benefit from the mining activities around here” (Ibid.). Frustration 
and resentment ran deep even before the provincial boundary dispute. The decision to move 
the locality from the wealthier Gauteng to the poorer North West was perceived as having 
the potential to worsen an already precarious situation.  
The centrality of service delivery and social development based arguments in 
residents‟ justifications of their preferences for Gauteng reflect the importance of existing 
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and projected material conditions in shaping the resistance. The overarching perception is 
that service delivery and prospects for social development are brighter in Gauteng Province 
compared to North West Province. Gauteng‟s provision of education is perceived to be 
richer in content, more advanced in terms of use of technology and adequate infrastructure, 
more resourceful, and more effective. Khutsong and Carletonville schools have been 
provided with computers and benefit from Gauteng‟s online program, whereas North West 
schools in Kokosi are “without computers because they are poor” and “all schools in North 
West are lagging behind with information technology”29. The Wedela submission pointed 
out that “the MEC for education has introduced a nutritional programme for all schools in 
Gauteng and it is doubtful whether North West will have a similar programme on a 
sustainable basis”.30 The Carletonville branch of South African Democratic Teachers‟ 
Union (SADTU), for instance, saw the Gauteng Department of Education as way ahead of 
its North West counterpart when it came to curriculum issues, human resources 
management, and infrastructure development. “We cannot afford to leave Gauteng 
Department, which is in forefront in curriculum issues i.e. currently the process of RNCS; 
implementation in 2006 is at an advanced stage. What about the North West? Moving to 
North West would cause a serious confusion”, could be read in SADTU‟s submission to 
Government.
31
 It also adds: “in Gauteng difficulties around provision of teachers and 
administration staff is a thing of the past. It depends on the effectiveness of the manager of 
the school in terms of submission. But in the NW schools have applied for such services 
from the Department and no supply hence very poor management and administration of 
                                               
29 Merafong city submission: View of the community of Wedela, submission to the Gauteng provincial 
legislature, 2005. 
30 Submission by Congress of South African Students (COSAS), 25 November 2005. 
31 Submission of the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU), Carletonville branch, to Gauteng 
legislature, 2009 
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schools which resulted in misadministration of schools”.32 Regular supervisory visits in 
schools; special attention to child headed families; orphans and needy learners; provision of 
temporary teachers; quicker filling of vacant positions; and better financial aid 
opportunities for learners are some of the Gauteng benefits which residents argue are not at 
all or scarcely provided in North West.  
Health and emergency services are also better in Gauteng as compared to North 
West, pro-Gauteng residents argued. There are enough clinics in Carletonville and 
Khutsong whereas in Kokosi, only two clinics exist without “medicine and staff to provide 
services after hours”33. No hospital exists in Kokosi resulting in pregnant women being 
always referred to Carletonville Hospital or Potchesftroom hospital. The majority of 
Merafong residents access secondary and tertiary health care in Gauteng and will continue 
to do so even if the municipality was to fall under North West for functional reasons. This 
would constitute an additional burden on Gauteng Province if the municipality does not fall 
under its jurisdiction. Emergency services such as fire brigade and ambulances are run by 
the Gauteng West Rand district municipality which serviced even areas of Merafong that 
fell in the North West under the cross municipality dispensation. Residents believe that it is 
unlikely that North West will provide them with similar services and that “it is unthinkable 
that accident victims on the N12, R28 and N14 where it currently runs through the West 
Rand District in the Westonaria and Merafong City areas, would be taken to secondary and 
tertiary medical facilities in the North West Province in Potchefstroom”.34 North West‟s 
under-resourced position aside, efficiency demands that emergency services be provided by 
                                               
32 Ibid. 
33 Merafong city submission: View of the community of Wedela, submission to the Gauteng provincial 
legislature, 2005. 
34 Ibid. 
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Gauteng given the short distance and functional link to its major cities such as 
Johannesburg.  
Concerning home affairs services, Merafong residents are happy that Gauteng has 
offices in Khutsong and Carletonville where registration for identity documents is done 
daily on an effective and efficient manner. The same benefit is not available to Kokosi 
residents who are said to be “suffering because their Government in North West cannot 
afford to bring services closer to them”. Identity documents are a necessary requirement for 
accessing welfare and other Government services. Access to home affairs services in the 
North West part of Merafong municipality is perceived to be difficult as attested by this 
testimony: “Officials from Potchefstroom are sent every Tuesday to register people without 
ID. Registration is done manually. People are expected to walk to town to register for IDs. 
If a person does not get an opportunity to register on that day, he must wait for the next 
Tuesday”35. A similar scenario applies to Government social services for which there are 
offices in Khutsong and Carletonville whereas in Kokosi, there is no dedicated office for 
these services. “They use municipal offices in Kokosi. They cannot afford to hire offices 
because they are poor”, complain Gauteng proponents.36 “In Gauteng, pensioners are paid 
for three days, whereas in Kokosi, pay for pensioners is provided once per month. If you 
fail to avail yourself on the pay day, you must wait for next month”, they add.37 Besides, 
Merafong-Gauteng is said to have enough staff for social services whereas in Merafong-
North West communities are serviced by only one social worker and volunteers. As 
Merafong was integrated in North West in 2006, residents noticed that certain community 
structures including the Mothusampilo, the home based care, Tshepo Themba Development 
                                               
35 A resident’s submission to the Gauteng Legislature, 2009. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.  
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centre and all the crèches suffered from absent or inadequate funding. The existence of a 
multipurpose community centre and eradication of the bucket system in Merafong-Gauteng 
are also celebrated as benefits one would not leave to go to North West where such a 
multipurpose centre does not exist and the bucket system is still prevalent.  
In addition to service delivery and social development concerns, residents also 
justified their attachment to Gauteng on economic considerations. The local economy of 
the Merafong is hard hit by the down-scaling of the mining sector as a result of the 
financial crisis. This creates significant job losses with associated increasing levels of 
poverty. The crisis caused by a declining mining sector is not helped by the dolomitic 
challenge which prevents establishment of industrial or agricultural activities on a large 
scale in order to absorb mining sector job losses. In this difficult socio-economic context, 
residents ask “to what extent the North West Province would be able to absorb such job 
losses into its provincial economic dynamics and to what extent the North West Province 
would provide the economic base or impetus for the survival of the communities of 
Merafong city”?38 For them, it is unlikely that North West will be able to help the local 
economy to cope and reinvent itself. Scepticism on North West capacity to re-launch 
Merafong local economy is unambiguous: “the material probability that the North West 
Province would not be able to provide a dynamic and empowering economic environment 
to counter the down-scaling of the mining sector and to absorb its impact in the long term is 
cause for grave concern”.39 But so is residents‟ acceptance that “the City region of Gauteng 
provides a far more feasible empowering economic environment to counter the steadily 
                                               
38 Merafong City submission: View of the community of Wedela, 2009. 
39 Ibid. 
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declining mining activities of the West Rand”.40 Indeed, existing poor material conditions 
in Khutsong, the driving force behind the border dispute, and concerns over service 
delivery and local economic development greatly shaped the uncompromising and violent 
rejection of Government‟s policy. This explanation would be overly materialistic if 
insufficient attention is paid to ideological underpinnings of the resistance -namely local 
notions of democracy and development.   
 
3.4. Local notions of democracy and development 
 
Recourse to democratic principles abound in residents‟ justification of their dissent. 
A memorandum submitted to authorities said: “The residents of Khutsong are calling on 
both the National Council of Provinces and the National Assembly to think about their 
mandate, which is to represent the people of South Africa. The decision to incorporate 
Khutsong into North West goes against the above principle, and we view this as a serious 
act to undermine democracy” (Ndaba, 2005). In various public demonstrations, residents 
would insist on the imperative that “people shall govern”, “batho pele”, and “the people 
must tell you” as could be read on posters on 20 September 2007 when the Merafong 
dispute was being argued in the Constitutional Court. Another community organizer and 
member of the Communist Party, Andries Magodiele expresses it in contrasted form: 
“Batho pele, people first, is what the Government keeps saying, but they are not putting us 
first”. In a 2009 submission, the Khutsong branch of YCLSA stated: “The YCLSA 
Khutsong branch is not in any way prepared to accept any deviations from the WILL of the 
                                               
40 Ibid. 
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masses of Merafong. Our guiding revolutionary documents are very clear that „THE 
PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN‟ not that the masses shall be guided to govern. According to 
the Greek Philosopher, „Democracy can‟t be guided‟”. In a post-apartheid South Africa 
where representative democracy is the instituted form of governance, these calls for 
popular sovereignty à la Freedom Charter were bound to clash with politicians‟ views of 
their role.  
Distinctive conceptions of local development also shaped residents‟ stance on the 
boundary issue. It was believed that only Gauteng has the resources to develop Khutsong 
and other poor townships in the area. Given the contribution of mining in the creation of 
wealth in Gauteng, Merafong and in particular Khutsong are seen to be entitled to 
investments from Gauteng especially in the current economic crisis. So deeply entrenched 
is such a belief in economic mutuality and inseparability between Merafong and Gauteng 
that Jomo Mogale could say: “Our revenue for the mines does not go to the North West 
Government, it goes to the Gauteng Government. It goes to the West Rand Council. Even 
when Merafong fell into North West, mining sector money was going to Gauteng. You see. 
Carlton Centre was supposed to be built here in Carletonville. That is why it is called 
Carlton Centre because of the romantic issue here. The Marshal tours, the Chamber of 
commerce were built with the revenue of the mines from Merafong. Why is it that we 
should now be taken to North West where we have never contributed financially? We have 
contributed a lot in Gauteng. So we belong here”.41 
Local development is also seen as a function of distance of one‟s locality to major 
economic centres. Besides, it is regarded as greatly facilitated when provincial demarcation 
                                               
41 Interview with Mr Jomo Mogale, Spokesperson of the Merafong Demarcation Forum, in Khutsong,  
07 March 2009. 
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corresponds with the existing flow of goods and movement of people. On several 
occasions, pro-Gauteng residents pointed out that the flow of goods and movement of 
people were naturally and functionally driven to Gauteng rather than North West. “We 
spend our money in Gauteng” as some residents put it. Monetary and material flows to (and 
from) Gauteng reinforce the belief that their communities should be served by Gauteng 
rather than any other province. This arrangement is believed to return value for residents‟ 
expenses in Johannesburg and other towns in Gauteng as well as proximity to Government 
departments in Gauteng. On close inspection, residents of Merafong and the Government 
professed adhesion to two conflicting schools in the regional planning debate. This 
fundamental conflict is at the centre of the clash between the people of Merafong and 
Government. 
  
3.5. Conflicting regional planning paradigms  
 
In holding to a conception of democracy as popular sovereignty and prioritising 
imperatives of local economic development and social equity as key determinants of 
provincial boundary demarcation, residents of Khutsong ascribed to the territorial regional 
planning model. In the affected community‟s eyes, all that mattered was the interests of 
Merafong and its right to determine its provincial identity. For this reason, they expected 
politicians to deliberate in a way that did not override local preferences. In other terms, 
legislators at national and provincial levels were bound to pro-Gauteng wishes expressed 
by residents in public hearings and various submissions. This is clearly a regional planning 
model that views Merafong as a territory whose fate should be determined not by national 
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or provincial leaders in pursuit of certain broad national or provincial interests but by the 
inhabitants of the locality for the sake of local interests.  
In contrast, Government‟s justification of its contested policy was framed within the 
functional regional planning paradigm. Securing a significant “equitable share” for North 
West featured as the key motivation for Government to insist on excluding the whole of 
Merafong from Gauteng.
42
 The North West Province had already lost parts of its areas and 
inhabitants to Northern Cape and Gauteng. In disestablishing the cross boundary 
municipalities that straddled between North West and Northern Cape, namely Phokwane 
Municipality, Ga-Segonyana Municipality, Kgalagadi District Municipality and Francis 
Baard District Municipality, “a substantial portion of the geographical areas which 
previously fell under the North West Province became part of the Northern Cape 
Province”.43 Besides, in including the whole of the metropolitan municipality of Tswane in 
Gauteng, “North West Province lost approximately 412,583 inhabitants”.44 Hence, the need 
to make sure the whole of Merafong was demarcated in North West, which stood to gain 
approximately 308,237 inhabitants, improving significantly its “equitable share”.   
Government also sought to take away additional strains that would fall on Gauteng if it had 
to cater for the whole of Merafong municipality. This would, on Government analysis, have 
necessarily increased the number of persons living in informal settlements to which 
Gauteng would have to provide services while being overwhelmed by increasing demands 
                                               
42 “Equitable share” is the State revenue allocated to provinces in terms of the applicable Division of Revenue 
Act enacted every year pursuant to Article 214 of the Constitution. The distribution of equitable share to 
provinces is one of the important financial instruments through which provinces are able to provide services 
to their inhabitants and support that municipalities are able to provide municipal services to their local 
communities equitably, and on a sustainable basis. One of the primary considerations which is ordinarily 
taken into account in determining the equitable share of each province is the number of inhabitants in the 
provinces. 
43 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others, 2008, CCT41/07, Answering affidavit of first and third respondents.  
44 Ibid. 
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from migrants and persons living in informal settlements. These policy justifications were 
presented for the first time to the Constitutional Court and had never been discussed at the 
provincial or local sphere of Government. It is thus difficult to know whether they were 
mere rationalisation in an attempt to pass the Court‟s rationality test. It is clear that the 
contested policy sought to instrumentalise the local unit in order to achieve national goals 
of provincial viability and service delivery load balancing.  
Functional regional planning reasoning also shaped Gauteng‟s decision to let 
Merafong municipality join North West. Though it had promised Merafong residents that it 
would support its cause at the NCOP, Gauteng Province was faced with the impossibility to 
amend the Bill at the NCOP level as it could only approve or disapprove the Bill. It had the 
constitutional power to veto the part of the Bill that excised Merafong from Gauteng, but 
decided not to exercise its veto power. In the final voting mandate, the Gauteng legislature 
justified its stance on national and provincial interest grounds. It argued that vetoing the 
Bill would prolong the situation of cross boundary municipalities across the province, fail 
to create viable and sustainable municipalities with proper revenue base and produce other 
undesirable consequences. In the minority judgement, Justice Moseneke argued that the 
legislature misconceived its power in the legislative power and acted irrationally. Justice 
Sachs reasoned that the legislature was obliged to at least inform residents of Merafong of 
its changed position. Whatever the appreciation of this conduct of the legislature, its use of 
national and provincial interests arguments to override reasonable local preferences 
amounts to functional regional planning thinking. People‟s conception of their power over 
their local territory and Government‟s functional approach to territorial reform were bound 
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to clash. In the course of the confrontation, Government displayed significant democratic 
deficit which greatly contributed to hardening grassroots resistance. 
 
3.6. Government democratic deficit  
 
Indicators of the Government‟s inadequate adhesion to democratic norms include 
unresponsiveness, inappropriate cooperation between the three spheres of governance, 
absence of policy justification and broken promises to Merafong residents.  As far as 
unresponsiveness is concerned, residents complained that the Minister of Local and 
Provincial Government, Sydney Mufamadi and Gauteng premier Mbazima Shilowa did not 
take seriously their objections to Government policy.  Even after the Municipal 
Demarcation Board, following consultation with the people in Merafong, had withdrawn its 
initial proposal of demarcating Merafong in North West, the Minister maintained his policy 
and was determined to push it through Parliament. Despite having received dissenting 
submissions from residents of Merafong and having met with a delegation from Merafong 
on 5 November 2005, the Minister introduced the Bill to Parliament without even alluding 
to the fact that the proposed legislation was generating local resistance. Before Parliament, 
the Minister argued that the proposed “legislation would set the scene for the reconstruction 
of the „developmental landscape‟”.45 Jomo Mogale slammed the Minister‟s conduct in 
these terms: “We had public hearings on November 25, which were attended by the 
portfolio committee of the Gauteng and North West legislatures, and the outcomes of the 
hearings were clear: the people of Khutsong want to remain in Gauteng … We had an 
                                               
45 SAPA, 13 December 2005. 
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overwhelming 90 percent vote for Gauteng. The remaining few wanted to go to North West 
for their own selfish interests… In spite of the majority decision, Mufamadi went ahead to 
lobby Parliament to support his proposal” (Ndaba, 2005). Pointing at Minister Sydney 
Mufamadi as one of the main instigators of the ensuing social unrest in Khutsong, a 
resident in Khutsong remarked that “as long as President Thabo Mbeki and Minister 
Mufamadi, who is in charge of Local Government, continue to ignore the cry of the 
residents of Khutsong, or continue to use the police in order to beat the people of Khutsong 
to submission, the crisis will continue”.46 As for former premier Mbazima Shilowa, his 
failure to oppose Merafong‟s exclusion from Gauteng was seen as complicit: “Shilowa did 
nothing to stop the move, instead he supported it. We went to his office several times but he 
never came to speak to us. He sent junior staff and never responded to our grievances”.47 
The municipal mayor Des Van Rooyen was likewise seen as betraying the cause of 
Merafong after his council had made a strong submission for the area to stay in Gauteng.  
Political leaders were not just unresponsive, but were also seen arrogant. This 
attitude profoundly humiliated and frustrated residents, consolidating their determination to 
fight back by all means. Mosioua Lekota‟s attempts at engaging the residents of Khutsong 
appeared too confrontational and came too late. He responded to residents‟ anger by 
reading them the riot act, blaming the local leadership and calling on the police to arrest 
unruly protesters. During a rally in Khutsong on 19 February 2006, “Lekota and Justice 
Minister Brigitte Mabandla had to be whisked to safety by heavily armed police” as 
protestors “chanted „voetsak (fuck off) out of Khutsong‟ and sang other derogatory 
                                               
46 SAPA, “disgusting silence” from cabinet, 21 August 2007. 
47 SAPA, Khutsong “no-go area” for dissidents -Mogale, 29 October 2008. 
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songs”.48 The then ANC chairperson and Defence Minister later conceded that conditions 
for a free and fair election did not exist in troubled Khutsong. However, it is the then 
President Thabo Mbeki‟s derogatory dismissal of Khutsong‟s campaign which hurt 
residents the most. On visits through certain polling stations, President Thabo Mbeki was 
reminded by journalists about election boycotts in Khutsong. He responded: “why focus on 
Khutsong? Khutsong is just a drop in the ocean. Whether they vote or not won‟t make any 
difference”49. The statement caused Khutsong residents to radicalise the resistance as 
Gladys Matshoele, MDF organiser and Khutsong SACP secretary, stated: “that derogatory 
statement made us unite and we said: let us show him that the small drop in the ocean can 
have a big impact in his political life. So then we told ourselves we are going to make sure 
that this area becomes ungovernable”.50 Even as violent protest intensified in Khutsong, 
President Thabo Mbeki attended imbizos in other non-troubled areas prompting reporters to 
question the president‟s “quiet diplomacy” on Khutsong. They wondered: “Where is 
President Thabo Mbeki as Khutsong burns? Last week he was in Kimberley, then in 
Soshanguve, then Manenberg and Langa. In other words, everywhere but Khutsong”.51 
Thabo Mbeki‟s distant attitude was interpreted as active opposition against the wishes of 
the people of Merafong as expressed in a statement from Khutsong Ministerial fraternity: 
“We don't know why the president has sided against us. Perhaps he is misinformed”.52 
                                               
48 http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Politics/0,,2-7-12_1886111,00.html. Accessed on  
28 December 2009. 
49 Interviews with Gladys Matshoele, treasurer of SACP Khutsong and Merafong Demarcation Forum  
organiser and with Yvonne Ntshabele, teacher at Badirile school in Khutsong, Branch Executive member of  
SACP in Khutsong and Secretary of Merafong Demarcation Forum, in Khutsong, March 2009. 
50  Ibid. 
51 Vukani Mde and Karima Brown, Khutsong exposes absentee leaders, 27 Feb  
2006.http://emm.newsexplorer.eu/NewsExplorer/clusteredition/en/20060227,bday 
491a300767b93f5898a564d1ef2fc1fd.html.  Accessed on 28 December 2009. 
52 SAPA, Mbeki given “Khutsong‟s gospel”, 09 May 2007.  
http://www.pretorianews.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=&fArticleId=nw20070509153751164C350311. 
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Another indicator of Government democratic deficit is found in the lack of prior 
consensus between the three spheres of Government on the demarcation decision. It turns 
out that the provincial Government and the Merafong municipal council never really 
bought into the stated objectives of this policy. Had the national Department of Local and 
Provincial Government convinced the provincial Government and the municipal council of 
the appropriateness of demarcating Merafong into North West, these two entities would not 
have shown opposition to this policy. It emerges from public submissions to the provincial 
legislature that the municipal council initially opposed the policy and advocated in favour 
of Merafong falling totally within Gauteng. The submission reads: “the Merafong City 
Local Municipality, taking all relevant factors into account, and after consultation with the 
community, herewith submit a fully motivated request that, should action be taken to do 
away with cross-boundary municipalities, the total area of jurisdiction be included in the 
Gauteng Province”.53 Later on, the Mayor Des Van Rooyen abandoned the municipal 
council‟s early position without any justification.  Some residents alleged that councillors‟ 
late approval of the controversial policy had been bought in exchange for promotions in the 
North West provincial Government. As a result, councillors‟ houses and municipal 
buildings became primary targets of public violence by Khutsong residents when the crisis 
escalated into violent protest. 
Similarly, the provincial legislature initially promised to make sure that Merafong 
municipality was not demarcated in North West. “The portfolio committee on Local 
Government… recommends to the house amendment to schedule 1A of the Constitution 
Twelfth Amendment Bill [B33B-2005] to provide for the inclusion of the municipal area of 
                                                                                                                                               
Accessed on 28 December 2009. 
53 Motivation by Merafong City Local Municipality to be included in Gauteng province, Merafong City, 
Office of the Executive Mayor, 10 November 2005. 
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Merafong into the municipal area of the West Rand District municipality of the Gauteng 
Province”54 concludes the assessment of the views of the public canvassed during public 
hearings held on 25 October 2005. The negotiating mandate for the vote in the NCOP was 
adopted in line with this conclusion. Until 30 November 2005 when the Gauteng 
negotiating mandate was presented to the select committee of the NCOP, the position of the 
legislature was unchanged. Whatever the persuasion exercised on the Gauteng provincial 
legislature, it altered its stance on the matter between the 1
st
 December 2005 and the 5
th
 
December 2005. Whether it was reasonable and rational for the Gauteng provincial 
legislature to trade its constitutional right to provincial territorial integrity with other issues 
of “national interest” remains an open debate. The Gauteng legislature, with all the good 
will invested in facilitating public involvement in the legislative process, found itself in a 
fait accompli situation. It is not an exaggeration to conclude that the final policy decision of 
excluding Merafong from Gauteng was imposed on the municipal council, the provincial 
legislature and the people of Gauteng.  This is easily achieved in the ruling ANC in which 
loyalty to “instructions from above” is a cornerstone virtue (Gumede, 2005).  
A further dimension of Government democratic deficit was the absence of any 
justification as to why it was found more appropriate to demarcate Merafong as a whole in 
North West rather than in Gauteng following the disestablishment of cross boundary 
municipalities. COSAS justified its opposition to Government policy on the grounds that it 
did not “give us any substantive and compelling reasons as to why Merafong should go to 
North West as opposed to Gauteng Province”.55 Such explanation deficit raised suspicions, 
mistrust and consolidated perceptions that the policy was irrational. “The fact that there are 
                                               
54 Ms Refiloe Letwaba, Gauteng Legislature, Local Government portfolio committee, Negotiating mandate 
on Constitution Twelfth Amendment Bill. 
55 Submission by Congress of South African Students (COSAS), 25 November 2005. 
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no reasons forwarded for the proposed move to North West is a clear indication of 
arrogance on the side of Government and we strongly believe that the views of the people 
must be taken into account”, added COSAS.56 In Court papers, The Merafong Demarcation 
Forum contests the rationality of the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act by arguing that 
“the reasons provided for the change of stance on the Amendment do not make sense and 
are, in fact, not reasons at all”.57 
In pushing the National Assembly to adopt the Twelfth Amendment Bill, the 
minister of provincial and Local Government did not provide detailed and municipality-
specific justifications for his proposal. It was taken as sufficient justification to pursue the 
suppression of cross boundary municipalities. Why a municipality would be demarcated 
exclusively in one province rather than the other was not justified either by the Minister of 
provincial and Local Government or by the National Assembly at the adoption of the Bill. 
So shocking was such lack of justification on the part of Government that the 
Constitutional Court judges stated that this amounted to undemocratic conduct and did not 
facilitate judicial arbitration of the dispute. As the criticism was formulated in the context 
of the Matatiele provincial boundary dispute, the next chapter will discuss further the 
significance of the judicial attack on the opacity of Government policy. It is at a late stage, 
under interrogation from the Constitution Court, that Government put forward reasons 
behind its decision to demarcate the whole Merafong in North West. It was difficult to find 
out whether these reasons did indeed inform the decision-making process or whether they 
were merely plausible explanations which could help Government get off the hook. What is 
clear is that neither the equitable share nor the population load-balancing arguments had 
                                               
56 Ibid. 
57 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others (2008), para 180. 
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been presented or discussed with the Gauteng Province, the Merafong municipal council or 
the residents of Merafong.   
 Lastly, failure of the Gauteng provincial legislature to honour its promises and to 
report back to the people of Merafong on its unsuccessful attempt to secure their inclusion 
in Merafong constituted a democratic deficit problem. Constitutional Court judges were 
divided on whether there was a Constitutional duty for the provincial legislature to report 
back to the people of Merafong. On whether the Legislature‟s failure to report back to the 
community vitiated the quality of its compliance to the Constitutional duty to involve the 
public in the legislative process, the majority held a minimalist and formalistic view of the 
right of public participation whereas the minority judgment, especially Judges Sachs‟ and 
Madala‟s reasoning, provided a maximalist interpretation. The majority of judges were 
satisfied with the holding of the public hearing and the recording of residents‟ concerns in 
the Legislature portfolio committee‟s minute and in the negotiating mandate. For them, that 
was sufficient evidence that the duty to facilitate public involvement was adequately 
discharged. That the Legislature misconceived its power in the NCOP and had to review its 
negotiating mandate without bothering to report back to the concerned residents was 
considered to be minor incidents that did not affect the quality of the public participation 
process that had taken place. The legislature‟s early ignorance of the impossibility to amend 
the Bill at NCOP level was excused by the argument that we cannot expect legislators to 
know all legal nuances or all relevant facts. That they did not report back was minimized as 
possibly disrespectful or discourteous, but not rising to the level of the breach of a 
Constitutional obligation. Such disrespectful conduct, the majority judgment suggested, is 
punished through elections not by Courts.  
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The minority judgment, especially Sachs‟ ruling, upheld the progressive 
interpretation of the right to public participation outlined in the Doctors for Life 
International ruling.
58
 According to Sachs, the initial engagement of the legislature with the 
residents of Merafong was not a sham. Yet, it was unreasonable for the legislature not to 
report back to the people on its changed position with regards to the demarcation of the 
municipality
59
. Whereas participatory democracy is intended to produce dialogue, 
mutuality of open and good-faith dealing, and maintenance of a good relationship between 
Government and the citizenry, absence of further consultation with residents engendered 
quite the contrary of these constitutional goals: diminished civic dignity for the majority, 
rupture in the relationship between the community and the Legislature, a debacle. On close 
scrutiny, the two camps disagree on the implications of the conduct of the provincial 
legislature, but all find such behaviour objectionable in a democratic society. Perceived 
Government democratic deficit contributed a great deal in radicalising and prolonging 
resistance against the unpopular policy. Moreover, the dispute was informed by groups‟ and 
individuals‟ strategic political agendas as well.  
  
                                               
58  Delivered on 17 August 2006, one day before the second judgement on the Matatiele provincial boundary 
dispute, the ruling,  in the matter between an international health organisation named Doctors for Life 
International and the National Assembly  and others, constituted a landmark pronouncement on the nature and 
the scope of the right of the public to be involved in legislative processes. The judgement struck down three 
health related acts on the basis that the National Assembly had failed to involve the public in its legislative 
processes. See Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and Others, CCT 
12/05, 17 August 2006. The judgement on the Matatiele provincial boundary dispute which also invalidated 
the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act as it related to Matatiele extensively drew on the doctrinal strides 
made in the Doctors for Life International case.  
59  Three important elements should have led the legislature to resume some degree of consultation with the  
community. First, the legislation was unusual: it is one of the rare matters on which the provincial legislature 
has been given the veto power. Second, its sociological consequences on the lives of residents were real as 
they stood to be functionally and emotionally affected by the legislation. Third, strong expectations had been 
created by two objective factors namely the proposal of the Municipal Demarcation Board and the initial 
position expressed in the negotiating mandate, both of which were favourable to the wishes of the majority of 
the people in Merafong. 
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3.7. Strategic political struggles  
 
Certain sectional strategic interests have underpinned the border conflict. On close 
examination, both the 2005 contested policy to exclude Merafong from Gauteng and the 
2009 fast-tracked decision to reverse the earlier policy seem to have been directly linked to 
strategic political interests of the ANC. In pushing for Merafong to be included in North 
West, Government sought to compensate the province for the population lost incurred as a 
result of moving Mabopane, Garankuwa and Hammanskraal, in the north of Gauteng, to 
the metropolitan municipality of Tswane(Pretoria) in Gauteng (See map 5). Members of 
opposition parties have alleged that this decision was dictated by a need for the ANC to 
consolidate its metropolitan electorate and ensure unchallenged control of the metropolitan 
municipality.
60
 According to these critics, the ANC electorate was strategically more 
important for the consolidation of ANC dominance in Tswane (Pretoria). Inclusion of these 
communities in the metropolitan area can be justified on proximity and functional grounds 
just as Merafong residents would do to defend their preferences for Gauteng. However, 
members of opposition parties charged that the Government preferred having these North 
West areas included in Gauteng, precisely in the metropolitan area of Tswane (Pretoria) 
because of the electoral advantage it would offer to the party
61
. To avoid further 
encroaching on the North West territory, the Government was left with no choice but to 
attach the whole of Merafong in North West.  
                                               
60
 Interview with Mr Herman Droenewand, DA MPL in North West provincial legislature, in 
Mmabatho/Mafikeng, 09 March 2009; with Mr Andrew Gerber, FF MPL in North West provincial legislature,  
Mmabatho/Mafikeng, 09 March 2009; with Chris Hantingh,DA MPL in North West provincial legislature 
Mmabatho/Mafikeng, 09 March 2009 and with Malusi, UCDP MPL in North West provincial legislature, in 
Wedela (Merafong), 12 March 2009.  
61 Ibid. 
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If true, these allegations point to some level of gerrymandering in the early decision 
to demarcate Merafong in North West. The reversal of this decision in 2009 was partly 
linked to the need to secure Khutsong‟s pro-ANC votes at general elections. This was a 
strategic imperative in a context of decreasing ANC membership in Gauteng due to the 
competition of the ANC breakaway party, Congress of the People and the controversy over 
the moral integrity of ANC presidential candidate, Jacob Zuma. Weeks before the 
finalisation of the decision by Parliament, Gauteng premier and ANC chairperson Paul 
Mashatile, in a rally held in Khustong, appealed to “residents of the Merafong Municipality 
to reward the ANC with their votes for bringing them back into Gauteng” (Du Plessis, 
2009). No wonder then that opposition parties have criticised the move as “political 
expediency” and “an opportunistic political move by the ruling ANC through Government 
structures” (Bateman, 2008). 
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Map 5. Former North West Areas such as Mabopane, Hammanskraal, Soshanguve, 
Garankuwa falling entirely in Tswane Metropolitan municipality in Gauteng since 2006. 
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Many members of Parliament have expressed the view that the process was rushed 
through. On briefing the Local Government portfolio committee on the Constitution 
Sixteenth Amendment Bill that aimed to redemarcate the whole of Merafong in Gauteng, 
the NCOP delegate Honourable Madala Abram Mzizi (IFP) stated that many legislators at 
provincial and national level complained that the relevant Bill was being rushed. The 
chairperson of the portfolio committee, Ms Refiloe Letwaba countered the criticism by 
arguing that it was less about rush than a drive to safeguard the interests of the people of 
Merafong.
62
 “The people of Khutsong have spoken. We have to embrace their views. It is 
democracy at work”, Ms Letwaba often stated during the hasty legislative process. The DA 
Chief Whip in Gauteng legislature Mr Jack Bloom questioned the credibility of this 
discourse: “this policy reversal is again a political thing in reality. A big quote coming from 
the ANC these days is : „It is democracy at work‟. Why does it work some times and not 
others”?63  
Personal interests of certain provincial and local politicians stood to be served or 
damaged both by the 2005 policy and its reversal in 2009. Merafong councillors‟ change of 
position from preference for Gauteng to support of North West was explained by residents 
as motivated by promises of promotions in North West Province. Regarded by the 
community as traitors, councillors, their property and municipal facilities became primary 
targets of public violence in the municipality. Besides, opposition party members of North 
West provincial legislature opposed the release of the Merafong municipality to Gauteng in 
2009. Some of them stood to be severed from their constituencies in Fochville and Wedela. 
                                               
62 These exchanges were observed by the author who attended four meetings of the Gauteng provincial 
legislature‟s Local Government portfolio committee on 20 February 2009, 27 February 2009, 3 March 2009, 
and 6 March 2009.   
63 Interview with Mr Jack Bloom, DA Chief Whip in Gauteng Legislature, in Johannesburg, 5 March 2009. 
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These DA, FF, and UCDP North West MPLs argued that, to correct Khutsong‟s forced 
removal from Gauteng, Government was again forcing Fochville, Kokosi, Greenspark and 
Wedela into Gauteng. Sections of the white population and local politicians in the 
previously North West parts of Merafong (Wedela, Greenspark, Kokozi, Fochville) did not 
support the inclusion of the whole of Merafong in Gauteng where they claimed to have 
little social and political connections. A white farmer voiced his opposition to the Bill at 
public hearing in Carletonville civic centre in these terms:  
We support the struggle of the people of Khutsong. But now Government is pushing 
Wedela, Kokozi and Fochville in Gauteng. The same mistake they did for Khutsong, 
they are doing it for us. We have never been part of Gauteng, now suddenly we must be 
part of Gauteng. So they correct a mistake by making another mistake.Government said 
no one will be moved against their will. Now people in Wedela, Kokozi and Foshville 
are being moved against their will.
64
 
 
A white school teacher from Fochville equally objected to the Bill citing a long productive 
relationship with North West and familiarity with its officials:  
We are quite happy in North West. We have spent long time to know people 
working in various Government departments. It is the third time that we will be 
moving now. No one consulted with us as a school and as a community. Actually, 
there has been no consultation in Fochville area that I am aware of. The ANC said 
no one will be forced to make a change.
65
 
 
Having his electoral base in Wedela, Mr Malusi, a UCDP MPL in North West likewise 
attacked the credibility of the public participation process leading to the policy reversal:  
 
We have not been sufficiently consulted. There was intimidation in the public 
hearing. Residents of other places such as Wedela could not feel free to voice 
dissenting views. People fear for their lives and their property as Khutsong residents 
                                               
64 Observation captured during my attendance of the public hearing session in Carletonville on  
25 February 2009. 
65 Ibid. 
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have been very violent in the past. We think that they should have organised 
separate hearings in places such as Wedela, Kokosi and Fochville. 
 
He then warned of future unrest in Kokosi, Wedela and Fochville as a result of their 
“forced” inclusion in Gauteng.   
An ANC Member of Gauteng legislature dismissed this opposition as driven by 
narrow interests and as the lamentation of losers:  
A few individuals in these opposition political parties just protect the interests of their   
narrow constituency... They want to preserve seats here or there, they look at their very 
narrow interests. No one tries to see what is in the interest of the majority of the people 
in that area. What is best for these people putting aside one‟s political interests? I know 
that Freedom Plus and other small parties cannot be happy with this decision. Some 
will lose their seats in NW legislature; some will lose control over few wards as there 
might even be redemarcation of wards within the municipality. We will swallow them 
over a few wards they used to control in the past. That is why they are not happy. But 
why can‟t they approach blacks and canvass for votes? Why do they maintain a racial 
constituency? We will swallow them.
66
  
 
As is apparent in this statement, political parties and individuals sought to promote 
and secure their strategic interests. Even at such local level, ANC politicians have looked at 
demarcation policy and counter-policy as a means to contain and defeat opposition parties.   
 
3.8. Limits of judicial mechanisms  
 
For Merafong residents, the most important lesson emerging from the Court‟s 
dismissal of their case was that the dispute needed political settlement. It took twelve 
months for the Court to deliver a highly polarised and controversial judgment.
67
 
                                               
66 Anonymous interview, Gauteng Legislature, March 2009. 
67 The majority position dismissed Merafong‟s application with the support of six judges. The minority 
judgment with the concurrence of four judges ruled in favour of the Merafong Demarcation Forum. See 
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Constitutional Court judges fundamentally differed on key inquiries: Was the public 
participation process a genuine one or just a sham? Did the process end with the holding of 
the public hearing session or was the legislature bound to keep the community engaged 
until the final decision? Was the legislature bound to a decision that accords with the 
wishes of the people and with its promises at the public hearing and in the negotiating 
mandate? Was the legislature‟s final decision to support the excision of Merafong from 
Gauteng rational or irrational in the light of the outcome of the public hearing and the 
power of a possible veto granted to it by the Constitution?  
The majority judgment considered that public participation in the legislative process 
had been properly facilitated despite legislators‟ failure to act on promises made to 
residents of Merafong and to report back to the people on the unfavourable development. 
As for the rationality attack, the Court applied a minimal rationality test which enquired on 
whether the legislation was directly linked to a legitimate policy goal. In this regard,  the 
legislature‟s  reliance on the urgency of disestablishing cross boundary municipalities, on 
the need to create sustainable and viable provinces, on the necessity to boost North West‟ s 
equitable share and willingness to avoid perceived adverse consequences of a veto was 
enough to satisfy the Court.  
On deeper analysis, the Court‟s dismissal of the application did not amount to an 
acceptance that Government‟s policy was adequate. It was in a sense a declaration of the 
Court‟s incompetence to rule on the matter. To achieve the goal of disestablishing 
Merafong as a cross boundary municipality, different ways were available, namely to locate 
Merafong either wholly in Gauteng or wholly in North West. The Court acknowledged its 
                                                                                                                                               
Constitutional Court of South Africa, Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others (2008) ZACC 10; 2008 (10) BCLR 969 (CC); 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC). 
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limits: “from economic, geographical and other perspectives the choice can be debated, but 
it is one for the legislature to make. It is not for this Court to decide in which province 
people must live or to second-guess the option chosen by the Gauteng Provincial 
Legislature to achieve its policy goals and thus to make a finding on how socially, 
economically or politically meritorious the Twelfth Amendment is”.68 Based on the 
Constitutional principle of separation of powers, this position of the Constitutional Court 
says it all on its inability to substantively weigh among Government‟s policy options when 
procedural requirements have been adhered to. 
 
3.9. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has focused on the Khutsong provincial boundary dispute. In 
explaining the protracted and violent boundary dispute between Government and the 
people of the Merafong municipality, the chapter has developed a sophisticated 
interpretative framework which places emphasis on the interplay between underlying 
precarious material conditions and local notions of democracy and development, on the 
clash between Government‟s and residents‟ regional planning models, on Government‟s 
democratic deficit, on strategic political struggles relating to the boundary decision, and on 
the inability of the judiciary to substantively address the dispute. In doing so, the chapter 
has shed more light on “the space-time constitution of sectional interests… power relations, 
and political struggles” (Gore, 1984, p. 260) which have influenced policy and counter-
policy regarding the provincial demarcation of the Merafong municipality.  
                                               
68 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others (2008), para 114. 
 109 
The combined effect of historically constituted material conditions and ideas of 
popular sovereignty and special entitlement to Gauteng‟s wealth rendered the township 
unreceptive to any change perceived against its interests and particularly predisposed to 
violent resistance. Residents of Merafong feared that exclusion from the wealthier Gauteng 
Province would dramatically compromise service delivery in all its aspects as well as their 
economic development. Arguments pointing to the lower standard of services in the North 
West Province, especially the issuing of home affairs documentation, emergency services, 
the management of schools, health care services, abounded and were recurrent. Whereas 
North West was represented as a rural and poor province, Gauteng was embraced as “the 
economic hub of the country” and “home”. It was seen as the only province capable of 
supporting Merafong to weather the storm caused by the mining downscaling and 
associated consequences. Merafong residents are convinced they are entitled to such 
support as the mining industry in Carletonville contributed a great deal to Gauteng wealth. 
Expectations of higher standard services and economic development underpinned by strong 
feelings of special entitlement constituted the driving force behind popular resistance to 
Government demarcation policy. These socio-economic demands were couched in a 
political discourse that emphasized the need for laws to be based on rationality and popular 
sovereignty.  
  The chapter has also argued that Government‟s functional approach to regional 
planning prevented any serious consideration of the preferences of the majority of 
Merafong residents. The Minister of Local and Provincial Government, like an architect 
remotely mapping the optimal configuration of regions, sought to transform 
underperforming cross boundary municipalities into “developmental landscape” using 
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criteria such as the need to guarantee “equitable share” and balanced population load. For 
residents of Khutsong, distance to centres of Government services, integration with close 
economic centres and local interests, factors usually associated with territorial regional 
planning, should have militated for attaching the area to Gauteng. Moving from 
diametrically opposed assumptions and interests, these two sides were bound to clash. 
The perceived undemocratic character of Government decision-making contributed 
a great deal to the violent confrontation. Government perceived unresponsiveness, 
indifferent and arrogant conduct of key Government officials, central Government‟s 
overriding conduct with regard to the provincial and local spheres of governance, late and 
the poor policy justification and provincial legislature‟s inability to honour promises, were 
all factors that diminished the democratic content of the contested policy. As a result, they 
contributed in lending some legitimacy to grassroots resistance, including disruptive 
protest.  
Both the 2005 demarcation decision and the 2009 policy reversal may have been 
linked to political strategic struggles in which the ANC stood to gain the most and other 
opposition parties had the most to lose. This shows that gerrymandering stills informs 
territorial reform in post-apartheid South Africa. When called to arbitrate the dispute, the 
Court‟s inability to weigh Government‟s policy options prolonged the conflict in driving it 
back into the political arena. In the final analysis, the provincial boundary dispute in 
Khutsong was less to do with some inherent value attached to provincial delimitations than 
with securing brighter socio-economic opportunities for the affected community. Besides, 
various disputants also sought to conserve or maximise their hold on political power. In 
order to broaden knowledge of the relevant socio-political dynamics in play in post-
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apartheid provincial boundary disputes, this thesis moves to another case -namely the 
Matatiele provincial boundary dispute in KZN and Eastern Cape (EC).  
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CHAPTER 4: PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY DISPUTE IN 
MATATIELE  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
On Thursday 16 October 2008, violence broke out in Matatiele Town. A march in 
celebration of the incorporation of the town to the Eastern Cape (EC) had been forcefully 
disrupted by dissidents in support of the demarcation of the municipality into KZN. The 
marchers had been bussed from surrounding areas to Matatiele Town with alleged logistical 
support from the municipality. The confrontation was expected, but nothing was done to 
call off the march. As a result, shops were looted. Others were even burnt down. In an 
attempt to reassert order, the police arrested nine individuals. One person was shot in the 
shoulder and laid down. When an EC ambulance arrived to pick up the injured person, pro-
KZN activists objected:  “Leave him alone. We need an ambulance from KZN”.69  
This disturbing episode of the generally peaceful Matatiele provincial boundary 
dispute revealed in unambiguous terms the depth of community antagonism caused by the 
2005 decision to move the town of Matatiele from KZN to EC. Since then, the area has lost 
peace and cohesion. The overwhelming majority of residents has fiercely opposed the 
policy through a wide range of political actions including petitioning, demonstrations, and 
Court challenges. A minority has aligned itself with the local political elite and traditional 
authorities to support the Government decision. In the face of intense protest and damaging 
                                               
69 Sapa, 16 October 2008 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=nw20081016162809246C441901. 
Accessed on 10 November 2010.  
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Court challenges, Government did not budge until late 2009 when it opted for fresh 
engagement with the people of Matatiele.  
In line with the explanatory framework emerging from the Bushbuckridge and 
Khutsong cases, this chapter also argues that the Matatiele provincial boundary dispute is 
best interpreted by highlighting the important role played by underlying material 
conditions, local notions of democracy and development, conflict between functional and 
territorial regional planning paradigms, Government‟s democratic deficit, strategic political 
struggles, and the limits of judicial arbitration. Before providing analysis on each of these 
factors as they pertain to the Matatiele case, it is opportune to present the geographic 
setting of Matatiele and the historical context of the provincial boundary dispute.  
 
4.2. Geography and historical context of the dispute 
 
Matatiele, a mid-sized town serving the farming and trading communities of East 
Griqualand in the foothills of the western Drakensberg, Eastern Cape (EC), on the border 
with KZN and 20 km from the southern frontier of Lesotho, is the reference point for all of 
the Northern Transkei (See map 6). The residents in and around Matatiele, as in most of the 
Northern Transkei region, are generally bilingual in isiXhosa and seSotho. Many speak 
some English. Some also speak as a home language (or as a language of heritage) Phuthi, 
especially residents in Tsitsong and Tšepisong. Amahlubi is the majority ethnic group in the 
area.  
In its current status, the Matatiele local municipality is comprised of three areas: 
Matatiele town, Cedarville and Maluti. Together with the municipality of Umzimvubu, it 
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forms part of the district municipality of Alfred Nzo which falls in the EC Province. The 
Matatiele municipality comprises 24 wards and a population estimated at 194,692.  
Matatiele has long witnessed instability in its provincial identity. As a result of 
apartheid spatial segregation, this area has experienced spatial fragmentation, confused 
provincial identity, racial polarisation and ethnic antagonism. Originally, Matatiele and the 
Maluti area constituted a single unit in the Cape colony before moving to the Natal 
Province. Matatiele was an urban development while Maluti was a rural area. In 1978, the 
Steyn Commission recommended that Matatiele and Maluti be separated, and that Maluti 
become part of the Transkei while Matatiele remain in Natal. This was in line with the 
apartheid policy of separate development and relocating Africans into rural areas which 
formed homelands while ensuring that whites remained in the urban areas. The Interim 
Constitution in 1994, using magisterial districts to delimit the nine provinces, established 
the current Matatiele town as the magisterial district of Mount Currie in KZN, and the 
current Maluti as the magisterial district of Matatiele in EC. In 1995, a majority of the 
Trengove Commission recommended that the district of Mount Currie be excised from the 
Province of KZN and incorporated into the Province of the EC whereas a minority report 
advocated that Mount Currie remain in KZN. Neither option was adopted. 
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Map 6. Geographical location of Matatiele. 
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During the 2000 municipal demarcation process, the Municipal Demarcation Board 
established the Matatiele Municipality in the area that was described as Mount Currie in the 
Interim Constitution. This municipality was incorporated into Sisonke District Municipality 
in KZN. The magisterial district of Matatiele (the Maluti area) was demarcated to form part 
of a local municipality known as Umzimvubu and placed within Alfred Nzo District 
Municipality, which fell in the EC (see map 7). The separation of Matatiele town from its 
surrounding Maluti rural areas remained unchanged and continued to be the subject of 
much discontent. Many voices insistently called for the reunification of the town and its 
rural villages.
70
  
All stakeholders agree that Matatiele Town and its surrounding Maluti area need to 
form one municipal unit in order to address the legacy of apartheid segregation. Whether 
the unified entity should be included in KZN or in the EC is the question that has since 
1993 divided not only the Government and its constituency, but more so the affected 
residents themselves. In 1993, ANC national leaders asked its Matatiele/Maluti 
constituency to “elect a people‟s Government that would ensure the unification of Matatiele 
and Maluti and its inclusion in the province that the majority of the people will wish to see 
themselves in”.71 In 1995, the ANC-led Government failed to act on either the majority or 
minority recommendations of the Trengove commission. As a result, Matatiele and Maluti 
areas remained separated. In 2005, the Matatiele-Maluti area between KZN and EC was 
considered by Government as “cross-boundary jurisdictional enclave similar to cross-
                                               
70 Most inhabitants of Matatiele Town come from the surrounding villages. These rural areas constitute the 
most important consumer and labour base for the town. The separation of these two areas was only based on 
apartheid policy. Residents of surrounding villages hence consider Matatiele to be their land and claim a right 
to ownership of what they regard as their town.  
71 Interview with Philip Galo Mandla, AIC President, leader in the MMMAOC and Matatiele Poverty 
Alleviation Network, and MPL in EC Province, Matatiele, 8th November 2009. 
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boundary municipalities”.72 Given administrative and functional difficulties experienced in 
cross boundary municipalities, the Department of Local and Provincial Government, under 
the leadership of Minister Sydney Mufamadi, sought to scrap this ineffective municipal 
arrangement. As was the case for Merafong and Bushbuckridge, Matatiele town and its 
Maluti rural areas needed urgent restructuring. According to Government, these two entities 
posed similar challenges as cross-boundary municipalities, though not having the official 
status of a cross boundary municipality. They belonged to two different provinces while 
they constituted a cohesive and integrated community. Such assimilation to a cross 
boundary municipality was strongly contested in legal proceedings that dissident residents 
instituted in resistance to the Government decision to move Matatiele town from their 
preferred KZN to EC. Residents could not understand why legislation dealing with cross 
boundary municipalities should be used to exclude their town from the Province of KZN. 
Nevertheless, all the parties admitted that the demarcation of the town and its surrounding 
rural areas in two different provinces was a territorial anomaly that needed intervention.  
Matatiele‟s fate was intimately linked with that of the municipality of Umzimkulu 
which had constituted an enclave in KZN. This EC municipality fell almost totally within 
the geographical territory of KZN. It was a matter of no debate that Umzimkulu naturally 
belonged to the KZN Province.  To address these demarcation problems, Government 
embarked on a process that would see the reunification of Matatiele and Maluti within the 
EC Province and the transfer of Umzimkulu municipality to KZN. As a result, EC Province 
stood to lose Umzimkulu with its 174,338 inhabitants, but was being compensated with the 
economically active town of Matatiele with its 16,226 inhabitants.  
                                               
72 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the RSA and Others 
[2006], ZACC 2; 2006 (5) SA 47 (CC); 2006 (5) BCLR 622 (CC) (Matatiele 1), para 13.  
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Map 7. The provincial location of Matatiele in the period from 2000 to 2005 
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The process of reconfiguring the Matatiele provincial boundary started in late 2005 
implicating institutions such as the Department of Local and Provincial Government, the 
Municipal Demarcation Board and Parliament. After it had considered submissions from 
the residents of Matatiele, the Municipal Demarcation Board, on 18 October 2005, issued a 
provisional re-determination which, contrary to the Minister‟s initial proposal, included the 
integrated Matatiele/Maluti as one municipality in KZN citing “well motivated” 
submissions from residents. However, the Minister maintained its decision to move the 
reconfigured Matatiele to EC and relied on Parliament to rubber stamp the policy.  
After failing to persuade Government through petitions, meetings with officials and 
public demonstrations, members of Matatiele Maluti Mass Organising Committee 
(MMMAOC) became disillusioned with the ANC. Disenchanted, they quickly registered a 
new party called the African Independent Congress (AIC), to compete in the March 2006 
local elections. As they campaigned to win seats for the local council in the 2006 local 
elections, MMMAOC members also launched a Constitutional attack on the Constitution 
Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005 and the related Cross-Boundary Municipalities Laws 
Repeal and Related Matters Act on grounds that Matatiele had been improperly assimilated 
to a cross-boundary municipality and that the Minister had usurped the Municipal 
Demarcation Board‟s power by overriding the latter‟s decision on the boundary between 
KZN and EC. 
Applicants‟ central claim was rejected by the Constitutional Court and the local 
elections were allowed to proceed as planned. However, in an unsolicited move that could 
be qualified as judicial activism, the Court called for further submissions on Government 
compliance with Constitutional procedural requirements to examine whether the challenged 
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act was adequately passed. The Court found that the provincial legislature of KZN did not 
facilitate public involvement in the legislative process before approving the Bill, as 
required by Article 118 of the Constitution. For that reason, the legislation was declared 
unconstitutional, but the ruling was suspended for 18 months to afford Government time to 
rectify the defect. Despite this legal victory, Matatiele remained in the EC, awaiting a 
corrective legislative process.  
However, the rectified legislative process, completed in October 2007, was 
corrected only in form. The final outcome substantially deviated from embracing the views 
of the majority of the people of Matatiele. The ANC-led provincial legislature of KZN 
approved for the second time the exclusion of Matatiele town from its provincial territory 
against the wishes of the majority in the area and amidst protestation by all the opposition 
parties and affected residents.  
Unlike areas such as Merafong and Bushbuckridge where border disputes have 
mainly opposed Government to the local community, the Matatiele case has displayed 
sharp divisions within the community itself.  The area has seen the emergence of two 
camps, a pro-EC and a pro-KZN one, with both sides holding strong views in justification 
for their preferences. Pro-KZN residents by far outnumber the pro-EC ones, judging from 
submissions to provincial legislatures and the recent test of the views of the residents 
organized by the new Minister of Co-operative and Traditional Affairs, Mr Sicelo 
Shiceka.
73
 Though forming the minority view, the pro-EC group with influential support of 
local ANC leadership and traditional authorities, has been more effective in persuading the 
                                               
73 After three years of unresolved dispute, the Zuma administration decided to re-engage with the residents of 
Matatiele. One of the measures taken in that regard was the organization of an informal electoral process 
through which residents had to cast votes on their provincial preference. It took place from 28 to 31 October 
2009.  
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national Government to demarcate Matatiele/Maluti in EC.  The disagreement over the 
provincial boundary has divided the community and has generated much personal 
animosity.  
In late 2009, the Constitution Thirteenth Amendment Act of 2007, that confirmed 
the inclusion of Matatiele town to EC, was attacked by a network of Matatiele 
organisations called the Poverty Alleviation Network. Yet, the Court found that the 
legislative process had conformed to constitutional standards. The rise of Jacob Zuma to 
the ANC and country leadership as well as the appointment of a new Minister for Local and 
Provincial Government opened opportunities of fresh engagement with border dissidents. A 
visit of Matatiele by a high level alliance delegation constituted of ANC national secretary 
general, Gwede Mantashe, COSATU general secretary Zwelizima Vavi, and SACP general 
secretary Blade Nzimande allowed the alliance leadership to realise the sharp antagonism 
between pro-KZN and pro-EC camps and the lack of clarity on what constituted the 
majority view in the area. President Zuma visited the area in person and urged local 
authorities for improvement in service delivery. An NEC decision on 30 March 2009 
mandated the Minister of Co-operative and Traditional Affairs to test the views of residents 
in border disputes areas such as Moutse and Matatiele in order for the Zuma cabinet‟s final 
decision to be informed by people‟s choice. This move constituted a clear departure from 
the top down approach to provincial boundary decision making that characterised the era of 
President Thabo Mbeki and Minister Sydney Mufamadi. 
The testing of the views of the people of Matatiele/Maluti through an electoral 
process was of course a progressive move, heralding a territorial approach into regional 
planning. Yet, its implementation from 28 October to 31 October has failed to appear 
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transparent, free and fair in the eyes of the pro-EC camp which has denounced the process 
and its outcome as “useless”, “partisan”, “flawed” and “illegal”. The end result of this 
process revealed that 89% of voters support KZN while only 11% are in favour of EC. 
That cabinet made it clear that the final decision will not be based solely on the 
outcome of the polling exercise keeps some EC proponents optimistic. Yet, it is difficult to 
think of an alternative boundary arrangement that will avoid the terribly destabilising 
defect of creating winners and losers. In the context of the Matatiele provincial boundary 
dispute, few voices have been advocating for scrapping provinces all together. To account 
for the Matatiele provincial boundary dispute, this thesis employs the interpretative 
framework which emphasises the interplay between material conditions of the people of 
Matatiele/Maluti and local notions of democracy and development, conflicting regional 
planning paradigms, Government‟s democratic deficit, strategic political struggles and 
limits of judicial arbitration. Focus falls on each explanatory factor in order to shed more 
light on this complex case. 
 
4.3. Material conditions of the population in Matatiele/Maluti  
 
The Matatiele municipality comprises 24 wards with a population estimated at 
194,692 of which 13% is employed, 22% unemployed and 65% economically inactive 
based on Statistics South Africa Census of 2001 and adjustment following the amendments 
to municipal boundaries that took place on 1 March 2006. Some 41% of the households 
have no income while 90% have an annual income of less than R19, 200 (Matatiele 
municipality draft IDP 2007-2011). 
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Socio-economic considerations are by far the most cited by KZN supporters. These 
reasons refer to a wide range of governance areas in which KZN is rated significantly 
higher than the EC: infrastructure, emergency services, health services, education, housing, 
transparency. Residents are not only convinced of better services with KZN Province, but 
they also fear deterioration of the status quo as their municipality has been moved to a less 
efficient, less resourced and more corrupt EC Province. “To obtain identity documents 
would be more difficult. Submitted documents get easily lost in EC. Then one is called to 
resubmit again. One ends up with long delay in getting the much needed service” 
complained residents in the public hearings prior to the passing of the Constitution 
Thirteenth Amendment Act of 2007.
74
 According to Mandla Galo, chairperson of 
MMMAOC, residents of Matatiele “wanted to be part of KZN because it had better 
infrastructure and was more organized”.75 The Drakensberg Taxi Association chairperson 
lamented bad roads in EC and pointed out that good maintenance of roads in KZN is one of 
the reasons they want to remain in this province.
76
 
Quality of health services prominently features as an area of great concern in 
residents‟ rejection of EC. A number of respondents have pointed out that services have 
deteriorated with the transfer of Matatiele to EC. Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe stated that 
“clinics lack oxygen, blood and provide poor health services. There was a time when 
                                               
74   Interview with MPL Mbuso Kubheka, President of the KZN legislature portfolio committee on local 
Government and traditional affairs, Newcastle, 5 April 2009. 
75   SAPA, Matatiele looking for a “home”,  27 September 2005,  
http://www.news24.com/Content/SouthAfrica/Politics/1057/1d5c1f8c871641cabbeb70812a1b008c//Matatiel 
ooking_for_a_home, accessed on 29 June 2010. 
76  Interview with Davidson Lebeko, the chairperson of the Drakensberg Taxi Association, Matatiele,  
11 November 2009.  
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people would say: „you go to Matatiele hospital, you go to a death camp‟”.77 This sinister 
picture was echoed by a woman street vendor in these terms:  
When someone is sick, we are told there are no ambulances to transport them and 
have to hire private vehicles only to discover (on getting to hospital) that there are a 
lot of parked ambulances. When one calls for an emergency service, the phone rings 
forever and one is compelled to take their sick person onto the bus. This used not to 
be the case under the KZN administration. While they were not familiar with our 
rural areas, they made efforts like requesting one to wait at the bus stop to direct the 
ambulance accordingly and their response was very quick. The ambulance would 
even be coming from Pietermaritzburg. In Matatiele clinics, medication given to our 
sick persons is only panado irrespective of one‟s illness or diagnosis78 . 
 
 AIC Councillor Makolwa noted that: 
The best services are rendered by hospitals in Pietermaritzburg or Durban. Yet, 
when a resident is in bad condition, he is transferred to Umthata in the EC. In case 
he dies, it is costly to have the corpse transferred back to Matatiele. Transferring 
corpses from Pietermarizburg or Durban is less expensive and there are many taxis 
on that route.
79
 
 
He argued that reliance on ineffective emergency services from EC once cost life to victims 
of an accident. Councillor Makolwa recalls the drama:  
There was Mvenyane bus that was involved in an accident in 2008 at around 8.00 
am. We had to wait for emergency services from Bisho, but they took long time to 
arrive on the accident scene. And when they came they had inadequate equipment. 
We then decided to call KZN emergency services that quickly came. Some 21 
people died. Matatiele residents were angry at us as the EC Province came with 
inadequate equipment.  Had the service been closer, some people would have been 
saved. This whole change put our people in danger.
80
  
 
As with regards to the education sector, residents and professionals complain about 
the lack of tertiary institutions in EC resulting in most students attending KZN universities, 
                                               
77 Interview with Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe, Ongeluksnek farms (Matatiele), 8 November 2009. 
78 Focus group interview with women street vendors: Mapulane Tsoaeli, Maradebe Njobe, NG Makae, in 
Matatiele, 9 November 2009. 
79 Interview with AIC councilor Makolwa, in Matatiele, 9 November 2009. 
80 Ibid. 
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poor management of schools in EC, human resources management problems and pervasive 
corruption. “Our boys go to school to Durban or to Pietermaritzburg. There are no tertiary 
education institutions in this region”, noted the chairperson of Drakensberg Taxi 
Association.
81
 Two pro-KZN Matatiele teachers described dysfunctional and inefficient 
practices such as lack of transparency in the selection of senior teachers, inconsistencies 
and discrepancies in how temporary and permanent teachers are treated, tribalism, 
unnecessary workshops serving the interests of service providers which turn out to be 
associated with education officials, wasteful expenditures, and mismanagement of sport 
and recreation activities to the detriment of learning and teaching curriculum. Human 
resources mismanagement is viewed in terms such as this:  
Some educators are underpaid, but others are overpaid without explanation. It 
happens that people are paid more than they expect without any explanation. Here 
in EC, they are confused. There are temporary educators that are being paid more 
than permanent teachers. Temporary educators are getting housing allowances and 
medical subsidies and yet there are permanent teachers that do not get those 
benefits. These are not errors. And you must not think that these temporary teachers 
are treated in the same way.
82
 
 
Irregular collusion of education officials‟ business interests and school activities seriously 
compromise learning quality in schools:  
Department of Education organizes workshops where we do not get to learn 
anything. They invite service providers who use the workshop to advertise 
themselves and make money. And at the end of the day, you have travelled long 
distances and missed lessons for nothing. These workshops are so many, for 
teachers, principals, etc. If you look closely, you will see that officials from the 
Department of Education have all companies (catering companies, stationery 
companies, and accommodation companies). They seem to organize these several 
workshops with the purpose to spend money and get service providers make 
profit.
83
 
                                               
81 Interview with Davidson Lebeko, the chairperson of the Drakensberg Taxi Association, in Matatiele,  
11 November 2009. 
82 Anonymous focus group interview with two teachers, in Matatiele, 10 November 2009. 
83 Ibid. 
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All these malpractices leave teachers deeply demobilized: “we are sick and tired of EC. As 
teachers we have tried to support the EC, but we are sick and tired”.84 
Similar disenchantment emanated from two street vendors for whom EC has not 
delivered on promises to support hawkers association and provide housing. The 
chairperson of the Masibambane Hawkers Association elaborated on their grievances:  
When the EC administration took over, they made us join NAFCOC in 2006. We 
paid joining fees varying from R45 to R90, depending on the nature of business. Up 
to now, we have not seen any improvement and no one tells us what is happening. 
We were hoping to get support from this initiative as we had been promised 
cooperatives. The sad thing is we were never given any receipt as proof of payment 
and they promised to build a stock store for us. Nothing has happened. All this has 
rendered the hawkers ungovernable.
85
 
 
Speaking on the housing problem, another street vendor said:  
We were also promised RDP houses by KZN. This has never happened after the EC 
took over. In fact, the EC administration has never attempted to help us in any way. 
I have personally tried to speak to Parliament in Cape Town alerting them to the 
complaints about the municipality as the municipality has divided people and 
selected those they favour and did not allow us in their meetings. The municipality 
had not given any reason why they were doing this. We are told that the houses had 
been given to people without following the list which was drawn some time ago.
86
 
 
Poor material conditions in EC are thought to be linked with pervasive corruption 
and patronage politics in the province. Accusations of widespread corruption and patronage 
in EC provincial departments and municipalities were recurrent in conversations with 
participants. These perceptions undoubtedly informed residents‟ rejection of EC. At the 
time of interviews, reports of embezzlement of 28 million rand in Alfred Nzo district 
                                               
84 Ibid. 
85 Focus group interview with women street vendors: Mapulane Tsoaeli, Maradebe Njobe, NG Makae, in 
Matatiele, 9 November 2009. 
86 Ibid. 
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municipality had just surfaced in the media. Exposed corrupt practices included recurrent 
embezzlements of public funds, awarding of tenders to business associates or friends, 
clientlist appointments to municipal jobs, and suppression of debates on financial reports. It 
was argued that corrupt practices take place within patronage networks that permeate key 
party political structures from the municipal to the national level. For pro-KZN residents, 
municipal officials resist provincial change because their long established corrupt 
patronage networks within EC risk being dismantled while establishing similar networks in 
KZN political structures may prove challenging. As AIC Councillor Makolwa put it: 
Here, they give tenders to their people regardless of their competency. Corrupt 
networks in EC risk being destroyed. If moved to KZN, these local leaders will 
have to start afresh or will not get anything.
87
 
 
Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe concurred: “embezzlement of funds is terrible here”.88 Even a 
pro-EC resident such as Ms Klopper admits there appears to be more corrupt practices in 
EC in comparison to KZN. However, she is adamant that residents should not flee but 
rather contribute to fixing the problem:  
We love EC even if the service delivery level is low. If we all run away from EC, 
who will fix the province? Instead of running away from the province, we need to 
cry louder for us to be heard. Leaving the province will not help.  Who will fix EC 
if no one is there to complain?
89
 
 
While Ms Klopper‟ statement underscores the limitations inherent with pro-KZN residents‟ 
attempt at addressing a governance problem with an exit strategy, her provincial preference 
may be biased by her participation in a school transport contract with the EC Department of 
Education. Like her, many holders of contracts with the municipality or the provincial 
                                               
87 Interview with AIC councillor Makolwa, in Matatiele, 9 November 2009. 
88 Interview with Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe, in Ongeluksnek farms (Matatiele), 8 November 2009. 
89 Interview with Ms M. Klopper., in Matatiele, 7 November 2009. 
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administration support the status quo for fear of increased competition or inexistent 
“support networks” in KZN. 
 
4.4. Local notions of democracy and development  
 
From the residents‟ perspective, the Matatiele provincial boundary dispute has 
emerged from an ideological background which sees the post-apartheid era as the 
democratic moment and democracy as involving more than just consultation. From the 
transition period, the majority of residents in Matatiele/Maluti have desired the 
reintegration of the town with its rural surroundings and their inclusion in KZN Province. 
The apartheid separation of Matatiele and Maluti and the subsequent inclusion of Maluti in 
Transkei have long been held as illegitimate. This explains resistance against this policy 
which was ultimately implemented by force. Against this backdrop, residents of 
Matatiele/Maluti saw the end of apartheid as an opportunity for the people to define by 
themselves their local identity and provincial location. As the provincial arrangement 
agreed upon at the 1993 multiparty negotiation maintained the status quo, residents of 
Matatiele/Maluti urged the ANC to ensure they were demarcated in KZN. In response, 
ANC leaders asked residents to first vote the ANC into Government and the necessary 
territorial reform would follow. So, the apartheid illegitimate territorial policy in the area as 
well as initial promises made by the ANC shaped residents expectations for a people-driven 
regional policy in the post-apartheid era.  
The notion that people should fully participate in shaping their provincial identity 
has been deeply entrenched within the population. It formed one of the principal reasons 
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for opposing Matatiele‟s exclusion from KZN. On the day of hearing at the first 
Constitutional Court challenge, a resident, George Moshoeshoe, put it simply: “We‟ve 
never been part and parcel of the EC and they (Government) never spoke to us” (Musgrave, 
2006). The decision to move Matatiele to EC was found unconstitutional precisely on the 
basis that the KZN legislature failed to involve the people of Matatiele in its legislative 
process.  
Besides, local notions of democracy go beyond requirements of consultations.  
Dissenting residents fundamentally reject the view that Government may override the 
community majority view. The notion that “instructions from above” should override local 
preferences is just unacceptable to dissenting residents. The latter constantly appeal to the 
notion of popular sovereignty contained in the Freedom Charter; as Chief Jeremiah 
Moshoeshoe puts it: “The views of the people are important. Whenever you move 
communities, you have to consult with them. As the Freedom Charter says people shall 
govern. It is a matter of checking the views of the people”.90 Failure of the KZN legislature 
to agree with the preferences of the majority of residents in Matatiele/Maluti in correcting 
the early constitutional defect was attacked anew in the Constitutional Court and in public 
opinion as unacceptable in a truly democratic society. The post-apartheid era was embraced 
by the residents of Matatiele/Maluti as time for more democratic decision-making. Such 
democratic character meant more than just the requirement to consult the people. It has 
been represented a state of affairs in which the voice of the majority can prevail, even 
against Government‟s initial position.  
As far as local conceptions of development are concerned, the majority of residents 
see local development as conditioned by proximity to provincial headquarters and other 
                                               
90 Interview with Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe, in Ongeluksnek farms (Matatiele), 8 November 2009. 
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major economic centres. In addition, they see development as greatly facilitated in a 
situation where provincial location corresponds with the pre-existing flow of goods and 
people. In this regard, the proximity to the provincial capital has been an important factor -
as stated by a reporter in these unambiguous terms: “Another problem the community had 
with the demarcation was that the capital of the EC, Bisho, was nine hours away from 
Matatiele while KZN‟s capital Pietemarizburg was only three hours away” (Musgrave, 
2006). Sections of the farming community have justified their preference for KZN on the 
ground that “the area is closely associated with KZN. They believe that their interests can 
be more effectively served from Pietermaritzburg as the capital” (Adams, 2005, p.4). If 
Government is to be close to the people, then residents think it makes more sense for them 
to be governed from Pietermaritzburg rather than from Bisho. Proximity to provincial 
structures is believed to make a difference because “when a problem has not been 
addressed by the municipality, we want to be able to easily contact the provincial 
authorities”.91 
Economic and social functionality, as it relates to the flow of people and goods, has 
greatly shaped preference for KZN and resistance to Government policy. The typical 
functionality-based argument would be expressed as follows: “We do most of our business 
with KZN. Our boys go to school in KZN. Most people travel towards KZN and have 
relatives there. We hardly go to Bisho and any other town in the EC”.92 Against this 
backdrop, pro-KZN residents find it hypocritical that certain pro-EC leaders have houses in 
Pietermaritzburg or Durban where their families go for education, holidays and 
entertainment while they continue pushing for Matatiele to remain in the EC. For AIC 
                                               
91 Interview with E. T. Hehlehla, the Headman of Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe, in Ongeluksnek farms 
(Matatiele), 8 November 2010. 
92 Ideas recurrent in conversations with pro-KZN residents. 
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councillor Makolwa, self-interest can explain what he sees as an ambivalent position 
towards provincial boundaries:  
Chief Magadla, head of CONTRALESA in EC, supports EC whereas he has a 
house in Pietermaritzburg where his kids and himself go for holidays. In the past, he 
used to advocate for KZN, but he suddenly changed his mind for self-interest. He is 
not alone in the category. There are also other people who contradict their actions.
93
  
 
Of course, people are free to move and operate wherever they like. The point of this 
argument is that the conduct of municipal and traditional leaders is such that they implicitly 
recognise that KZN offers more opportunities than EC. While their families and themselves 
access these resources, they prefer the municipality as a whole to stay in EC. For pro-KZN 
activists, this ambivalent conduct shows clearly that the most important reason the local 
political elite support EC has to do with their political career and not the benefit of the 
majority of affected people.  
Linking development with proximity to economic and political centres is dismissed 
by pro-EC politicians as “homelands” thinking or remnants of the “influx control” era. 
Besides, for an influential minority in the Matatiele/Maluti community, the move to KZN 
would have detrimental consequences on traditional authorities, cultural practices and land.  
Proponents for EC place a great deal of emphasis on their cultural differences from the 
Zulu culture and express fears of falling victims of Zulu cultural and political hegemony in 
KZN. Among pro-EC residents, it is common to hear utterances such as these: 
“Circumcision is very important to us. Zulu don‟t practise it. We may not be free to 
exercise this cultural practice as we are used to in the EC”; “The Sotho town Nqutu has 
already experienced disturbances in the performance of their circumcision rituals in KZN”; 
“Here, boys go to mountains for circumcisions. This may not be accommodated by KZN 
                                               
93 Interview with AIC Councillor Makolwa, in Matatiele, 9 November 2009. 
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people”; “Most pro-KZN are not circumcised. That‟s partly why they would prefer KZN 
where circumcision is not practised”94. These respondents strongly believe that the KZN 
provincial Government, under the dominant influence of the Zulu people, may outlaw or 
fail to adequately promote their cultural practices, especially circumcision. Some point to 
such precedents in Nqutu, the only Sotho village in KZN where the practice of 
circumcision is said to have been disturbed by neighbouring Zulu people. A Matatiele ANC 
councillor expressed dangers for culture and traditional chieftancy in these terms:  
There are cultural concerns. Umzimkulu that shifted from EC to KZN has 
experienced disrespect of its culture. Their culture is not being respected in KZN. 
The chiefs used to be paid in EC. They are not paid in KZN.
95
 
 
It is in its relationship to traditional authorities and land that the Zulu hegemony 
inspires deep fears that are reminiscent of old era of tribal rivalries and ethno-nationalist 
wars. “Our traditional Chiefs will not enjoy the same recognition in KZN. All traditional 
Chiefs are remunerated here in EC. This may not be the case in KZN where some may not 
be recognised as such”, stated Mr Mayibongwe Mhlonyane, a pro-EC informant96. The 
figure of King Zwelithini is perceived as having the potential to overshadow and subjugate 
traditional Chiefs moving to KZN. These perceived threats were expressed in these terms:   
Some of our traditional chiefs may end up being treated as „induna‟; in KZN, they 
say that there is only one king, and that is King Zwelithini; we will all become 
subjects of King Zweletini with obligation to pay him tribute and gifts when he 
comes to visit these areas. We don‟t want that”.97 
 
                                               
94 Interview with Mayibongwe Mhlonyane, a member of the Uncedo Taxi Association, in Matatiele,  
12 November 2010. 
95 Anonymous interview with ANC councillor, in Matatiele, 10 November 2010. 
96 Interview with Mayibongwe Mhlonyane, a member of the Uncedo Taxi Association, in Matatiele,  
12 November 2010. 
97 Ibid. 
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It is not just traditional authorities, but also land that are feared to fall under the 
control of the KZN provincial Government and King Zwelithini. Hence traditional Chiefs 
and ANC councillors‟ appeal to residents‟ ethno-nationalist sentiments asking them not to 
surrender the people and the land to KZN. “This is the land people have fought and died 
for. We can‟t just let it go”, said an ANC councillor98. Residents in Maluti areas were 
galvanised not to hand over “Mantanzima‟s land”. Chief Lebenia looked at the inclusion in 
KZN as having the potential to resuscitate ancient tribal wars. Asked on what might happen 
if the area was finally demarcated into KZN, some pro-EC ANC councillors declared that 
armed resistance and other protest actions would ensue. 
Whether perceptions that traditional authorities, cultural practices and land would 
be endangered under the KZN administration are founded or unfounded cannot easily be 
decided on the basis of existing evidence. It remains that these strongly held views are 
shared among a non-negligible section of the inhabitants of the Matatiele/Maluti area under 
the influence of the majority of traditional Chiefs and ANC councillors. However, for the 
pro-KZN residents, the idea that people may be prevented from practising circumcision or 
other cultural practices in KZN is far-fetched given the protection guaranteed by the 
Constitution. As for the fate of traditional chiefs in the KZN, though this camp does share 
the same apprehension as the opposing group, it insists that the interests of the people 
rather than personal gains of traditional Chiefs should guide the community position on this 
matter. “What does it mean for ordinary residents if their chief is being paid but they cannot 
find a job or don‟t get adequate services?” asked the chairperson of the Drakensberg Taxi 
Association
99
. Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe had a similar line of questioning: “If most of 
                                               
98 Anonymous interview with ANC councillor, in Matatiele, 10 November 2010. 
99 Interview with Davidson Lebeko, the chairperson of the Drakensberg Taxi Association, in Matatiele, 11 
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your people move to KZN, but you as Chief insist on staying in EC, who are you going to 
be Chief of in EC? Shouldn‟t Chiefs follow the view of the majority of their people?”100 
Pro-EC residents‟ efforts to portray inclusion in KZN as subjugation to the kingship of 
King Zwelithini and selling out own ancestral land are dismissed as desperate 
instrumentalisation of ethno-nationalist sentiments in the furtherance of Chiefs‟ and 
Councillors‟ personal interests. The perception of a minority group that traditional 
leadership, cultural practices and land are more secured in EC than in KZN and their 
readiness to place more value on these issues than economic advantages only underscores 
the heterogeneous character of local conceptions of development. It remains true that the 
majority considers that the interests of the community would be better served in KZN as 
there exists functional linkage to its political and economic centres. Hence, a further 
contributing factor in the Matatiele provincial dispute is the conflict between the territorial 
regional planning model held by the dissenting residents and the functional regional 
planning model informing Government‟s approach to provincial boundaries.  
 
4.5. Conflicting regional planning paradigms  
 
 
Government‟s official justification of the decision to move Matatiele town to the 
Eastern Cape clearly falls within the functional regional planning paradigm. At insistent 
request from the Constitutional Court, the Minister of local and provincial Government, in 
a supplementary affidavit, reaffirmed the rationality of moving Matatiele to EC arguing that 
“placing Matatiele in the EC, in the Government‟s view, made geographical, spatial and 
                                                                                                                                               
November 2009. 
100 Interview with Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe, in Ongeluksnek farms (Matatiele), 8 November 2009. 
 135 
economic sense”.101 On close consideration of Government‟s justification, reasons 
explicitly justifying inclusion of Matatiele in the EC rather than just the correctness of 
unifying the formerly separated Matatiele and Maluti areas evolve around the contested 
idea of cultural affinity between Matatiele and EC, the controversial economic link 
between Matatiele and the surrounding municipalities in the EC and the requirement of 
population load balance between the two provinces. Government submits that: 
It took into account the fact that the whole area of Matatiele and Maluti was 
culturally more interconnected with the people of EC than with the people of KZN. 
There were cultural institutions and linkages amongst the people being AmaHlubi, a 
segment of the Xhosa cultural group, the people of the area are interdependent and 
speak the same languages and share the same traditional values and practices.
102
 
 
This statement is strongly rebutted by applicants who rather postulate cultural proximity 
with KZN:  
What is stated therein is simply not true and is misdirection on the facts. The 
AmaHlubi people speak Zulu, Xhosa and Sotho because of their geographical 
position but they are spiritually and culturally linked with the people of Estcourt in 
KZN who are Zulus. The Amahlubi are the dominant group in the Matatiele area 
and are not connected culturally with the people of EC.
103
 
 
Government‟s economic argument depicts Matatiele as an economic growth centre 
not only for its closer surrounding areas, but also other surrounding localities in EC such as 
Mount Ayliff, Mount Frere, Mount Flecher, and Qumbu. It is envisaged that its sport and 
recreation facilities would benefit less resourced areas in the EC. Since these EC towns 
“are dependent on the Matatiele town for their economic needs …, it is important for all the 
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people who contribute to the fiscus for the area to derive benefit from the development of 
the area”104. It is assumed that the best way for the surrounding localities to benefit from 
Matatiele‟s development is for them to belong to the same province. However, dissidents 
respond that these surrounding localities are rather closer and more functionally linked to 
other satellite towns such as Kokstad, Umtata, and Port Shepstone. They reject the 
economic argument arguing that “nowhere in extensive investigation and ultimate report of 
the Municipal Demarcation Board in July 2003 was it suggested that the presence of the 
Matatiele local Municipality in KZN affected any economic growth elsewhere”.105 They 
also state that there is no evidence in support of the view that “such „separate treatment‟ 
[Matatiele falling within the KZN Province] made it difficult to capitalize on the economic 
growth that could be achieved for the „area‟”.106 
Finally, Government motivates its policy by the necessity to balance population size 
between the two provinces.  EC Province had 6,501,201 people whereas KZN counted 9, 
761,032 people (SA statistics, 2001). It is clear that EC Province stood to lose even more 
people, had the Maluti area people been moved to KZN, in addition to the loss incurred for 
the exclusion of Umzimkulu. However, dissidents criticize Government‟s inconsistency 
with regard to the population size balance argument: “If it had truly been Government‟s 
intention to balance demographics between provinces, it would not have deprived the EC 
of 174,338 people in exchange for a gain of 16,226 people”.107 On dissidents‟ analysis, 
population exchange in the Umzimkulu and Matatiele swop of provincial locations can 
only be understood as a “voter swop” or “a package deal” to “ensure that a large number of 
                                               
104 Supplementary affidavit of second and third respondents, op. cit., para 5.9. 
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committed ANC voters are added to KZN, which is a marginal ANC province (which only 
holds one half of the seats in the provincial legislature) in exchange for a relatively wealthy 
area to be „given‟ to the EC in return”.108 This accusation of gerrymandering will be further 
unpacked when the thesis discusses the strategic political struggles that have shaped the 
dispute.  
On the other hand, dissenting residents insisted both on the sovereign will and 
developmental interests of the discrete community of Matatiele/Maluti as the key 
determinants of their provincial location. Such reliance on local sovereignty and social 
equity is at the core of the territorial regional planning approach. Residents argued that 
their economic and developmental interests would be better served from a closer provincial 
capital. Their preferential provincial arrangement is the one that conforms to existing 
transport and economic functional linkages with KZN and its major towns. Inclusion in 
KZN is perceived to best serve local interests. For that reason, the demarcation in EC is 
resisted as illegitimate even if it has been duly enacted and pursues other rational 
objectives. Furthermore, residents unambiguously manifest their adhesion to territorial 
regional planning when they reject the Government‟s overruling of majority preference. On 
correcting the defect for which part of the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act had been 
invalidated, Government consulted more broadly, but reconfirmed the impugned policy 
against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of residents. This departure from the view 
of the people to be affected by the decision has been regarded as unacceptable and 
prompted the third Constitutional Court challenge on the Matatiele case. That 
representatives may override preferences of the people is rejected by border dissenters, 
especially in the South African political structure characterised by party political 
                                               
108 Ibid., para 24. 
 138 
centralism. Such dissatisfaction with representative democracy is a clear call for a more 
direct form of decision-making on issues as critical as provincial location. Far from being a 
political accident, the Matatiele provincial boundary dispute stemmed from a conceptual 
clash between Government‟s functional regional planning approach and residents‟ 
territorial regional planning thinking. This also reflects a conflict between practices of 
representative democracy and calls for direct democracy at least on provincial boundary 
demarcation. However, the conflict has also been fuelled by Government‟s democratic 
deficit.  
 
4.6. Government’s democratic deficit  
 
In a number of aspects, Government‟s conduct has been perceived as undemocratic, 
leading residents to resist in a bid to “safeguard our democracy”. First, the Minister‟s plan 
to exclude Matatiele from KZN had to be pushed through Parliament with no support from 
the Matatiele municipal council and the Municipal Demarcation Board. The municipal 
council of Matatiele was itself aggrieved by the policy and stood as one of the 
complainants at the first Constitutional Court challenge. The Municipal Demarcation 
Board, the independent body tasked with demarcating municipalities, differed from the 
Minister‟s proposal and reasoning. After considering submissions from the Matatiele 
community, it withdrew its recommendation for the exclusion of Matatiele from KZN, 
citing “many well motivated submissions”(Municipal Demarcation Board, 2005). Dissent 
from these two statutory bodies was ignored by the Minister of Local and Provincial 
Governmentwho lobbied Parliament to support the Bill. ANC party loyalty mechanisms 
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were relied upon to ensure cooperation from ANC national and provincial legislators and to 
get the Matatiele municipal council to pull out from the Court case. Such lack of consensus 
across state bodies and reliance on “party discipline” to impose controversial decisions 
appeared undemocratic and lent some legitimacy to popular opposition.  
Second, the fact that the initial decision to exclude Matatiele from KZN lacked 
justification highly troubled not only affected residents, but even Constitutional Court 
judges. The majority judgment written by Justice Ngcobo criticized a “lack of candour on 
the part of Government as to why it was regarded as appropriate to place Matatiele 
municipality in the EC”.109 Justice Sachs added:  
The problem with the record in the present matter is that whereas there is an 
abundance of material dealing with re-configuring provincial boundaries so as to 
eliminate cross boundary municipalities, there is very little indeed from which to 
discern the governmental objective behind transferring Matatiele to the EC. Nor are 
there clear pointers in the statute itself.
110
 
 
At the time, the Court formulated directions for Government “to provide further 
information concerning the objectives sought to be pursued by the relocation of Matatiele 
to the EC”, arguing that “such information could be of considerable assistance to the Court 
in finalising this matter”.111 Such lack of justification came close to being construed by 
certain judges as arrogance of power or dictatorial tendencies particularly in the light of 
State counsel‟s insinuation that “Government knows best, end of enquiry”.112 Faced with 
such an “information deficit”, the Court reminded Government that public policy ought not 
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to be arbitrary or based on “naked preferences”. The denounced information deficit 
amounted to a lack of openness, transparency and democratic deficit.  
Third, the Court‟s finding that the KZN legislature failed to facilitate public 
involvement in its legislative process is further indication of the democratic deficit which 
affected the policy. The people of Matatiele were constitutionally entitled to be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to participate in the provincial boundary decision. However, the 
KZN legislature failed to call for written or oral submissions. In his ruling, Justice Ngcobo 
emphasised both the participatory and representative traits of the South African democratic 
system, arguing that “elections are meaningless without massive participation … and the 
participation by the public on a continuous basis provides vitality to the functioning of 
representative democracy”.113 Against this background, voluntary or involuntary omission 
of public hearings by the KZN legislature constituted a blow at the heart of the South 
African democratic system.  
Fourth, the renewed legislative process aimed at correcting the initial defect, though 
it passed constitutional muster, appeared formulaic and thus a “sham” process. Reviewing 
the public participation component of this legislative exercise, the Human Rights 
Commission of South Africa later stated that public participation had the characteristics of 
a sham process. In their own words, “It would appear that the involvement of the public 
was merely undertaken to fulfil an obligation in terms of a judgement rather than to give a 
new/fresh opportunity to revisit the Bill and to seriously engage with the community 
regarding their views on the Bill”.114 Accusations of sham public involvement constituted 
the core of the third Constitutional Court challenge against the enacted policy. However, 
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Government had made it difficult for the judiciary to identify any procedural inadequacy; 
just as a criminal who manages to tamper with crucial evidence would go off scot-free.  
Fifth, poor justification of the policy to keep Matatiele in EC against the majority 
opposition deeply compromised the democratic legitimacy of the decision. The thesis has 
referred to the controversial arguments based on alleged cultural affinity, economic links 
and the need for population load balancing. On close analysis, the most problematic issue 
was not that the KZN legislature rejected the affected community majority view, but that it 
did so with no “cogent reasons”. During the legislative session that approved for the second 
time the exclusion of Matatiele from KZN, members of opposition political parties held a 
high moral ground, helplessly reminding the house that “the people of Matatiele had 
spoken” and that there was no valid reason to resist their “well motivated” demands.115 
They called on ANC members to honour their party‟s credentials of a people-driven 
movement citing personalities such as Chief Albert Luthuli and Olivier Tambo. To these 
ANC MPLs allegedly “being forced to follow a route they do not agree with”116, was sent a 
call to emulate famous ANC dissidents such as Feinsteins and Govender.
117
 “Has courage 
failed you just when it should be answered?”118 desperately asked DA MPL Burrows before 
concluding: “This house can, by majority, veto Matatiele-Maluti going to the EC . It can 
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insist that the people have spoken and that they wish to be part of our province”.119 Acting 
otherwise was condemned as “betrayal”, “messing with people‟s life”, “messing up with 
public participation”, “messing up with democracy”, “Mugabeism at its worst”.120 Using its 
majority position to pass undemocratic laws was said to be tantamount to ruling by force: 
“The manner you are governing the county won‟t work, the tactic of using the majority 
vote by force won‟t help instead it will be destroyed by fire. We don't care about anyone, 
we have our country”.121  
The Zuma administration has sought to address this democratic deficit by re-
engaging with residents and holding a poll in Matatiele/Malu in order to determine the 
majority view. It was found that an overwhelming majority preferred the area to be 
demarcated in KZN, though pro-EC residents questioned the credibility of the poll. Whether 
the policy will be reversed on the basis of the poll results and lessons from the protracted 
local unrest remains to be seen. That the voice of the overwhelming majority of residents 
has been sidelined for so long cannot be explained otherwise than by pointing to the 
strategic political interests of certain individuals and groups.  
 
4.7. Strategic political struggles  
 
The initial Government decision to move Umzimkulu to KZN, though it made 
geographical sense, also achieved the ANC strategic goal of consolidating political support 
in KZN where ANC and IFP compete for provincial dominance: KZN gained 174,032 
people from Umzimkulu, a traditionally ANC electorate. Residents of Matatiele have seen 
                                               
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
 143 
their exclusion from KZN as compensation to the Alfred Nzo District and to the EC for 
letting go Umzimkulu. On their analysis, the simultaneous change of provincial location of 
Umzimkulu and Matatiele is a “voter swop” or “a package deal” to “ensure that a large 
number of committed ANC voters are added to KZN, which is a marginal ANC province 
(who only held one half of the seats in the provincial legislature from 2004 to 2009) in 
exchange for a relatively wealthy area to be „given‟ to the EC in return”.122 Given the 
practice of gerrymandering in post-apartheid territorial restructuring (Cameron, 1999), this 
accusation cannot be dismissed.  
It appears then that the ANC political elite in Alfred Nzo district had vested 
interests in having Matatiele in EC rather than letting Maluti areas join Matatiele in KZN. 
This latter option would have left the district with only one municipality, Umzimvubu, 
which would have called for the disestablishment of the district altogether. Political offices 
and jobs were on the line. This partly explains why the majority of ANC councillors have 
opposed the preferences of residents for KZN. Besides, for the ANC political elite based in 
Maluti areas, the move to KZN would mean severance of long cultivated political ties with 
ANC and Government structures in EC. These networks are crucial to local politicians‟ 
upward political mobility and the success of neo-patrimonial deals. Many pro-KZN 
participants interpreted the councillors‟ opposition to the majority view as based on the 
need to preserve their corrupt networks in EC. It was argued that corrupt practices take 
place within patronage networks that permeate key party political structures from the 
municipal to the national level. For pro-KZN residents, municipal officials resist provincial 
change because their long established corrupt patronage networks within EC risk being 
dismantled while establishing similar networks in KZN political structures may prove 
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challenging.  
Preservation of strategic personal interests has also motivated most traditional 
authorities‟ stance on the border dispute. Support of the majority of traditional chiefs for 
EC is seen as driven by their self-interest and their positions in CONTRALESA. “Most 
traditional chiefs do not want to be part of KZN as they are benefiting from the system. 
Some of these chiefs have positions in EC. So they have their hands tied” said the pro-KZN 
Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe.
123
 It is commonly believed that traditional authorities protect 
the recognition enjoyed in EC and associated monetary benefits. EC supporters tended to 
portray inclusion in KZN as leading to subjugation to the Zulu King and giving out one‟s 
ancestral land. This argument appealed to residents‟ ethno-nationalist sentiments, leading a 
councillor to vow that there would be armed resistance and bloodshed had Matatiele/Maluti 
been moved to KZN. However, traditional authorities‟ strategic interests were questioned 
by pro-KZN activists. Given the strong influence of both ANC councillors and traditional 
authorities, their preference for EC has prevailed for the past five years. Taking into 
consideration strategic political interests of ANC, its councillors and traditional authorities 
helps to explain why the majority view has been repeatedly ignored and the polarisation 
has sometimes reached confrontational dimensions. 
The border dispute lead a section of pro-KZN activists to the formation of a new 
“grassroots political party” which entered the electoral competition in an effort to “defend 
people‟s democratic right to choose where they want to live”. The new party managed to 
secure 10 seats in the municipal council in the 2006 local elections. It performed better than 
long established small parties such as the PAC, the UDM, and the DA. In 2009 general 
elections, AIC gained one seat in the provincial legislature. As a result, Mr Mandla Galo, 
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the chairperson of the MMMAOC and AIC leader, became a member of the provincial 
legislature serving in Bisho, Eastern Cape, where he continues to advocate for the reversal 
of the decision that incorporated Matatiele in Eastern Cape. In 2011 local government 
elections, AIC also fielded candidates in the KZN province. The party garnered 13, 43% of 
the votes in the municipality which translated into 7 seats in the municipal council, a slight 
decrease in comparison to the 2006 performance. This underperformance may be attributed 
to the stagnation of the demarcation issue.  As in the Bushbuckridge and Khutsong cases, 
the Matatiele provincial dispute has also been prolonged partly because of the limits of 
judicial arbitration.  
 
4.8. Limits of judicial mechanisms  
 
The Constitution Thirteenth Amendment Act of 2007, that confirmed the inclusion 
of Matatiele town in EC, was attacked by a network of Matatiele organisations called the 
Poverty Alleviation Network. Applicants claimed that the KZN provincial Government 
decision to exclude them from its territory did not take into account the outcome of the 
public participation process which was overwhelmingly opposed to the policy. They argued 
that the KZN legislature members, here referring to ANC MPLs, did not apply their mind 
to the representations of affected residents of Matatiele, but rather followed instructions 
from their national party leadership. Against this backdrop, they charged that public 
participation was merely a sham as the outcome was “predetermined” and that the resultant 
legislation is irrational because it was “not based on rationality or merit factors but on 
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political or ulterior factors which in the spirit of a democracy have no place”124. They 
further alleged that “people from as far away as Mt Frere were bussed” to attend the public 
hearing in Matatiele in order to “deliberately sabotage it” and water down their voices.125 
Speakers of KZN provincial legislature, EC provincial legislature and National Assembly 
naturally opposed the application claiming that public participation conformed to 
constitutional standards and that there was no legal basis to suggest that the enacted 
legislation was irrational.  
Justice Nkabinde summed up the substantive issues for the Court to determine in 
the dispute: (1) whether failure on the part of the respondents to consult only with the 
discrete group, as identified in Matatiele 2, renders the facilitation of participation by the 
respondents unconstitutional; (2) whether failure on the part of the National Assembly to 
receive oral submissions from interested parties constitutes non-compliance with the 
constitutional obligation; and (3) whether the National Assembly and the KZN Legislature 
considered the representations made by the residents of Matatiele; (4)whether the 
Thirteenth Amendment Act is rationally connected to a legitimate governmental purpose.
126
 
The unanimous Court judgment, written by Justice Nkabinde, rejected all 
contentions put forward by the applicants. Referring to calls for written submissions, 
organized public hearings and to invitation of applicants to the KZN legislature, the Court 
concluded that “objectively, it is manifest that participation was facilitated”.127 Second, 
applicants‟ contention that the KZN legislature ought to have consulted only with the 
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“discrete” community of Matatiele was declared to have “no merit”.128 Third, the Court 
ruled that the fact that the National Assembly did not receive oral submissions which other 
spheres of Government catered for did not render the process of public participation 
“nugatory”.129 Fourth, applicants‟ contention that “Parliament and the KZN Legislature did 
not consider their representations but merely went through the motions in inviting 
submissions and arranging public meetings so as to secure constitutional compliance 
regardless of the outcome of the process” was found unconvincing.130 The Court pointed to 
various minutes which recorded the views expressed by residents and purported to devise 
courses of action on how to deal with residents‟ concerns, especially those relating to 
service delivery. The Court went on to affirm the autonomy of the legislature: “Although 
due cognisance should be taken of the views of the populace, it does not mean that 
Parliament should necessarily be swayed by public opinion in its ultimate decision”.131 It 
warned that credibility of public participation in a legislative process should not be judged 
on the outcome: “the fact that the process of engagement is not reflected in a change to the 
legislation, or in the accommodation of the representations submitted to Parliament, does 
not necessarily mean that reasonable public participation did not take place or that the 
views of the public were not considered”.132 Elsewhere, the Constitutional Court made it 
clear that views expressed in public participation processes are not binding on legislators 
and that “public participation in the legislative process is supposed to supplement and 
enhance the democratic nature of general elections and majority rule, not to conflict with or 
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even overrule or veto them”.133 Examination of the above four allegations resulted in the 
conclusion that Government complied with the requirement of public involvement in the 
legislative process as provided for in Articles 59 (1) (a), 72 (1) (a) and 118 (1) (a) of the 
Constitution, respectively.  
It remained to investigate applicants‟ rationality attack on the legislation. The 
challenge was twofold. First, applicants alleged that the legislation was irrational as 
“Matatiele was never a cross-boundary municipality and therefore that it should never have 
been included within the scheme of the Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005”.134 In this regard, 
the Court observed that both applicants and respondents agreed that Matatiele was rather a 
cross jurisdictional enclave and posed governance challenges given apartheid separation of 
the town with its rural surroundings. It further noted that the impugned act intended to 
correct this state of affairs with a view to improve governance and service delivery. For the 
Court, the rationality test requires the legislation to be linked to a legitimate governmental 
purpose. When there are more than two ways to achieve a legitimate policy goal, as was the 
case in Matatiele which could see the reunified entity fall either within KZN or in EC, it is 
for the legislature to decide. This position is predicated on the minimal nature of the 
Court‟s rationality test135, and the principle of separation of power as explained in the 
Merafong case:  
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What is required, insofar as rationality may be relevant here, is a link between the 
means adopted by the legislature and the legitimate governmental end sought to be 
achieved. It is common cause that doing away with cross-boundary municipalities is 
desirable for improved service delivery and governance. This is the purpose of the 
Twelfth Amendment. More ways than one of achieving the objective are, however, 
available, namely to locate Merafong either wholly in Gauteng or wholly in North 
West. From economic, geographical and other perspectives the choice can be 
debated, but it is one for the legislature to make. It is not for this Court to decide in 
which province people must live or to second-guess the option chosen by the 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature to achieve its policy goals and thus to make a 
finding on how socially, economically or politically meritorious the Twelfth 
Amendment is.
136
  
 
So, the first argument of the rationality attack could not succeed. The second argument 
alleged that the legislation was irrational because the decision was “predetermined”, “the 
law makers were instructed to vote in a certain manner”, and “the ruling party instructed its 
members in Parliament on how to vote on the Constitution Thirteenth Amendment Act”.137 
In response to this argument, the Court observed that the allegation called for investigation 
beyond the “rationally enacted Constitution Amendment” into the motives of Parliament 
and the ruling party: “This the Court cannot do”, admits Justice Nkabinde.138 The Court‟s 
rationality test deals with the stated purpose of the legislation not legislators‟ motives:  
The Court cannot concern itself with the individual motives of legislators. There is 
good reason for this: if the Court preoccupies itself with what precedes the passing 
of the legislation (the motive), to the exclusion of its actual purpose, it would fail to 
focus on the proper object of the enquiry, which is the rationality of the legislation 
and not necessarily the motives of those who enacted it.
139
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In the end, the application was dismissed with the Court declaring its inability to enquire on 
one of the central complaints namely that the legislation pursued partisan political 
objectives to the detriment of the affected population. 
 
4.9. Conclusion  
  
The Matatiele provincial boundary dispute is undoubtedly a legacy` of apartheid 
regional planning and reflects current attempts at redressing past territorial abnormalities. It 
is against this background that one can understand the wide consensus on the need to move 
Umzimkulu municipality to KZN and to unite Matatiele town and its surrounding Maluti 
areas. However, there have been deep divisions on whether the reunified Matatiele/Maluti 
municipality had to fall within the KZN or EC Province. In discussing this case study, the 
chapter has outlined an interpretative framework that rests on the role played by the 
interplay between residents‟ poor material conditions and their local conceptions of 
democracy and development, the conflicting regional planning paradigms, Government‟s 
democratic deficit, strategic political struggles, and limits of the judicial arbitration.  
Throughout the analysis, it has emerged that Government, through the Department 
of Local and Provincial Government and Parliament, has pursued the policy of excluding 
Matatiele town from KZN against the view of the majority of the affected population. 
Convinced of the transformative nature of the policy, but also aware of its contested 
character, Government heavily relied on its majority position in Parliament and in 
provincial legislatures to pass the required Constitutional Amendment Acts to alter 
provincial boundaries. With such strong power and a lack of concurrence from the 
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Municipal Demarcation Board, contestations from the municipal council and protestations 
from the majority of residents did little to stop the enactment of the contested boundary 
arrangement. It also appears that Government initially avoided any direct interaction with 
dissenters and even ignored their existence, presenting the proposed act as 
“developmental”. The Constitutional Court ruling invalidating the Constitution Twelfth 
Amendment Act of 2005 forced it to facilitate public involvement in the legislative process. 
However, it was manifest that the renewed legislative process was run as a mere formality 
to comply with the constitutional obligation of public participation. In passing the 
Constitution Thirteenth Amendment Act of 2007, special attention was accorded to 
accumulating as much evidence as possible of formal public involvement in the process 
whereas the outcome clearly seemed “predetermined”.  
It is less the rejection of the majority view than poor justification of such a 
controversial decision that strikes analysts. Little explanation was provided as to why the 
new Matatiele/Maluti unit was to fall within the EC and not KZN. Under the Constitutional 
Court‟s directions, the Department of Local and Provincial Government argued that the 
shift of Matatiele town to EC was based on cultural affinity with the province, its potential 
growth pole position within the area, and the need to balance population size between the 
two provinces. Dissidents rejected these reasons as based on inaccurate facts, in particular 
the cultural argument. Besides, none of these reasons rest on independent experts‟ 
recommendations. Hence, there has been no consistency in the way the policy was justified 
across state institutions involved in the legislative process including the Department of 
Local and Provincial Government, the National Assembly, the NCOP, and provincial 
legislatures, as they developed different and sometimes contradictory discourses to 
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legitimize the same decision. Given these deficiencies, it is hard to discredit dissenters‟ 
contention that Government‟s justification has been “changing and contradictory”, that the 
contested policy has been shaped by political ulterior motives namely compensation for 
Umzimkulu “voter swop” and accommodation of the interests of ANC local politicians 
who feel more at home in EC than in KZN for historical and cultural reasons and whose 
political career prospects appear brighter in EC than in KZN.  
Pro-KZN residents, under the leadership of MMMAOC, have heavily relied on their 
constitutional right to influence Government policy. Confronted with blatant 
unresponsiveness, they mobilized a range of political actions including demonstrations, 
petitioning, and Court challenges. Given the community split on the boundary issue and the 
backing of the pro-EC local elite by ANC national structures, KZN proponents could only 
hope that the Constitutional Court would force Government to adhere to the wishes of the 
majority. These expectations were misplaced as the Court made it clear that Government is 
not bound to views expressed in public participation processes, even where such views 
clearly reflected majority position. Whether it is consistent with democratic values that 
Government facilitates public participation with “predetermined” outcomes or opposes an 
overwhelmingly majority position without strong justification are questions that go beyond 
what the Constitutional Court could offer.  
Because Government‟s conduct has left so many questions unanswered, the 
majority of residents still consider the conflict unresolved. They still hold on to the idea 
that demarcating the Matatiele/Maluti area in KZN makes more sense on functionality, 
social and economic development and cultural grounds. Preference for KZN rests more on 
pragmatic reasons such as service delivery standards, levels of transparency and existing 
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flows of goods and services. Reference to historical or cultural proximity with KZN is 
marginal. Yet, there is also an ideological underpinning to the Matatiele local resistance 
which consists in a critique of the prevailing state sovereignty type of democracy and 
advocacy for a popular sovereignty type of democracy.   
As for the pro-EC group, its numerical insignificance has been compensated by the 
presence of key local political and traditional leaders. The local political elite has used its 
position within ANC structures to push for the inclusion of Matatiele town in EC and to 
lobby against any policy reversal. It is alleged that ANC councillors and traditional chiefs 
have sometimes conditioned access to state resources or traditional assets on a resident‟s 
provincial preference. Just as its adversary, the pro-EC camp has pushed its cause through 
petitioning and public demonstrations, sometimes organized with logistical support from 
the municipality. Ethnic and nationalist sentiments have also been instrumentalised in a bid 
to portray KZN as a threatening “other”.  To justify their emotional attachment to EC, 
residents within the pro-EC camp mainly evoke history and culture. They appear more 
concerned about the interests of traditional authorities and cultural practices such as 
circumcision which they claimed may be endangered by moving to KZN. They pay little 
attention to whether or not living conditions would be improved for most residents as a 
result of having Matatiele/Maluti in EC. Despite this apparently nationalist approach to the 
provincial boundary between KZN and EC, which is held by a minority, the conflict 
appears to be mainly about securing socio-economic prosperity. The majority of residents 
think that such a brighter future can more effectively be attained in KZN rather than in EC. 
Personal socio-economic benefits also inform the support or rejection of a specific 
provincial boundary arrangement. Besides, disputants including political parties, 
 154 
councillors and traditional authorities seek to maintain or maximise their hold on political 
power. Provincial boundaries are thus approached as frontiers of prosperity and political 
power.  
As the Zuma administration reconsiders ways to resolve the Matatiele provincial 
boundary conflict, it is unlikely that the final solution will manage to mend the border 
divisions within the Matatiele/Maluti community. Some suggest that only the scrapping or 
reduction of provinces will achieve such a result. The future of provinces in South Africa 
has also attracted recent academic attention (Ruiters, 2011). The ANC is seriously 
considering both options. Before a decision is made, it is important that conflict 
management mechanisms be put in place to avoid the border disagreement escalating into 
“bloodshed”.  
 155 
CHAPTER 5: THE EMERGING PATTERNS 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter seeks to provide a comparative discussion of the explanatory 
framework developed in the three case studies. The key argument of this thesis is that post-
apartheid boundary disputes are rather complex political phenomena that have been shaped 
by the interplay between material conditions and local notions of democracy and 
development of affected communities, conflicting regional planning paradigms, 
Government‟s democratic deficit, strategic political struggles, and the limits of judicial 
arbitration of this type of conflict. This has been demonstrated in the context of each case 
study from chapter 2 to chapter 4. This set of explanatory factors has not played itself out in 
exactly similar manner in every case study. So, it is of interest to examine parallels and 
contrasts across case studies and provide necessary explanation where necessary.  
The chapter then moves to a discussion of the implications of our analysis for future 
policy making in the area of boundary demarcation and boundary conflicts resolution.  
 
5.2. Emerging patterns  
 
The multiple case study approach employed in this thesis has revealed that the three 
instances of post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes have been shaped by similar 
explanatory factors, though with certain case-specific features. 
 
 156 
5.2.1. Material conditions of affected communities   
 
In the three case studies, historically constituted precarious material conditions 
constituted a breeding ground for protest as well as the predicament from which residents 
sought to escape by waging protest campaigns against Government policy.  These poor 
socio-economic conditions are partly a legacy of apartheid spatial segregation, particularly 
the homeland policies. However, they are also a result of post-apartheid neglect, corruption, 
and an ineffective system of Local Government. 
Material conditions arguments have case-specific formulations. For instance, in 
Bushbuckridge, the emphasis was less on the preferred province‟s higher capacity to 
deliver services to the residents than on functionality and proximity which in turn have 
socio-economic benefits. In contrast, in Khutsong and Matatiele, residents believed that the 
preferred provinces would more effectively undertake service delivery and social 
development. In other words, Khutsong and Matatiele‟s preference for Gauteng and KZN 
involved a value judgment of North West and EC governance capacity whereas 
Bushbuckridge‟s preference of Mpumalanga did not imply either that Limpopo was 
ineffective or that Mpumalanga would be more efficient in terms of service delivery and 
socio-economic development. Besides, in contrast to the two other case studies, Khutsong 
residents heavily relied on a special entitlement to be serviced and uplifted by Gauteng in 
exchange for mineral wealth extracted from their area. Also, influence of perceived corrupt 
governance on residents‟ rejection of a particular province has been more pronounced in 
Matatiele as compared to the other two case studies. Corruption has often been cited as 
deeply compromising the availability and quality of services in EC municipalities. It may 
have been the case that Mpumalanga and Limpopo were not clearly perceived as different 
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when it came to corruption and effective governance. Yet, in the Matatiele case, it was clear 
to most participants that EC was more corrupt and less effective. The fact of the matter is 
that the three provinces are said to “approach the Chabal-Daloz model of a state with feeble 
capacity, resting on a politics of vertical patronage networks” (Hyslop, 2005, p. 786). 
 
5.2.2. Local notions of democracy and development   
 
All three communities based their claims on a popular sovereignty conception of 
democracy. Being in majority black and ANC voters, their reference slogan has been the 
Freedom Charter‟s “People shall govern” clause. Though post-apartheid South Africa has 
enshrined a form of representative democracy, affected communities have not been 
prepared to accept that their majority view may be overridden by politicians at least on the 
issue of provincial boundaries. This ideological stance reinforced in the long history of the 
liberation struggle combined with the pressure to secure better material conditions resulted 
in clashes between communities and Government.   
As far as local notions of development are concerned, it is striking that in the three 
case studies development of one‟s locality is perceived as dependent upon one‟s distance to 
economic and political centres. In addition, residents see development as facilitated in a 
situation where provincial demarcation corresponds to the existing flow of goods, 
movement of people, employment and spending patterns. However, only in Matatiele, have 
we experienced an influential minority view which places more weight on culture and 
tradition considerations than on socio-economic development. This alternative perspective 
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into the provincial boundary dispute has compounded the conflict and delayed its 
resolution.  
 
5.2.3. Conflicting regional planning paradigms  
 
The three case studies demonstrate that Government‟s justification of its regional 
decisions has been consistently formulated within the functional regional planning 
framework. Government‟s regional planning model echoes classic functional regional 
planning theorists who advocate that regional planning policies be used as tools for the 
realisation of  “regional equilibrium”, “interregional income equalization” (Orlin, 1933), 
“growth pole centres” (Perroux, 1955; Boudeville, 1966) or “urban industrial growth pole” 
(Hirschman, 1958). This paradigm has a long pedigree in South African history of regional 
planning (Tomlinson and Addleson, 1987). However, it is ironic that the post-apartheid 
Government would still use an ethnic argument to justify a regional policy as it did in the 
Bushbuckridge and Matatiele cases. Government‟s pursuit for centrally defined goals such 
as “equitable share”, “population load balance”, “ethnic alignment” and “economic 
viability” through territorial demarcation rests on a firm commitment to a unitary State.  
On the other hand, affected residents have consistently justified their resistance 
appealing to notions of direct democracy and a territorial regional planning framework.  
Affected communities seem to adhere to the call long uttered by territorial regional 
planning theorists: “The time is ripe for the containment of functional power and its 
subordination to a territorial will” (Friedman and Weaver, 1979, p. 227). Their   reliance on 
self-determination, equity, local veto right is perceived to threaten Government‟s capacity 
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to restructure the South African territory and economy. So, the clash between affected 
communities‟ territorial regional planning approach and Government‟s functional regional 
planning model ultimately reflects a contest over the nature of the post-apartheid State.  
A cross case studies analysis also reveals how weak or sometimes non-existent have 
justifications for demarcation decisions been. This is indicative of absence of accountability 
and deficient “deliberative democracy” (Guttmann and Thompson, 2004). Besides, it is 
striking that affected communities accept the constitutional representative and participatory 
democracy as enshrined in the Constitution, but are not ready to tolerate that Government 
officials override local preferences. This is not only contradictory, but also source of 
institutional instability.  It demonstrates the contested nature of the existing democratic 
arrangement.  
5.2.4. Government’s democratic deficit  
 
It has emerged that Government democratic credence has been seriously damaged 
in the course of the three provincial boundary disputes. Undemocratic conduct has included 
moving provincial boundary decision-making power from communities to Government or 
party leaders, unresponsiveness, broken promises, lack of accountability, inappropriate 
cooperation between spheres of Government, absence of policy justification, failure to 
facilitate public involvement, and “sham” public participation facilitation.  
In all three communities, there has been a strong perception that democracy was 
under threat and that the people have to stand up to safeguard it. For affected residents, it 
was important that border decisions that significantly shape their livelihoods are infused 
with democratic content. Apart from obvious undemocratic practices such as those cited 
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above, Government and the people often clashed on the understanding of the democratic 
element that ought to have shaped decisions. Government officials and legislators have 
thought that, after taking input from the people, it was up to them to decide what is good 
for the people. On the other side, the people have not been prepared to accept that their 
regional preference may be overridden by politicians. In addressing popular perceptions of 
democratic inadequacy, consultation may not be enough. What is needed is clear 
demonstration that public inputs have significantly shaped the policy. In the three cases, 
such a level of legitimacy could not be achieved, partly because certain strategic political 
struggles were simultaneously waged on provincial boundary arrangements.   
 
5.2.5. Strategic political struggles  
 
There have been allegations of gerrymandering in the three instances of provincial 
boundary demarcation. Government demarcation decisions may have been linked to 
ulterior motives to consolidate the ANC electorate. Practices of gerrymandering 
characterised both the first post-apartheid delimitation of provinces and the demarcation of 
metropolitan areas (Muthien and Khosa, 1995; Cameron, 1999). As Cameron observed in 
his study of the demarcation of Cape metropolitan area, “despite strong technical 
submissions by both the majority and minority reports, party political considerations 
ultimately decided the outcome of the Cape Metropolitan Council boundary debate” 
(Cameron, 1999, p. 130). In the context of the demarcation of Johannesburg metropolitan 
area, a revised model of internal boundaries, developed with great influence from the ANC, 
was contested by the DP as “a crude attempt by the ANC to gerrymander the borders of 
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Johannesburg‟s substructures” and by the NP as “new boundaries clearly designed to 
favour the ANC in the upcoming elections” (Mabin, 1999, p. 187). As for Durban, Udesh 
Pillay has described several months of intense, often acrimonious and heated debate and 
deliberation during which political parties such as ANC, IFP and DP tried to make sure that 
“the new demarcation and delimitation of the Durban area (a prerequisite for local 
elections) in as far as possible worked to their advantage, in the hope of ensuring certain 
electoral outcomes” (Pillay, 1999, p. 212). In contrast with this pattern of political 
contestation over metropolitan boundaries among political parties for the sake of electoral 
advantages, the rural provincial boundary disputes considered in this study have not 
reflected the same intensity of multiparty competition. This can be explained by ANC 
dominance in the affected areas and scant interest from opposition parties. These factors 
make it even easier that gerrymandering plans, as alleged in the context of the Khutsong 
and Matatiele disputes, go unchallenged.  
Besides, the local ANC elite in Bushbuckridge and in Matatiele have sought to 
secure their entrenched political networks in the preferred province mainly for the sake of 
individual political careers and the perpetuation of existing patronage relationships. 
Aspirations for higher political offices or a need to protect current political positions and its 
associated benefits have also shaped provincial boundary disputes as it has been shown in 
the three case studies. This is a clear indication of the politicization of boundary changes. 
They have the potential to alter the national, provincial and local political structure and 
dissolve existing alliances and dismantle individuals‟ political bases. For this particular 
reason, provincial boundary changes have been objects of fierce political contestation. This 
echoes Cameron‟s observation on post-apartheid metropolitan boundary disputes when he 
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noted that “the fight for political power was the most intense in the major metropolitan 
areas, precisely because the stakes and resources were so much higher” (Cameron, 1999, p. 
4). 
Opposition parties have also attempted to capitalize on residents‟ discontent against 
the ruling ANC in order to raise their profile. In Matatiele, an ANC break away party, AIC, 
campaigning against Government‟s demarcation decision, managed to gain seats at the 
local municipality and one seat in the EC legislature. However, political exploitation of 
residents dissatisfaction with ANC Government has generally had limited success. Affected 
communities have remained strong ANC electorates. Protest against ANC Government has 
hardly led to electoral sanctions. In Khutsong, ANC voters boycotted the 2006 local 
elections instead of shifting loyalty to a different political party. 
 
5.2.6. Limits of the judicial arbitration  
 
In the course of the three provincial boundary disputes, communities called for 
judicial arbitration. However, the Bushbuckridge community had little legal ground on 
which to base its challenge. Bushbuckridge‟s inclusion in Limpopo had been a result of 
political compromise at the multiparty negotiations platform in 1993. BBCC ended up 
requesting the court to deliver unconstitutional orders, what no Court could do. On the 
contrary, the Khutsong and Matatiele communities had solid constitutional grounds on the 
basis of which to challenge Government decisions. Both communities heavily relied on the 
constitutional requirement of public involvement in legislative processes and the 
imperative of rationality attached to the exercise of political power. Four judgments, of 
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which only one reflected a unanimous decision of the constitutional Court, have made 
pronouncements on the Khutsong and Matatiele cases, often dismissing their complaints. In 
the three disputes, Courts state their limits and throw the issues back to the political arena. 
Courts‟ inability to offer desired relief to aggrieved communities may well be a result of a 
formal interpretation of the duty of public involvement and a minimalist rationality test. 
Whether Courts can do better than this remains an open question that requires further 
Constitutional law research. 
5.3. Discussion  
 
Several provincial boundary disputes are presently still unresolved, namely the 
Matatiele, Moutse, Balfour, and Ba-Gamothibi cases. Moreover, the ANC Government has 
announced plans to reduce the number of provinces in accordance with a party resolution 
taken in Polokwane in December 2007. The DA has already criticized the plan as 
detrimental to the South African Constitutional democratic order and indicative of ANC 
desire to offset power challenge at provincial level. In this context of imminent 
restructuring of provincial boundaries and pending border disputes, it is opportune to 
discuss the implications of our thesis for future policy making. The following discussion 
assumes that territorial reform has to be pursued with a view to maximize social harmony, 
democratic legitimacy and social justice.  
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5.3.1. Spatial challenges may be best addressed by non spatial policies  
 
It goes without saying that provincial boundary disputes in areas such as Matatiele, 
Khutsong, Bushbuckridge, and Moutse reflect post-apartheid Government and 
communities‟ efforts to deal with the legacy of apartheid regional planning policies which 
were based on segregation and racial discrimination. Ironically, post-apartheid provincial 
demarcation policies “tend to cement the geography of the former Bantustans” 
(Ramutsindela, 2007, p. 43) and reproduce “the socio-spatial and economic inequalities 
which appears to be still very high and perhaps increasing” (Giraut and Maharaj, 2002, p. 
49). In essence, provincial boundaries and sometimes even municipal boundaries still stand 
as dividing lines between poverty and wealth, between ineffectiveness and efficiency, 
between corrupt government and relatively transparent government, between 
underdevelopment and development. It is for this mix of social, economic and political 
disparities that affected residents relate to provincial boundary changes as a matter of life or 
death.  
A long-term strategy in preventing boundary disputes should include the reduction 
of spatial disparities. Spatial distribution of social, economic, cultural and political 
resources should be undertaken in an equitable and sustainable manner so that internal 
administrative boundaries cease to be a significant enabler or barrier to accessing these 
goods. A common reaction from Government officials has been to respond to border 
dissidents that provincial boundaries do not matter, that South Africa is a unitary State 
which will service all its citizens wherever they find themselves. For this statement to mean 
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much more than just a rhetorical utterance, the South African State has to systematically 
and structurally address spatial inequities.  
To achieve this goal, non-spatial policies may actually be more effective than 
spatial policies. As “aspatial” policies can be as spatially powerful as spatial ones, “spatial 
policies cannot achieve their objectives unless they work in concert with sectoral and 
macro-economic policies” (Gore, 1984, p. 216). This is to say that the long-term solution to 
provincial boundary disputes may not be provided by recurrent boundary restructuring 
policies. More emphasis has to be placed on socio-economic policies which alter the 
structural underdevelopment, chronic poverty and political challenges related to provincial 
boundary disputes. These non-spatial policies may for instance push for the creation of 
sustainable job opportunities across regions, the establishment of local economic 
development strategies in municipalities, the emergence of more transparent and effective 
Local government, speedy land reform and effective rural development. 
 
5.3.2. Optimizing distance to services and adhering to existing 
functional patterns    
 
A defining feature of affected residents‟ local conceptions of development has been 
the notion that their locality‟s wellbeing depends on its distance from major economic or 
political centres and the correspondence between its provincial location and the existing 
flow of goods, services and people. These views may not be misguided as many territorial 
demarcation guidelines consider them to be critical. The reality is that these criteria may be 
overlooked when they conflict with other factors considered more important. 
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When a clash can be anticipated between Government‟s plan and affected residents‟ 
preferences, it should be commendable to opt for the boundary arrangement that minimizes 
distance to services and adheres to existing transport, employment and spending patterns. A 
factor that helped to delay tensions in the Bushbuckridge boundary dispute between 1998 
and 2005 was the establishment of the municipality as the seventh region (district) within 
the Limpopo Province. This meant that all Government departments had to open offices in 
Bushbuckridge. The proximity of Government services made a difference in managing the 
protracted dispute.  
 
5.3.3. Promoting cross boundary services for provincial border 
localities 
 
Even with the most excellent optimisation using distance and functional patterns 
criteria, there may still exist towns or villages geographically closer to a different 
provincial jurisdiction. For these localities, accessing certain emergency services from a 
neighbouring province or district may just be more effective. In this case, quality services 
should not be denied just on the basis of administrative considerations.  
Government could put in place the necessary administrative tools that will make it 
possible for provincial border localities to access emergency services from the closest 
centre, be it in a different province or district. In the European Union, mechanisms have 
been put in place for border towns to be able to cooperate on a number of issues of mutual 
interest including conservation and emergency services (Hoffschulte, 2009). That these 
cross boundary services can even be implemented at interstate level makes it all the more 
compelling for them to be provided for at intrastate level. It is true that South Africa has no 
 167 
encouraging experience of what was called “cross boundary municipalities”. They had to 
be disestablished due to administrative complexities. However, targeted cross boundary 
services may be implemented in an improved administrative environment with more 
effective cooperative governance. The enabling context will have to precede the 
establishment of standard and targeted cross boundary services.  
 
5.3.4. Developing national standards on traditional authorities 
 
There should not be fears on the part of traditional authorities that they risk losing 
recognition or other related advantages by moving under a different provincial jurisdiction.  
In the context of Matatiele boundary dispute, concerns of this sort have contributed a great 
deal in shaping anti-KZN sentiments and deepening antagonism within the local 
population. Had there been more clarity and certainty on the fate of traditional authorities 
and other related matters such as cultural rights guarantees and land, the pro-Eastern Cape 
camp in Matatiele would have little to be concerned about if they were asked to fall under 
KZN jurisdiction. Interviews with traditional authorities in Bushbuckridge also revealed 
different institutional arrangements and treatment for traditional chiefs, headmen and 
members of traditional councils in Limpopo and Mpumalanga. This lack or poor 
implementation of national common standards creates uncertainty which informs resistance 
to provincial boundary change.  
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5.3.5. The democratic nature of territorial reforms decisions  
 
 A key finding of this research is that border dissent is shaped by both material 
conditions and local notions of democracy and development. This means that residents 
have opposed unfavourable demarcation policy not only on materialistic grounds, but also 
on an ideological basis. They have rejected a particular type of democracy or development 
reflected in the Government‟s policy and its decision-making process. For affected 
residents, it is important that decisions that so seriously affect their lives be not only 
procedurally democratic, but substantively so. The notion of popular democracy often 
advocated by dissidents does not always cohere with the current constitutional arrangement 
which envisages a representative and participatory form of democratic governance. 
Government officials have to educate their constituencies on the possibilities and limits of 
the current constitutional democratic order and have them accept that Government may not 
be bound to public opinion. Nevertheless, legislators have to do everything in their power 
to assure that their decisions are substantively democratic and are perceived so by affected 
constituencies.  
A number of elements of an undemocratic decision have particularly frustrated 
dissenting resident. The most recurring have been the following: absent or poor policy 
justification; non adhesion, especially by the national Government, to the principle of 
cooperative governance; systematic rejection of recommendations formulated by technical 
and independent state bodies such as the Municipal Demarcation Board; and “sham” public 
participation mechanisms. In improving the democratic character of territorial policies or 
any other policy, Government should pay particular attention to such elements.  
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5.3.6. Avoiding tight timeframe for provincial boundary change 
legislation 
 
The Khutsong and Matatiele boundary disputes were greatly affected by the lack of 
necessary time for deliberation and consultation on the Bill. In 2005, there was a pressure 
to finalise the process before the holding of March 2006 local elections. For the electoral 
calendar to be adhered to, municipal restructuring policies had to be concluded in 
December 2005 after only 2 months of engagement with affected communities. It is under 
these circumstances that the KZN provincial legislature omitted to facilitate involvement of 
the people of Matatiele in the legislative process. This was an omission that caused the 
legislation to be declared unconstitutional in 2006 though the order of unconstitutionality 
was suspended for 18 months to afford Government time to rectify the defect. In 2009, the 
Bill to return Khutsong to Gauteng was again rushed giving dissidents less time to engage 
legislators and raising accusations of political expediency. In both the Matatiele and 
Khutsong second rounds of legislative process, it was clear that public hearings were 
embarked upon just as a formality as the final decision had already been taken and even 
announced in the Khutsong case.  
Democratic and sound governance takes time. It is important that bills that aim at 
changing provincial boundaries be dealt with within a reasonably sufficient period and 
preferably long before elections.  
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5.3.7. Minimizing partisan and individual political interference in 
demarcation decisions  
 
The process of provincial boundary changes has always been a politically contested 
terrain. Political parties, interest groups and individuals have always sought to secure 
strategic interests such as political dominance, electoral advantage, political offices, 
tenders, existing political networks, and so on. Some of these interests may be antithetical 
to the public interest or the interests of the majority of affected communities. The three case 
studies considered in this research have revealed strategic political struggles between 
competing groups or individuals as well as gerrymandering allegations against the ruling 
party.  
A key starting point of this research has been that provincial boundary demarcation 
decisions are ultimately political. As such, they will remain a contested ground with various 
interest groups competing to advance sectional agendas. To minimize destabilizing effects 
and the disruptive potentials of such struggles, the State has to mediate among competing 
interests. As Gore puts it, development strategies or regional planning policies have to be 
understood as “the outcome of a negotiation of conflicting powerful interests in society 
mediated through the institutional apparatus of the state” (Gore, 1984: 247).  In doing so, 
the State has to ensure that public interest prevails over partisan or individual agendas. The 
three case studies have illustrated instances where strategic political struggles prevented the 
realization of the interests of the overwhelming majority. In the three instances, 
Government has considered reversing its early policy, but after years of violent conflict and 
associated destruction of property and social cohesion. To prevent such huge social, 
economic and political cost in the future, Government needs to ensure it minimizes the 
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interference of partisan and individual interests in the policy-making process. It has 
particularly to guard against using boundaries to promote the interests of a specific group 
or political party.   
 
5.4. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has provided a comparative discussion of the key arguments developed 
in each case study. In undertaking this cross-case studies analysis, this chapter sought to 
highlight parallels and contrasts. It has also provided explanations for these similarities and 
dissimilarities. This comparative exercise has further demonstrated the relevance of the 
explanatory framework which this thesis has developed in a bid to provide a socio-
economic and political account of post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes.  
The second section of the chapter has discussed policy implications emerging from 
this thesis. Seven propositions have been formulated not as ready-made prescriptions, but 
as ideas capable of stimulating debate and informing deliberation.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION: FRONTIERS OF PROSPERITY AND 
POWER 
 
This thesis has tackled both a practical and theoretical problem. Recurrent 
provincial boundary disputes have posed real challenges to the post-apartheid Government. 
They have been associated with high security, social, economic and political costs. In many 
respects, they have threatened the legitimacy of Government, especially at the local level.   
While these provincial border conflicts have been multiplying and intensifying, 
there has been limited social scientific research capable of explaining them. Existing 
literature exclusively focused on the early Bushbuckridge case. Besides, discussion of this 
first instance of post-apartheid provincial boundary dispute, though very enlightening, 
presents certain limitations. It has overly relied on socio-economic factors to account for 
the border dispute, paying little attention to the ideological and strategic underpinnings of 
the clashes. These deficiencies particularly came to light when, in 2005, there emerged in 
2005 other provincial boundary disputes in Khutsong, Matatiele, and Moutse. In the face of 
such countrywide political phenomenon, it became clear that early studies of the 
Bushbuckridge border dispute needed to be complemented in order to enrich our 
understanding of social, economic and political drivers of these territorial conflicts.  
Against this backdrop, this research has aimed at providing a socio-political 
explanatory framework for post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes. To achieve this 
objective, this thesis has employed a multiple case study approach. Some of the most well-
known cases of provincial boundary disputes in the post-apartheid era have been 
considered. These three instances of border disputes, namely the Bushbuckridge, Khutsong 
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and Matatiele cases, have involved all spheres of Government, at least six provinces and 
have collectively spanned from the transition period to the present time. A multiple case 
study methodology has yielded results that could hardly have been obtained with past 
single case study research of this phenomenon. Thanks to a concomitant examination of 
socio-political dynamics surrounding three cases of provincial boundary disputes, the thesis 
has been able to develop, through inductive reasoning, a general interpretative framework 
pertinent across cases, an enlightening view of parallels and contrasts as well as 
explanatory account of specificities.    
Throughout its five chapters, this thesis has demonstrated that post-apartheid 
provincial boundary disputes are complex socio-political phenomena which can best be 
accounted for by taking into account various socio-economic and political factors including 
the interplay between historically constituted material conditions of affected communities 
and their local notions of democracy and development, conflicting regional planning 
models, Government‟s democratic deficit, strategic political struggles and limits of judicial 
arbitration. While this list is by no means exhaustive, these are the most important factors 
that we have seen come into play in the three provincial boundary disputes. Interpreting 
these cases with this explanatory framework has clearly shown that under the veneer of 
provincial boundary disputes, disputants have actually been engaging in battles for socio-
economic emancipation, in ideological contestations and strategic political struggles. 
Physical provincial frontiers are fought over not because of any inherent importance, but 
mainly because they are represented as proxies for socio-economic prosperity and political 
power 
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In the three localities, residents‟ poor material conditions predisposed them to resist 
a policy they perceived would worsen their already precarious socio-economic situation. 
Besides, residents sought to secure improved material conditions by holding on their 
preferred provincial choice. That precarious material conditions played an important role in 
shaping border dissent is confirmed by the fact that more affluent white communities in 
Merafong and Hoespruit have not displayed similar resistance against North West or 
Limpopo. To avoid an overly materialistic explanation of these disputes, this thesis has 
emphasized the interplay between these material conditions and local notions of democracy 
and development. Democracy has often been construed as “people‟s power” in the sense 
that the view of the people must prevail even when they conflict with their representatives‟ 
collective choice. Development has been seen as facilitated by proximity to economic and 
political centres as well as by a provincial arrangement in line with existing transport, 
spending, and employment patterns.  
This material and ideological setting has led affected communities to adopt a 
territorial regional planning paradigm which places a premium on local interests and social 
equity. This model was bound to clash with the post-apartheid Government‟s 
predominantly functional approach into regional planning. Based on the notion that South 
Africa is a unitary state, the Government has often resisted people-driven territorial reforms 
as this may limit its power. Instead of demarcating communities in preferred provinces, the 
Government has repeatedly taken unpopular decisions in the name of promoting “equitable 
share”, viable provinces, population equilibrium, or the controversial goal of ethnic 
alignment.  
 175 
In pushing these policy goals, even against the force of popular resistance, the 
Government has inevitably failed to uphold key democratic values namely responsiveness, 
accountability, rationality, and participation. Perceptions of the Government‟s democratic 
deficit have deeply alienated affected residents, driving them to even stronger resistance for 
the sake of “safeguarding our democracy”. As far as democratic governance is concerned, 
the most perplexing for the analyst is less the deviation from majority view than absence or 
poor justification for such conduct.  
To understand why the Government would maintain its stand against protracted 
popular resistance to poorly justified policy, the analyst is led to acknowledge the influence 
of undeclared party, group and individual interests which necessarily interfere in 
demarcation policies. These strategic political struggles, assuming various forms including 
gerrymandering, preservation of one‟s political networks, consolidation or fear to lose one‟s 
political electoral base or constituency, and expectations of higher political offices 
profoundly shape provincial boundary demarcation decisions, prolong provincial border 
disputes and compound their resolution. Because most of these strategic interests can be 
veiled and maintained intact even through constitutionally adequate processes of public 
participation, Courts have proven unable to put to rest provincial boundary disputes. What 
their arbitration has often done is to return the conflict back to the already contested 
political arena. Courts‟ inability to offer desired relief to aggrieved communities may well 
be a result of a formal interpretation of the duty of public involvement and the use of a 
minimalist rationality test.  
One of the merits of this interpretative framework is to show the link between 
recurrent and protracted provincial boundary disputes and other socio-economic struggles 
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in the post-apartheid era. It also reflects how these conflicts intersect with other underlying 
contests for political power at local, provincial or even national level both within the ANC 
and among various political parties. Finally, it has brought to the fore the fragilities and 
limits of the post-apartheid democratic constitutional order. In a nutshell, post-apartheid 
provincial boundary disputes are deeply connected to ongoing socio-economic and political 
struggles. Under the appearance of provincial boundary disputes, disputants have actually 
been engaging in battles for socio-economic prosperity, in ideological contests and strategic 
political struggles.  
The argument developed in this thesis has both theoretical and practical value. On a 
theoretical level, it significantly enriches existing scholarship on regional planning in 
general and boundary disputes in South Africa. Socio-economic and political dynamics at 
play in the three instances of provincial boundary disputes constitute key factors that one is 
likely to observe in any post-apartheid provincial boundary dispute.  
The interpretative framework arising from the three case studies helps to explain 
not only instances of provincial boundary disputes, but also other post-apartheid political 
struggles. That is to say that the thesis has revealed socio-economic and political dynamics 
that are characteristic of post-apartheid politics. In this regard, this thesis has broader 
theoretical significance. 
On a practical level, this thesis has the potential to enlighten policy-making in the 
area of boundary demarcation and boundary disputes resolution. It is assumed that better 
understanding of the key drivers of provincial boundary disputes will help prevent and 
effectively manage such crises in the future. The thesis has formulated insights which can 
invigorate and guide deliberations in policy formulation circles. At a moment when at least 
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two provincial boundary disputes are unresolved
140
 and the Government seriously 
considers the plan to reduce the number of provinces,
141
 this thesis is most timely. 
 
 
                                               
140 At the time of completion of this research project, the Matatiele and Moutse provincial boundary disputes 
are still unresolved though the ANC leadership has succeeded in convincing residents that the matter will be 
settled favourably. Active protestation has thus subsided in these two areas. However, exchanges with Mr 
Nkontwana Nhlakanipho, advisor of the Minister of cooperative governance and traditional affairs revealed 
that any change of the current provincial boundary arrangement can only be carried out after the 2011 Local 
Government elections (interview with Mr Nkontwana Nhlakanipho, in Midrand, 07 July 2010).  
141 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/ANC-parks-discussion-on-provinces-20100923 ,accessed on 
01 February 2011; http://www.timeslive.co.za/Politics/article674048.ece/ANC-to-decide-on-provinces 
within-three-months ,accessed on 01 February 2011. The current debate on the future of provinces has also 
attracted scholarly attention (Ruiters, 2011).  
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APPENDIX 1: FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1. THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS  
 
It is opportune to elaborate further on the research process from which this thesis has 
stemmed. Attention shall be focused on detailing the process of data collection and the 
subsequent step of data analysis.  
Information collected for the purpose of writing this thesis has mainly been obtained 
through primary and secondary sources. Primary data were gathered through personal visits 
to the areas chosen as case studies namely Bushbuckridge, Khutsong, Matatilele; through 
individual interviews or focus group interviews and through observation. Secondary 
materials have included sources such as several newspaper reports, Court materials, 
legislation, policy documents, municipal reports, public submission to Parliament and 
provincial legislatures, and various other reports. Let us specify each of these data collection 
sources in turn.  
1.1. Primary sources 
1.1.1. Individual and focus group interviews  
1.1.1.1. Bushbuckridge  
In the course of this research, I visited the municipality of Bushbuckridge on three 
occasions: from 27 April to 6 May 2007, from 15 November 2007 to 22 November 2007 and 
from 18 August 2010 to 24 August 2010. The two visits in 2007 were merely exploratory and 
were linked with other research projects at the Wits Rural Facility in the vicinity of 
Acornhoek (Bushbuckridge). The third visit was specifically devoted to the conduct of 
interviews and collection of additional data. My visits helped develop familiarity with the 
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geographical setting, human settlement patterns and socio-economic realities of the 
Bushbuckridge area.  
On my third trip to Bushbuckridge, I managed to interview the following persons:   
Themba Godi. 2010. Member of Parliament, President of ACP, and former secretary of 
BBCC, Telephone interview: 9 August. 
Reinas Khumalo. 2010. ANC councilor and Chief whip of the Bushbuckridge municipal 
council, Bushbuckridge: 20 August. 
Andries Mapayila. 2010. Municipal manager of the Bushbuckridge municipality, 
Bushbuckridge: 20 August. 
Kgoshi Mokoena. 2010. Chief of the Mathibela traditional authority and former member of 
Parliament, Mathibela traditional authority: 21 August. 
Maurice Ndlovu. 2010. Secretary of COSATU-Bushbuckridge, leader in DENOSA, health 
professional, Bushbuckridge: 22 August. 
Prince Ndlovu. 2010. Former leader of BBCC, Hazyview: 22 August. 
Matome Malatji. 2010. Communication manager of the municipality of Bushbuckridge, 
Bushbuckridge: 22 August. 
Dibakoane Noel. 2010. Councillor in the municipality of Bushbuckridge, Shatale: 23 August.  
 
  Selection of participants was guided by the need to capture the views and 
experiences of actors in the Bushbuckridge saga as well as current municipal authorities. 
With regard to this particular case study, the number of interviewees was kept to a minimum 
as significant information on the border dispute had already been captured in existing 
literature. The dispersed human settlement pattern made visits and the conduct of interviews 
particularly challenging.  
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1.1.1.2. Khutsong 
 
The municipality of Merafong is within easy reach from Johannesburg. This made 
possible several visits and participant observation in the area. I made six visits to the 
municipality of Merafong on these dates: 15 February 2009 (exploratory visit); 21 February 
2009 (General elections rally in Khutsong), 25 February 2009 (Public hearing in 
Carletonville); 3 March 2009 (interviews); 7 March 2009 (interviews); and 12 March 2009 
(interviews).   The process of data collection on the Khutsong case study also took me 
Mafikeng (Mmabato) and Gauteng provincial legislature in Central Johannesburg for 
interviews with members of the provincial legislatures. I also took part in three sessions of 
the portfolio committee on Local Government of the Gauteng Legislature. As for the 
Busbbuckridge case study, the choice of interviewees was guided by the need to get 
information from main protagonists on both sides of the dispute and from opposition parties 
such as DA, FF, and UCDP. Here is the list of interviewees:   
 
Yvonne Ntshabele. 2009. Teacher at Badirile School in Khutsong, Branch Executive member 
of SACP in Khutsong and Secretary of Merafong Demarcation Forum, Khutsong: 1 March.  
Gladys Matshoele. 2009. Treasurer of SACP Khutsong and Merafong Demarcation Forum 
organiser. Khutsong: 1 March. 
Paul Willenburg, 2009. DA MPL in Gauteng provincial legislature, Johannesburg:  3 March. 
Herman Droenewand, 2009. DA MPL in North West provincial legislature, 
Mmabatho(Mafikeng): 09 March. 
Chris Hattingh, 2009. DA MPL in North West provincial legislature, Mmabatho(Mafikeng): 
09 March. 
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Jack Bloom. 2009. DA chief whip Gauteng provincial legislature, Johannesburg: 5 March. 
Andrew Gerber. 2009. Freedom Front Plus MPL in North West provincial legislature, 
Mmabatho(Mafikeng): 9 March. 
Jomo Mogale. 2009. Spokesperson of the Merafong Demarcation Forum, Khutsong: 07 
March. 
Mahlakeng. 2009. ANC MPL and chairperson of the portfolio committee on Local 
Government, North West Provincial legislature, Mmabatho (Mafikeng): 9 March. 
Refiloe Letwaba. 2009. ANC MPL and chairperson of the portfolio committee on Local 
Government, Gauteng provincial legislature, Johannesburg: 12 March 2009. 
Malusi. 2009. UCDP MPL in North West provincial legislature, Wedela (Merafong): 12 
March. 
 
1.1.1.3. Matatiele  
Visit to Matatiele municipality took place from 07 November 2009 to 15 November 2009. I 
also visited surrounding rural areas and farms. Interviewees were drawn from the municipal 
council, traditional authorities, civil society and various interest groups including members of 
the tripartite alliance (SACP-COSATU-ANC), and local taxi associations. The field work on 
the Matatiele case study also took me New Cattle in KZN where I had to interview the 
Chairperson of the portfolio committee on Local Government and traditional affairs in KZN 
provincial legislature. An IFP member of the same committee was interviewed in 
Johannesburg. Here is the list of all interviewees with whom I exchanged on the Matatiele 
case study:  
Bhengu.  2009. KZN IFP MPL, Johannesburg: 3 April. 
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Kelibone Florencia Mankayi. 2009. Chairperson of UNCEDO Matatiele Taxi Association 
(MUSTA), Matatiele: 11 November. 
 
Kubheka, Mbuso. 2009. KZN ANC MPL and Chairperson of the portfolio committee on 
Local Government and traditional affairs, Newcastle: 05 April. 
 
Jeremiah Moshoeshoe, 2009. Traditional authority, Ongeluksnek farms (Matatiele): 8 
November. 
 
Mandla, Galo, 2009. AIC President, leader in the MMMAOC and Matatiele Poverty 
Alleviation Network and MPL in EC province, Matatiele, 8 November.  
 
Klopper, M. 2009 , Resident of Matatiele, Matatiele: 8 November. 
 
Hehlehla, E. T. 2009. headman of chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe, Ongeluksnek farms 
(Matatiele): 8 November. 
 
Tsoeli Mapulane, Njobe Maradebe, NG Makae, residents and street vendors, Matatiele: 9 
November. 
 
Makolwa, 2009. AIC councillor in the municipality of Matatiele, Matatiele: 9 November  
 
Anonymous teachers, Matatiele: 10 November 2009. 
 
Anonymous. 2009. ANC councillor of the municipality of Matatiele,  Matatiele: 10 
November. 
 
Gebashe, Thabani Samson. 2009. ANC Councillor and ward councillor 9, Matatiele: 10 
November. 
 
Libenya. 2009. Traditional chief, Matatiele: 10 November. 
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Macoba, Nomonde Primrose. 2009. ANC councillor and ward councillor 10, Matatiele, 10 
November. 
 
  
Mankayi, Kelibone Florencia. 2009. Member of the Uncedo Matatiele Taxi association, 
Matatiele, 11 November. 
 
Mhlonyane, Mayibongwe. 2009. Member of the Uncedo Matatiele Taxi association, 
Matatiele, 11 November. 
 
Lebeko, Davidson M. 2009.  The chairperson of the Drakensberg Taxi association, Matatiele, 
11 November. 
 
To discuss the phenomenon of post-apartheid provincial boundary disputes with 
reference to the three areas considered in this study, I interviewed an official of the 
Department of cooperative governance and traditional affairs: Nkontwana, Nhlakanipho, 
advisor to the Minister of provincial and cooperative governance, at Midrand, on 17 July  
1.1.2. Observation  
 
I took part to the following meetings:  
 
1. Meeting of Gauteng legislature‟s Local Government portfolio committee: 20 February 
2009 
 
The agenda included the briefing by the NCOP delegate on the Constitution of the RSA 
Sixteenth Amendment Bill, 2009 in conjunction with the Cross-Boundary Municipalities 
Laws Repeal and Related matters Amendment Bill.  
2. General elections rally in Khutsong: 21 February 2009.  
 
3. Public hearing session in Carletonville: 25 February 2009. 
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4. Meeting of Gauteng legislature‟s Local Government portfolio committee: 26 February 
2009. 
 
The agenda included the adoption of the Negotiating Mandate on the Constitution of the RSA 
Sixteenth Amendment Bill, 2009 in conjunction with the Cross-Boundary Municipalities 
Laws Repeal and Related matters Amendment Bill.  
 
5. Meeting of Gauteng legislature‟s Local Government portfolio committee: 3 March 2009 
 
The agenda included among other items a presentation by the Department of Local 
Government on the Committee‟s Focused Intervention Study (FIS) topic: The assessment of 
Pubic Participation in Local Government: Public Participation in their localities –successes 
and challenges.  
 
6. Meeting of Gauteng legislature‟s Local Government portfolio committee: 6 March 2010 
 
The agenda included adoption of the Final Voting Mandate on the Constitution of the RSA 
Sixteenth Amendment Bill, 2009 in conjunction with the Cross-Boundary Municipalities 
Laws Repeal and Related matters Amendment Bill. 
 
1.2. Secondary sources 
 
Secondary source materials have included:  
-Newspaper reports  
-Court materials  
-Legislations 
- Policy documents  
-Municipal reports  
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-Public submissions to Parliament and provincial legislatures  
2. THE DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS  
 
This research made use of thematic content analysis in interpreting collected data. 
The five key factors presented as parts of the interpretative framework for understanding 
provincial boundary disputes in the post apartheid era are a result of an inductive reasoning 
process.  
 
3. AREAS OF DISCUSSION DURING INTERVIEWS  
 
Interviews focussed on exploring participants‟ understanding of the key drivers of a 
specific provincial boundary dispute. The conversation further probed interviewees‟ 
perception and evaluation of various strategies mobilized by disputants in a bid to advance 
their cause. Questions were asked differently depending on the position of the interviewee 
either as a supporter of the Government, of dissenting local communities or an impartial 
observer.  
Areas of discussion or themes included the following questions:  
 
1. The national government knew very well that residents preferred Gauteng to North West 
(Khutsong), KwaZulu Natal to Eastern Cape (Matatiele), Mpumalanga to Limpopo 
(Bushbuckridge), why did it not accept such preference from the outset?  
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2. Do you think that local residents are justified in dissenting with State regional policy (in 
the way it affects them)? Why?  
 
3. Why, in your view, local residents have used illegitimate means (violence, etc) to voice 
their opposition?  
 
4. To what extent the Government strategy, the dissent of residents and their strategies of 
resistance are informed by ethnic factors? ( in other words: Does ethnicity play a role in State 
demarcation decisions, in the way residents resist the State, and in strategies of resolving the 
conflict? If yes, are such manifestations of ethnic consciousness in conflict with the building 
of national or provincial identity?  
 
5. Do residents‟ claims to determine their provincial location threaten the unitary character of 
the South African State?  
 
6. Boundary disputes are instances where representatives at provincial and national level, 
have promoted policies that are contradictory to the preferences of constituencies whose 
interests they are supposed to uphold.  Is it accurate to state that in these instances, 
representatives have betrayed their constituencies?  
 
7. Are there indications that some representatives felt divided between support for a national 
policy and the need to uphold interests of their local constituencies?  
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8. To what extent residents‟ concerns about service delivery or development prospects are 
valid and justified by facts?  
 
9. What imperatives can justify severing a municipality from a province to which it seems 
more functionally linked?  
 
10. As far as service delivery is concerned, do you think that residents‟ refusal to belong to an 
ineffective or poor province is perceived as a matter of life or death?  
 
11. Have the dissent and the escalation of the dispute displayed party or alliance divisions? 
How decisive were such divisions in precipitating or exacerbating the conflict?  
 
12. Do you think that the crisis (in its eruption and escalation) has been shaped by personal 
interests as well (at provincial level, national level, or local level)? Can you illustrate?  
 
13. Do you think that the way a particular person or institution has handled the issue of 
boundary demarcation or boundary dispute has had a bad or a good impact on the whole 
process or on the dispute?    
 
14. Why would residents of the dissenting local community have “emotional attachments” to 
their preferred province?  
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15. As far as the legislation on the scrapping of cross-boundary municipalities is concerned, 
what are the most important processes that took place between the presidential committee 
resolution in 2001 and the referral of the matter to the municipal Demarcation Board?  
 
16. Why did the National Assembly start the process of adopting the legislation that had the 
effect of re-demarcating certain municipalities (Constitution twelfth amendment Act and the 
cross-boundary municipalities repeal Act) while the Municipal Demarcation Board was still 
in the process of consulting with municipalities with regard to those changes? How can one 
explain such duplication of processes?  
 
17. What has been the Municipal Demarcation Board decision with regard to the three areas 
(Bushbuckridge, Khutsong, Matatiele)?  
 
18. How was the legislation studied, debated and passed in provincial legislatures, in 
National Council of Provinces (NCOP), and in the National Assembly?  
 
19. How were the representations of some dissenting communities dealt with at the 
Municipal Demarcation Board level, in provincial legislatures and in Parliament?  
 
20. How has Government (at the local level, provincial level, national level) responded in 
face of local residents‟ disapproval of the demarcation decision?  
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21. What has been the nature of engagement or interaction between resistant local 
communities and Government?  
 
22. How satisfactory was your (communities‟) previous status of “cross-boundary 
municipality” or your previous provincial location?  
 
23. What strategies did the community put in place to ensure it was not detached from their 
preferred province?  
 
24. Why has Bushbuckridge been finally demarcated in Mpumalanga after the State had for 
years resisted such outcome?  
 
25. From the time the community knew it was demarcated in the “wrong” province, what did 
it do?  With what effects?  
 
26. How crucial is the role of the Constitutional Court in having these disputes settled? 
 
  
 
